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Abstract 
China has undertaken a series of comprehensive economic and banking reform 
programs over the past three decades. As part of the WTO agreement, the domestic 
financial sector is fully open to foreign investors from WTO member countries in 
2006. To answer the challenges, the policy makers and management of SOCB have 
been introducing two major steps to improve the Competitiveness of the commercial 
banks: transfer the bad debts to asset management companies and inject foreign 
exchange reserves to capital. However, the qualitative study shows that the general 
performance of the state-owned commercial banks is unstable during this period. It is 
high time that the consequences and efficiency of the reform were examined on an 
objective basis. This research offers a careful and rigorous examination of the 
condition and determinants of banking efficiency and competitiveness in China, with 
the focus on the state-owned commercial banks. The key contribution of this study is 
to develop a comprehensive empirical framework to measure and explain the 
performance of the state-owned commercial banks during the crucial transitional 
period from 1998 to 2003.  
This research examines the banking market conditions on the basis of a synthesis of 
the traditional Structure-Conduct-Performance paradigm and other alternative 
hypotheses. The thesis reveals that the state-owned commercial banks still dominate 
in both retail and business banking markets. The interest earnings remain the 
dominant source of commercial revenues.  Due to the special relationship with 
government and their operational characters in the financial market, the state-owned 
commercial banks are not sensitive to monetary policy adjustments. The competition 
from other type of commercial banks has been strengthening, but the impact is rather 
limited.  
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The main contribution of this study to the empirical literature on the Chinese banking 
market is the employment of the Data Envelopment Analysis to measure the 
efficiency of the state-owned commercial banks at provincial level, followed by a 
panel econometric investigation into the differences in banking efficiency across the 
stat-owned commercial banking groups as well as individual provinces. The results 
show that the level of banking efficiency was generally very low and there was a 
significant extent of input surplus among the provincial branches. The source of 
inefficiency is different among individual banking groups. The econometric study 
reveals that the SOCBs benefit from the concentrated market structure and strong 
complementary relationship with their traditional business areas.  The empirical 
results have also shed light on further policy measures to enhance banking 
competition and performance in China. 
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Chapter I. Introduction 
 
1.1 Background of the current study 
After three decades of market-oriented reform, the Chinese banks are considered to be 
successful facing the financial crisis in 2008. The three floated Chinese banks (ICBC, 
BOC and CCB) ―are now the world's largest by market value after the financial crisis 
destroyed the value of most US and European banks‖ (BBC news, 2009). An 
increasing amount of theoretical and empirical studies have examined the challenges 
and opportunities facing the Chinese banking industry from 1990s (e.g. Xu, 1998; 
Lardy, 1998; Huang, 1998; Chen, et. al., 2005; Fu and Heffernan, 2007). A critical 
analysis of the Chinese banking sector in the broad context of China‘s accession to the 
WTO and economic reform is highly significant. 
 
A large body of theoretical and empirical studies have established that greater 
financial development fosters growth and that financial development is related to a 
country‘s institutional characteristics, including its legal framework (Levine and 
Haubrich, 2004). A cross-country literature has found that growth in external 
dependent sectors is faster with more-competitive banking systems (Claessens and 
Laeven, 2004). Well-developed financial markets make it easier for firms to attract 
needed financing (Rajan and Zingales, 1998) as well as for improving the overall 
economic efficiency through risk-taking, risk-sharing and risk-reduction 
mechanisms offered by the modern banking and financial facilities. Although some 
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of the relationships between competition and banking system performance have 
been analysed in the theoretical literature and even empirically in some country 
studies, cross-country empirical research has so far mainly investigated the effects of 
regulations and specific structural or other factors on banking performance. For 
example, in a broad survey of rules governing banking systems, Barth et al. (2001) 
document for 107 countries various regulatory restrictions that were in place in 1999 
on commercial banks, including various entry and exit restrictions and practices. 
Using this data, Barth et al. (2004) document (among other things) that tighter entry 
requirements are negatively linked with bank efficiency, leading to higher 
interest-rate margins and overhead expenditures, and that restricting foreign bank 
participation tends to increase bank fragility. 
 
The importance of a modern banking and financial sector is vividly illustrated by the 
historical experiences in both the developed and developing countries. At the 
beginning of the 1990s, the sudden stagnation of the bubble-inflated Japanese 
economy was predated with the collapse of the banking and financial markets. 
Japan's high growth period came to an abrupt end. Japanese banks faced a massive 
overhang of bad loans. It is suggested that absence to undertake a number of 
―unconventional and bold‖ monetary policy measure put a drag on the economic 
recovery and an inefficient banking system is one of the central factors underlying 
the Japanese ―lost decade‖ in the 1990s (Saxonhouse and Stern, 2003). In contrast, 
the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD), which 
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groups together the world's most advanced economies, assesses the British economy 
as among the strongest in the developed world in 1990s (OECD, 2001). Prior to the 
2008-2009 global financial and economic crisis, the UK economy enjoyed 
significantly lower unemployment and inflation rates and higher GDP growth rate 
than most of the developed countries for the previous two decades (Riley, 2006). 
Rajan and Zingales (1998) examined the relation between economic growth in 
different industries and countries and the interaction of financial development of 
countries and the financial dependence of industries. Their report showed that there 
is a particularly strong relation when accounting standards are used as the measure 
of financial development of countries. They conclude that their results ―suggest that 
financial development has a substantial supportive influence on the rate of economic 
growth and this works, at least partly, by reducing the cost of external finance to 
financially dependent firms‖ (Rajan & Zingales, 1998, p584).  
 
In the developing world, several waves of bank crises have hit the Latin American 
countries‘ banking system since the 1980s. Many countries take a series of measures 
to reform their malfunctioned banking system, including financial liberalisation and 
strengthened regulatory regimes (Park and Wang, 2001). In many cases, these 
reforms were successful in strengthening banking system and averting banking crisis. 
Transparent and prudential regulatory and supervisory frameworks played an 
important role in the successful countries (Hilbers et. al, 2005). In others such as the 
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case in Argentina, however, the efforts were less successful and the banking and 
financial systems suffered repeated crises in the new millennium.  
 
The Chinese banking industry has started to be restructured with the establishment of 
the Construction Bank and Bank of China since 1978. Many packages of reform have 
been introduced in stages to fundamentally strengthen the efficiency and 
competitiveness of the Chinese domestic banks, especially the state-owned 
commercial banks, over the past three decades. However, the measures that have been 
taken do not seem to have resulted in the desired effects. According to the official 
estimates, the rate of non-performing loans in the big four state-owned commercial 
banks, which stood at 2.5 trillion Yuan (equivalent to US$3.0 trillion at the current 
exchange rate) by the end of 2004, was 14.98% of the total bank loans (Liu, 2005). 
This figure is deemed to be underestimated because of the devious rating system. The 
inefficient allocation system, personnel management system and operational 
mechanism make many important reform measures sterile. The Chinese banking 
system needs a comprehensive shakeup.  
 
The prospect of economic growth and gigantic amount of deposits are fascinating to 
international investors. The growth target of the Chinese economy is 8% per annum, 
as announced in the Prime Minister‘s government operational report (Wen, 2009). 
This rate of growth is believed by some analysts to be feasible for the next ten to 
twenty years (Liu, 2009). The currently stable political environment is regarded to be 
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conducive for the realisation of the growth potential for the foreseeable future. The 
amount of deposits was 25.3 trillion Yuan by the end of 2004 (PBC, 2005). China‘s 
entry to the WTO provides the international investors ample opportunities to tap into 
the huge potential in the Chinese market. According to the WTO agreement, within 
five years after accession to the WTO, foreign financial institutions will be permitted 
to provide services in China without restriction on either clients or geographic 
coverage. Some foreign banks have already staked out the ground. In 2004, HSBC 
took a 19.9% stake in the Bank of Communications (HSBC, 2004). In the year before, 
Citigroup owned 4.62% of Pudong Development Bank (Citigroup, 2003). The 
international shareholders make the domestic bank to take more prudential operational 
strategies. According to an official source from the Pudong Development Bank, the 
banking group has benefited from the Citigroup‘s interpellation since 2003 (Pudong 
Development Bank Annual Report, 2004). Moreover, some city banks are preparing 
to issue share on the stock market. The government injected US$ 45 billion of foreign 
exchange reserve to the Bank of China and the Construction Bank to enhance their 
capital adequacy ratios (ACFB, 2005). The State Council established a new regulatory 
institution, China Banking Regulatory Commission, to supervise the commercial 
banks. 
 
1.2 Research aims and objectives 
In the light of the recent trends in both the world and Chinese economies, especially 
the banking sector, also given the overwhelming dominance of the state-owned 
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commercial banks in China, the aims of the current research are to define, measure 
and evaluate the factors underlying the competitiveness of the Chinese state-owned 
banking sector in the context of recent economic and banking reforms from 1998 to 
2003. More specifically, the current study attempts to achieve the following 
objectives: 
 To examine the evolution of the functions and market structure of the Chinese 
banking sector over the period of economic reform. 
 To reveal the efficiency of the Chinese state-owned commercial banks at 
provincial level.  
 To assess how the competitiveness of the Chinese state-owned banking sector is 
affected by economic, market, bank-specific and institutional factors. 
 
1.3 Research methods 
The structure of the remainder of the thesis is as follows. Chapter 2 provides an 
overview on the economic and banking reform process in China in the past three 
decades. The focus is on the banking regulatory framework, general banking market 
conditions and market structure. Chapter 3 examines the internal organisation, 
competitive strategies, business models and general financial performance of 
individual banking groups. Chapter 4 reviews the main theoretical literature on the 
measurement and determination of banking performance. Details of the empirical 
research on the Chinese state-owned banks and the main research findings are 
presented in Chapters 5 and 6. The final chapter concludes.  
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The current study provides a synthesis and critical review of the literature on banking 
efficiency measurement and determination. In light of the theoretical controversy 
surrounding the definition and measurement of banking output, market conditions and 
data limitations, this thesis adopts a bank production function approach to examine 
the efficiency of the Chinese SOCBs over the period 1998-2003. Applying Data 
Envelopment Analysis (DEA) and decomposition analysis, this thesis conducts a 
thorough investigation into the technical input efficiencies of the Chinese SOCBs at 
the provincial level. Subsequently, a panel econometric approach is adopted to 
determine the significant factors underlying the differences in banking efficiencies 
across the state-owned banking groups as well as the Chinese provinces. For the 
econometric model, a random individual effects model is found to be best suited for 
the empirical investigation through rigorous empirical testing. Alternative theoretical 
hypotheses about the relationship between market condition, market structure, bank 
conduct and performance are incorporated into the econometric model and 
empirically tested. To the best knowledge of the author, the current study represents 
the first attempt to examine the Chinese state-owned banking sector at the provincial 
level. 
 
1.4 Main findings 
The empirical results show that, despite decades of rigorous efforts by the Chinese 
central government to reform the banking sector, the level of efficiency for the whole 
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state-owned commercial banking sector remained very low throughout the study 
period. As a result, there was a significant extent of input surpluses: even by 2003, 
around 50% of the main inputs to the banking production process, e.g., bank branches, 
number of employees and bank cards could be cut to achieve the most efficient levels 
of banking outputs. The empirical results also reveal significant differences in 
banking efficiency across the banking groups as well as the 31 Chinese mainland 
provinces. In trying to explain such differences, the empirical tests lend strong support 
to the institutional complementarity and the traditional structure-conduct-performance 
hypotheses and in the mean time reject the relative market power hypothesis. It 
appears that the SOCBs benefit from a concentrated market structure and the strong 
relationship with the traditionally established areas of businesses. Such relationships 
confer a significant advantage on a particular banking group at the expense of the 
other groups. The empirical results also led to some conclusions about policy 
implications.  
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Chapter II. Evolution of the Chinese Banking Industry 
 
2.1 The overall banking system in China 
Before 1979, the People‘s Bank of China (PBC) was the only bank in China. It played 
the dual role of being both the Central Bank and the commercial bank. The Chinese 
government began to reconstruct the banking system with the establishment of 
specialised banks and entry of foreign banks from 1979. The four specialised banks, 
including the Industrial and Commercial Bank (ICBC), Construction Bank (CCB), 
Bank of China (BOA) and Agriculture Bank of China (ABC), were set up from 1979 
to 1984. As the separate business scope gradually diminished, these banks became 
commercial banks in the late 1980s. Foreign banks began to operate in 1979, led by 
the Bank of East Asia. The joint-stock commercial banks, city commercial banks and 
asset management banks were set up in the 1990s. By the end of 2006, the institutions 
of Chinese banking system included 5 state-owned commercial banks, 3 policy banks, 
12 joint-stock commercial banks, 4 asset management companies, 113 city 
commercial banks, 78 urban credit cooperatives, 19348 rural credit cooperatives, 13 
rural commercial banks, 80 rural cooperative bank, 70 Business groups affiliated 
finance companies, 54 trust and investment companies, 6 financial-leasing companies 
and 1 Postal Savings Bank and. In addition, there were also 209 foreign bank 
branches and 242 foreign representative offices (ACFB, 2007). 
 
Even before China‘s accession to the WTO in 2001, the government began to 
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reconstruct the banking system. Four asset management companies were set up in 
1998 and 1999 specifically to resolve the huge amount of non-performing loans of the 
four state-owned commercial banks. They took over about 1.4 trillion Yuan 
(equivalent to US$170 billion at the current exchange rate) of non-performing loans 
(ACFB, 2001) (an extensive evaluation of non-performing loans in the banking sector 
under the ‗performance section‘ in Chapter 3). The China Banking Regulatory 
Commission (CBRC) was set up in 2003, specializing in the supervision and 
management of commercial banks, asset management companies and other deposit 
financial institutions. The government recapitalized the Bank of China and the 
Construction Bank in 2004 (ACFB, 2005) and the Industrial and Commercial Bank in 
2005(ACFB, 2006). They are all listed on both the Shanghai and Hong Kong stock 
markets. CCB, BOC and ICBC were listed on Hong Kong stock market in October 
2005, June 2006 and October 2006, on Shanghai stock market in September 2007, 
July 2006 and October 2006(ACFB, 2006-2008). On the other hand, the foreign banks 
are interested in investing in the opening market. HSBC, headquartered in London, 
took nearly 20 percent stakes in China‘s Bank of Communications (Yi, 2009). A few 
foreign banks have shown their interest to float on the Shanghai stock market (Cai, 
2009).  
 
Over the past five years, capital injections, tax exemptions and the introduction of 
foreign investors have mended the pace of the reform of the Chinese banking system. 
The major Chinese commercial banks have improved their capital and asset structures 
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remarkably (ACFB, 2007). Three of the four SOCBs, ICBC, CCB and BOC, have 
changed their ownership structure after the successfully IPOs on Hong Kong and 
Shanghai stock exchanges (the details of ownership structure will be discussed in 
section 5 in this chapter). Their financial performance has been dramatically improved 
after the stock market flotation. All of the four SOCBs claimed they have achieved a 
significant business success in 2007 (ICBC, ABC, BOC and CCB‘s Annual Report, 
2008). ABC was the most profitable bank in 2007(ABC‘s Annual Report, 2008). The 
joint stock commercial banks have also developed their business aggressively, 
although a number of them are still facing serious deterioration in their balance sheets 
(A brief introduction to the joint stock commercial banks will be provided in section 
6). So far, the Chinese banking system has turned down the fears that it will fall into 
serious disarray in the near future and the SOCBs have become the world‘s largest 
banks in the last two years (BBC news, 2009). On the other hand, the Chinese banks 
have started to invest in the foreign capital market. But most of the investments have 
turned out to be unsuccessful (Jiang, 2008). The Chinese banks still have a long way 
to go to strengthen the modern functions of risk management, corporate governance 
and new banking businesses on both domestic and international markets. 
 
Most recently, the main thrust of banking reform has been directed at the competitive 
capabilities and efficiency within individual banking groups of the SOCBs. 
Significant amounts of resources and efforts have been deployed to increase their 
business scope, improve banking and financial services, strengthen the internal 
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management and risk control systems, and increase operational autonomy. Since 2002 
the SOCBs have gained more autonomy in deciding their deposit and lending rates 
(Bi, 2006). More recently, apart from the traditional wholesale and retail banking 
businesses, the Chinese SOCBs have also adopted the universal banking model to 
venture into other fee-based or capital-gains-based banking and financial investment 
activities (apart from investing in the stock market). Due to the increasing complexity 
and risk of modern banking, the SOCBs have implemented measures to instil an 
independent credit culture and equip the credit managers with modern systems to 
monitor various elements of risks. This includes the adoption of 5-cateloge loan 
classification system (ACFB, 2003) and plans to set up the internal rating-based (IRB) 
loan systems (consistent with Basle II regulations). The risk management function has 
been separated from the business function. Internal audit and compliance systems 
have also been strengthened to safeguard against fraud through system upgrading and 
staff training. At the operational level, the SOCBs have implemented changes to 
consolidate operations and increase efficiency. During 2002-2005 the number of 
branches of the big four has declined by 27 percent while the number of employees 
has declined by 7 percent (shown in Table 5). How successful such efforts are in 
improving banking efficiency and competitiveness within individual banking groups 
remains an open question. Finding a sensible answer is the key task of the current 
study. 
 
Despite the relative decline, due to their vast banking infrastructure as well as political 
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and historical reasons, the SOCBs still dominate the retail banking market and the 
business banking market for the state-owned enterprises. In 2005, the SOCBs 
accounted for a market share of 63 percent of consumer deposits and 70 percent of 
consumer loans. On the corporate side, the SOCBs shared 75 percent of the deposits 
and about 70 percent of corporate loans in 2005. As China‘s bond and equity markets 
are still at the nascent stage, the SOCBs remain the most important source of finance 
for Chinese non-financial institutions (see Table 1 below) and the largest employers of 
banking employees (56 percent in 2005)
1
. 
 
Table 1. Source of finance for China's domestic economy (percent) 
 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006H1 
Bank loans 75.9 80.2 85.1 82.9 78.1 86.8 
Government bonds 15.7 14.4 10 10.8 9.5 1.4 
Corporate bonds 0.9 1.4 1 1.1 6.4 6.1 
Equity issuance 7.6 4 3.9 5.2 6 5.6 
Total 100 100 100 100 100 100 
2006 H1: first half of 2006 
Note: The figures are derived out from ACFB 2002-2007. The shares are the amount 
of the bank loans, government bonds, corporate bonds and equity issuance divided by 
the total amount of the source of the domestic economy respectively. 
 
                                                        
1 Unless stated otherwise, all the figures in this section are derived from the data contained in the 
Almanac of China‘s Finance and Banking. 
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2.2 Stages of reforming the Chinese SOCBs 
The People‘s Bank of China (PBC) was incorporated by North China Bank, North Sea 
Bank and Northwest Peasantry Bank in 1948 (PBC, 2004a). Before 1979, China‘s 
economy operated under a central planning system and the PBC played the dual role 
of being both the central bank and commercial bank. As a matter of fact, the PBC was 
not functioning as a normal banking institution but rather as an auxiliary resource 
allocation mechanism in a central-planning economy. The amounts and destinations 
of bank loans as well as the interest rates were all determined by the State Planning 
Commission together with the central fiscal and monetary authorities (Ministry of 
Finance and the PBC). As a major plank of the market-oriented economic reform 
programmes that started in 1979, the Chinese government began to reform and 
restructure the banking system. As the Chinese banking reform programme 
concerning the whole sector has been extensively discussed in the literature (see, e.g., 
Li, et al., 2001; Chen, et. al., 2005; Fu and Heffernan, 2007, 2009; Lin and Zhang, 
2008), this section only attempts to map out the key milestones in the reform process 
concerning the state-owned banks. Based on the history of the reform and Fu and 
Heffernan‘s literature, the reform process can be divided into the following four key 
stages. 
i). Separation of the People‘s Bank of China (PBC) from commercial banking 
and establishment of specialised state-owned banks (1979 – 1993). The focus 
of the early stage of the banking reform was on the establishment of the PBC 
exclusively as the central bank, together with the establishment of 
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state-owned specialised banks and the acceptance of entry by foreign banks 
from 1979. The specialised banks, including the Industrial and Commercial 
Bank (ICBC), China Construction Bank (CCB), Bank of China (BOC) and 
Agriculture Bank of China (ABC), were set up from 1979 to 1984 to serve 
the specific needs that arose from the implementation of the Chinese 
government economic plans in designated areas. They are the so-called ―big 
four‖ in banking industry in China. Bank of East Asia was the first foreign 
bank operated in 1979. The ICBC, CCB, BOC and ABC were all allowed to 
accept deposit and to engage in lending in the mid-1980s. This is the 
beginning of commercialisation of the ―big four‖ (PBC, 2004b). 
ii). Commercialisation of the big four state-owned specialised banks (1994 – 
1998). In order to separate policy needs from commercial considerations 
within the state-owned specialised banks, several policy-oriented banks such 
as China Development Bank, the Export-import Bank of China and 
Agricultural Development Bank of China were set up under the direct control 
of the State Council in 1994 (ACFB, 1995). The restriction on each banking 
group to operate in designated areas of business was also removed. The 
financial supervision institutions were being specialised in this period, 
including China Securities Regulatory Commission and China Insurance 
Regulatory Commission. The PBC is still the only supervisory authority in 
banking industry. 
iii). Management of assets and especially non-performing loans of the SOCBs 
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(1998 – 2002). Throughout the 1980s and 1990s, since the SOCBs were 
obliged to lending almost exclusively to the inefficient state-owned 
non-financial sectors, a significant amount of bad loans had accumulated. 
Towards the end of the 1990s, the official estimate of the proportion of bad 
loans among the SOCBs was over 25 percent (ACFB, 2001). So a pressing 
agenda for the subsequent reform programme was to make the SOCBs 
commercially viable. Four asset management companies (AMCs) were set up 
in 1999 specifically to resolve the huge amount of non-performing loans of 
the SOCBs. They took over about 1.4 trillion Yuan (equivalent to US$170 
billion at the exchange rate of 1999) of non-performing loans (NPLs), which 
amounted to 15.6 percent of the total assets of the four banks (ACFB, 2001). 
Each AMC had a charter of ten years and was supposed to recover as many 
of the NPLs as possible through debt-to-equity swap, bankruptcy and 
debt-restructuring. Nevertheless, the official figure for the proportion of 
non-performing loans among the SOCBs still stood at 25 percent at the end 
of 2002(ACFB, 2003).  
iv). Partial flotation and strategic alliance with foreign financial institutions 
(2003 – present). With China‘s accession to the WTO in 2001, the Chinese 
government‘s effort to reform the banking and financial services also sped up. 
Another significant step taken by the government to make the SOCBs 
commercially viable was to recapitalise them before listing them on the stock 
markets. Over the period 2004 - 2005, the Chinese government injected 
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US$60 billion of foreign exchange reserves into the capital of BOC, CCB 
and ICBC before these banks were successfully listed on the Hong Kong 
Stock Exchange in 2005 and 2006(ACFB, 2006-2007). The floatation of 
these banks attracted unprecedented level of interests, including interest from 
foreign financial institutions that were eager to enter the potentially lucrative 
Chinese banking market. Legions of well-known international banking and 
financial institutions, having gained incremental access to the market since 
China's admission to the World Trade Organisation, are buying minority 
stakes in Chinese banks (and other Chinese financial institutions) as well as 
expanding their limited branch networks in the country. Currently, 
restructuring of the ABC is underway and it is likely to be floated in the near 
future. On the other hand, the SOCBs are made look like profitable. It is 
surprising that ABC became the most profitable commercial bank in China in 
2007. 
 
At the same time as establishing state-owned market-oriented commercial banks, the 
Chinese government has also gradually opened up the Chinese banking market to 
competition from banks of alternative ownership structure, such as private banks, 
domestic joint-stock banks formed by local governments and corporations, 
domestic-foreign joint-stock banks, and foreign banking and financial institutions. 
Currently there are twelve national shareholding banks, more than 100 city 
commercial banks, and tens of thousands of urban and rural credit unions. These latter 
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types of banks compete aggressively with the SOCBs in the household retail banking 
market as well as the business banking market for the non-state-owned and local 
collectively-owned industries and businesses, particularly the fast growing, highly 
efficient and profitable small- to medium-sized enterprises (SMEs). It is no surprise 
that the SOCBs have been steadily losing market share over recent years. For example, 
the SOCBs‘ shares of total banking assets, loans and deposits were 84.9 percent, 84.3 
percent and 88.5 percent respectively in 1998. By 2005 these shares dropped to 56.1 
percent, 50.1 percent and 79.9 percent. In the same period, the assets of joint-stock 
commercial banks trebled and their market share increased from 13 percent to 15 
percent (ACFB, 1999-2006). 
 
2.3 The evolution of monetary policy 
A survey conducted by Pollard (2004) shows that 79 out of 88 central banks across 
different countries conducted their monetary policy by special experts-led committees. 
In China, the Monetary Policy Committee (MPC) was set up in 1997. According to 
the PBOC Monetary Policy Committee Bill (PBC, 2006), the Committee comprises 
13 members, including the PBC‘s Governor and two Deputy Governors, a Deputy 
Secretary-General of the State Council, a Vice Minister of the State Development and 
Reform Commission, a Vice Finance Minister, the Administrator of the State 
Administration of Foreign Exchange, the Chairman of China Banking Regulatory 
Commission, the Chairman of China Securities Regulatory Commission, the 
Chairman of China Insurance Regulatory Commission, the Commissioner of National 
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Bureau of Statistics, the President of the China Association of Banks and an expert 
from the academia. MPC performs its functions through its regular quarterly meeting. 
An ad hoc meeting may be held if it is proposed by the Chairman or endorsed by 
more than one-third of the members of the MPC. From the first quarter of 2001, the 
PBC publishes the monetary report quarterly on its website and China‘s Financial 
Publishing House issues a bilingual report in hardcopy. 
 
In 1986, the PBC has begun to use interest rate as a monetary policy instrument 
before the MPC was set up. The PBC has to rely on adjusting its own balance sheet to 
manage the monetary base before 1998. Since then, the PBC has tried to use other 
monetary policy instruments. In China, the monetary policy instruments mainly 
include open market operation, reserve requirement ratio, central bank base interest 
rate, rediscounts rate, central bank lending and so-called ―other‖ policy instruments 
specified by the State Council. The most used three policy instruments are: open 
market operation, central bank base rate and reserve requirements ratio. 
i). Open market operations (OMO) are the means of implementing monetary 
policy by which a central bank controls its national money supply by buying 
and selling governments securities, or other financial instruments. Monetary 
targets, such as interest rates or exchange rates, are used to guide this 
implementation. In China, the foreign currency OMOs started in March 1994; 
Renminbi OMOs resumed on May 26th, 1998 (ACFB, 1999). Since 1999, 
the OMOs have become an important instrument for PBC‘s day-to-day 
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monetary policy operations. The OMOs have played a positive role on 
controlling money supply, liquidity ratio and interest rate in money market. 
The PBC has a dedicated OMO trading room managed by the PBC‘s 
Monetary Policy Division. The PBC has developed a primary security market 
that includes 40 commercial banks in 1998 (ACFB, 1999). In early 2004, 6 
non-bank financial institutions were added as primary dealers (ACFB, 2005). 
From 2005 onwards, the PBC‘s Monetary Policy Division publishes the list 
according its evaluation to the dealers. In the most recent published list 2 
foreign banks were added as dealers in 2008 (PBC, 2008a). In the primary 
security market, the dealers can use treasury bonds and policy financial 
bonds to deal with the PBC as trading tools to OMO. At first, the PBC only 
engaged in one OMO a week. In the early days, cash bond trading was the 
most common means of adjusting the monetary base. After a short period, it 
was replaced by bond-based repo transactions. From February 25th, 2003, 
the central bank has engaged in two or more OMOs a week (ACFB, 2004). It 
has also developed a liquidity management system, which now provides a 
daily update on banks‘ liquidity positions. 
ii). The interest rate tools adopted by the PBC include the central bank base 
interest rate and deposit and loan interest rates. The base interest rates 
include re-lending interest rates, rediscount rate, deposit reserve rate and 
excess reserve rat. The interest rate reached the zenith twice between 1986 
and 1996: once in 1989 when the saving rate reached 11 percent and other 
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occasion was in 1993 when it reached 10.9 percent (ACFB, 1986-1996). The 
interest rate went down to 2 percent with the soft landing of the Chinese 
economy after 1996 (ACFB, 1997). However, due to the dominance of the 
SOCBs and the limited autonomy by these banks in deciding on their own 
deposit and lending interest rates, the role of the central bank‘s base rate as a 
lever in the banking and financial market is still severely restricted. 
iii). The official reserve requirement ratio sets the minimum reserves each bank 
must hold to customer deposits and notes. These reserves are designed to 
satisfy withdrawal demands, and would normally be in the form of fiat 
currency stored in a bank vault (vault cash), or with the PBC. It is used as a 
tool in monetary policy, influencing the country‘s economy, borrowing, and 
interest rates. Western central banks rarely alter the reserve requirements 
because it would cause immediate liquidity problems for banks with low 
excess reserves; they prefer to use OMOs to implement their monetary policy. 
The PBC has continuously increased deposit reserve ratio 17 times from 
2003 to 2008(Wang & Wang, 2008). In 2007 alone, the PBC changed the 
reserve requirement 10 times (PBC, 2008b). The ratio remained at 15.5 
percent in 2008 (Kang, 2009), which is significantly above the normal 
official reserve requirement ratio in the developed countries. For example, as 
of 2006 the required reserve ratio in the United States was 10 percent on 
transaction deposits (component of money supply ―M1‖), and 0 percent on 
time deposits and all other deposits (Qiao, 2008). 
22 
 
At present, the monetary policy instruments are not effective in regulating either the 
banking market or the real economy (Li & Zhai, 2007). Many academic studies show 
that adjustments on the level of interest have minimal impact on the demand for 
money (Lu, 2007). Technically, the reasons can be explained as: 
i). Banks are not very sensitive to the adjustments of interest rates and reserve 
requirement ratios. The amount to loans and deposit is till increasing steadily 
after the central banks basic interest rates has been decreased 8 times from 
2001 to 2008 (PBC, 2008c). One reason for this is the high level of excess 
reserves. In the United States, bank‘s excess reserves are only 0.5 to 1 
percent of deposits (Sun, 2008), since the Federal Reserve usually manages 
to keep liquidity in the banking system tight. The figure in China was 3% in 
China in 2007(ACFB, 2008). Flushed with cash, most Chinese banks do not 
need to borrow from the money market and are therefore not sensitive to 
money market rates. The other reason is that the PBC pays a higher interest 
rate to reserves in the central bank. The commercial banks prefer a less risky 
way to keep their assets. The PBC has tried to reduce the excess reserve ratio 
since 1996, and it fell from 9 percent in 1996 (ACFB, 1997) to 3 percent in 
2007 (ACFB, 2008). 
ii). As the most important intermediary in the money market, the commercial 
banks are not able to absorb and pass changes in the cost of money market 
funds to their customer appropriately. This involves training credit officers, 
building data systems, developing the ability to put together portfolios of 
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loans (which would allow banks to disperse risks). China‘s banks are only 
beginning to learn how to price risk. In a survey taken in 2003/04 the PBC 
found serious deficiencies in bank‘s ability to price loans and manage risk 
(Monetary Policy Report, 2004Q3). It found that banks did not have 
databases on the risk profiles of their customers or of the industries these 
customers operate in and have few analytical tools for assessing credit risk. 
Many of China‘s banks have employed overseas consultants to help them 
design and roll out such systems, but these improvements take time to be 
understood, absorbed, and extended over the whole banking industry. 
iii). The operation of monetary policy is not sufficiently transparent. This is 
because the operation is ―under the guidance of the State Council‖ (PBC, 
2006), in other words, it is a highly political system. Perhaps the most 
powerful monetary policy is the so-called ―other policy instruments‖ (PBC, 
2006), including ordering banks to increase or decrease the size of loans- 
regardless of the current interest rate- as well as suggestion on how to use the 
loans. 
 
In fact, the monetary policy is under control of the government. Therefore, the 
government will do everything it can to achieve its economic growth target. The key 
to understanding China‘s monetary policy is not to place the conduct of monetary 
policy in the general framework of regulating market incentives to prevent market 
failure in achieving economic efficiency, but to understand the government‘s 
24 
 
orientation to prevent social and political instability that might be caused by a 
significant slowdown in the economy and the associated mass unemployment 
problem. 
 
2.4 The improvements of banking regulatory regime in recent years 
The specialisation of the financial authority started in the 1990s. The PBC was set up 
as the central bank in 1983. This was the setup of financial regulatory institutions. The 
supervision right on stock market was separated from the PBC in 1992 and 
supervision right on insurance was separated in1998. The China Banking Regulatory 
Commission was set up in 2003. With the completion of this separation and 
specialisation programme, the modern Chinese financial regulation and supervision 
system came into shape. The new system is called ―one bank and three committees‖, 
including the People‘s Bank of China (PBC), the China Banking Regulatory 
Commission (CBRC), the China Securities Regulatory Commission (CSRC), the 
China Insurance Regulatory Commission (CIRC). The setup of CBRC is a landmark 
of reform on financial regulatory regime but more effort is required. Substantial 
improvements in banking regulation have been made in recent years, including in the 
critical areas of asset classification and provisioning and capital adequacy.  
1) The new capital adequacy requirements, which require banks to fully 
provision for their non performing loans (NPLs) and maintain at least 8 
percent of aggregate capital adequacy were adopted in 2004 and became 
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fully binding as of 2007(CBRC, 2007). Strengthening capital adequacy 
requirements was a major step in creating a standard regulatory environment, 
but it will be a major test for the CBRC to ensure that all banks achieve 
compliance and that no precedent of forbearance is created. By the end of 
2007, the capital ratios of all the SOCBs and JSCBs stood above the required 
level. In 2007, the CBRC also issued and revised a number of other 
regulations and took steps to strengthen on-site examinations and monitoring 
of large exposures and connected lending, introduced a risk based 
supervisory system for city commercial banks. 
2) The regulatory capability and quality have improved substantially since 2000. 
One of the more visible improvements over the past few years has been the 
improving regulatory capability and quality. Considering that the CBRC was 
only set up in 2003, it has made tremendous progress. The CBRC and PBC 
have been successful in encouraging almost all Chinese banks to adopt a 
5-category loan classification system (as opposed to the previous 
payment-overdue system). The CBRC has stepped up banks‘ reporting 
requirements with special focus on timely monitoring of asset quality. It has 
also setup an early alert on large-client exposure and loan concentration. 
These measures have helped the banks to improve the degree of information 
transparency and reduced the loan risk level. 
3) The CBRC has introduced guidelines on assigning supervisory ratings for 
commercial banks, based on a CAMEL model (CAMEL stands for Capital 
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Adequacy, Asset Quality, Management Quality, Earnings Quality and 
Liquidity) (ACFB, 2007). It is considered as the best available method for 
evaluating bank performance and health position of the bank since it 
considers all areas of banking operations. In addition to this, the CBRC 
carried on with the traditional on-site examinations. This is a trend to 
improve the situations of risk controlling. 
4) The CBRC now publishes quarterly information on NPL ratios, NPL disposal 
by the state Asset Management Companies (AMCs), and total assets and 
liabilities of banks. This promotes financial disclosure among individual 
banks, and greatly enhances confidence among investors who are interested 
in investing in Chinese banks. In addition a national database on consumer 
credit came into operation at the beginning of 2006, providing record on 
borrowing history including mortgage and credit card information (ACFB, 
2007). The database is comprehensive and covers almost all outstanding 
consumer credits. There is a plan to set up a similar database for corporate 
borrowers, but it has yet to become fully operational. The database will be 
managed by the PBC. 
 
China's banking supervision has made substantial progress in the past few years. 
However, it should be noted that China's current banking risks are still very prominent. 
There are also many problems in banking supervision sector. It is very significant for 
maintaining financial stability to enhance the effectiveness of banking supervision. 
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The main problems of the current banking supervision are as follows. 
1) The lack of relevant law and regulation. At present, there are 15 financial 
laws, more than 40 financial regulations and more than 1,000 pieces of 
relevant regulatory documents (ACFB2008). But the existing law system still 
lags behind the development of banking industry. For example, the definition 
on ―loans‖ is not clearly classified in the Guiding Principles on Loan 
Classification. The result is that each commercial bank has different business 
scope on the five categories. And the classification criteria are very vague. As 
a result, the understanding of classification standards is different between the 
supervisory authority and commercial banks. 
2) The database for the banking sector is not accurate. First, there are different 
Statistics departments in the banks, like accounting, statistics and credit 
control. The data from these departments are inconsistent. Moreover, banks 
do not strictly implement statistical and accounting rules, such as the rule 
requiring that the merger of statements does not exclude internal exchanges 
and inflated assets. Further, some banks misunderstand the policies and 
systems so that the understanding of five-category classification criteria 
differs across banks. The data are also subject to political manipulation as 
well.  
3) The on-site supervision lacks continuity and pertinence. A large number of 
on-site examinations of the project are a temporary arrangement. And the 
supervision is over once the report is turned in. There are no following-up 
28 
 
actions to improve the situation. 
 
As a summary, the regime of banking supervision in China has improved significantly 
over the recent years. Nevertheless, more work is required to establish a modern 
efficient system, which will take time and a great deal of effort as such a system is 
only beginning to take shape. 
 
2.5 Growth of banking and finance in recent years  
2.5.1 Growth of banking sector 
The role of the banking sector in the modern economy can be examined by the ratio 
of the bank assets to the Gross Domestic Product (GDP). The table below shows the 
changes of banking sector in the whole economy in China from 2000 to 2005. 
 
Table 2. Growth of Banking Vs Growth of GDP in China (percent) 
   Index 
 
Year 
Growth 
Rate of 
GDP 
Growth 
Rate of 
Banking 
Assets 
Banking 
Asset 
/GDP 
Lending 
/Total 
banking 
assets 
Growth 
Rate of 
deposits 
Growth 
Rate of 
Lending 
2000 7.9 4.4 151.8  73.4  13.8  6.0 
2001 7.3  9.2  154.2  76.0  16.0  13.0  
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2002 8.0  46.7  217.0  60.5  19.0  16.9  
2003 9.1  27.4  236.6  57.5  21.7  21.1  
2004 9.5  14.3  232.0  56.4  16.0  12.1  
2005 9.9  18.6  245.2  55.2  18.9  16.2  
AGR* 8.6  20.1  - - 17.6  14.2  
*AGR=Average Growth Rate.  
Note: The figures are derived from ACFB 2001- 2006 and CSY 2001- 2006.  
As shown in the table above, the growth rate of Chinese GDP has increased from 
about 8 percent in 2000 to 10 percent in 2005. In contrast, the growth rate of total 
banking assets varied from 4 percent to reach the peak at about 47 percent in 2002. 
The growth rate slowed down to about 20 percent from 2003 to 2005. The average 
growth rate of banking assets is significantly faster than that of GDP. The growth 
rates of banking assets are more volatile than that of GDP, especially in 2002 when 
the growth rate reached 46.7 percent. The main reason for the explosion of the 
growth in banking assets was the relaxation of restrictions on lending to private 
companies in that year (ACFB, 2003). The growth rate was generally below 20 
percent in the other years. 
 
The ratio of banking assets to GDP increased steadily from 151.8 percent in 2000 to 
245.2 percent in 2005. This ratio is at a very high level compared with international 
experience. For example, the banking assets to GDP ratio in the Euro area was on 
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average around 230 percent in 2003 (Sladkovský, 2004). In the transitional countries 
in Eastern Europe, the most advanced countries such as Cyprus and Malta have a 
ratio that is 200 to 300 percent; Poland, the Czech Republic and Hungary recorded 
57.66 percent, 106.79 percent and 66.56 percent in 1996 respectively (Havrylchyk 
and Jurzyk, 2003). 
 
Figure 1. Bank assets to GDP in Eastern Europe (Percent) 
 
Source: Kohutikova, E. (2002) 
  
As it has been documented in the literature, when GDP grows by 1 percent the 
lending volume increases by 1.45 percent on average in Poland (Havrylchyk and 
Jurzyk, 2003). The average growth rates of GDP and lending were 8.6 percent and 
14.2 percent in China. The proportion is 1:1.65, which is higher than Poland‘s. The 
high growth rate of lending shows the liquidity of Chinese financial system is very 
high. 
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2.5.2 Composition of banking assets 
The structure of China‘s banking sector has remained largely unchanged since 2000 
in terms of key players. The SOCBs continue to command the highest market share, 
although there has been a marginal decline. As is shown in table 3, the big four 
accounted for 52.5 percent of the banking sector‘s assets in 2005, down from 68.6 
percent in 2000. Mirroring the decline in market share of the SOCBs is the increase 
in market share of the JSCBs, which accounted for 15.5 percent of the banking 
sector‘s assets, up from 13.1 percent in 2000. This seems to suggest that joint stock 
banks are expanding at the expense of the SOCBs. The latter have been constrained 
by their large non-performing loans legacy, which prevents them from expanding 
lending activities as quickly as their competitors. 
 
City commercial banks accounted for another 5.7 percent of the sector‘s assets as of 
2006, up slightly from 5.3 percent in 2000. The share of assets held by other 
financial institutions has remained largely unchanged at around 26 percent (policy 
banks: 8 percent, rural credit cooperatives: 11 percent, postal savings: 4 percent, 
foreign banks: 2 percent, other: 1 percent) (ACFB, 2006). Going forward, it is likely 
that the composition of China‘s banking sector assets will continue to be fought 
between the SOCBs and the JSCBs. The relevance of other domestic institutions will, 
at best, remain stable. Rural credit co-operatives will be undergoing a major 
consolidation exercise, which may see their market share decline further. Policy 
banks, meanwhile, are unlikely to show a big market share increase since the central 
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government‘s policy thrust has been to reduce their role in the financial system. In 
contrast, foreign banks‘ share only increased slightly after the remaining restrictions 
on RMB businesses are lifted by WTO accession requirements in December 2006 
(ACFB2008).  
 
Table 3. Composition of Banking Assets  
     Index 
 
year  
Total 
Banking 
Assets 
(Trillion 
US$) 
Assets of 
SOCBs 
(Trillion 
US$) 
SOCB/ Total 
(percent) 
Assets of 
JSCBs 
(Trillion 
US$) 
JSCB/ Total 
(percent) 
2000 1639.6* 1125.5* 68.6  214.7* 13.1  
2001 1789.7* 1223.1* 68.3  260.5* 14.6  
2002 2626.0* 1658.6* 63.2  374.7* 14.3  
2003 3346.2 1839.5 55.0  474.2 14.2  
2004 3825.5 2049.9 53.6  568.7 14.9  
2005 4536.3 2379.9 52.5  703.7 15.5  
* Data are figured out from ACFB 2001- 2006 
 
The policy banks include China Development Bank, Export-Import Bank of China 
and Agriculture Development Bank. The aim of China Development Bank is to 
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marshal funds from society to support the construction of infrastructure, basic and 
pillar industries, high-tech and new technology industries and other projects, to 
support these and other sectors that the government deems to be in dire need of 
development. The main mandate of Export-Import Bank of China is to implement 
the state policies in industry, foreign trade and economy and finance to provide 
policy financial support so as to promote the exports of Chinese mechanical and 
electronic products and high- and new-tech products. The Agricultural Development 
Bank of China is in charge of loans to the agriculture sector.  
 
The eleven joint stock commercial banks (JSCBs) include the Bank of 
Communications, CITIC Industrial Bank, China Everbright Bank, Huaxia Bank, 
Guangdong Development Bank, Shenzhen Development Bank, China Merchants 
Bank, Shanghai Pudong Development Bank, Industrial Bank, China Minsheng 
Banking Co. and Evergrowing Bank. Among the JSCBs, Shenzhen Development 
Bank, Shanghai Pudong Development Bank, Minsheng Bank, Merchants Bank and 
Huaxia Bank have listed on China‘s A share stock market. They are called joint 
stock banks because the initial core capital of the banks was jointly raised by a 
number of state-owned corporations.  
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2.5.3 Ownership structure 
Three of the four SOCBs – BOC, CCB and ICBC – have changed from a wholly 
state-owned bank to a shareholding one. Other shareholders besides the Chinese 
government are now allowed to hold shares of these banks, but the state remains the 
largest shareholder. As the table 4 shows, the commercial banks, including JSCBs 
are still controlled by the government. 
 
Table 4. The Ownership Structure of Chinese Banks 2008 (percent) 
 Ministry of 
Finance 
Central Huijin 
Investment 
State-owned 
enterprises 
Foreign 
Investments 
ICBC 43.3 43.3 5.0 8.5 
BoA * 67.5 6.1 26.4 
Merchants Bank * * 46.6 * 
HuaXia Bank * * 9.3 14.0 
SZDB * * 8.7 17.9 
SPDB * * 45.8 4.2 
Minsheng Bank * * 42.1 3.9 
Source: ACFB, 2008.  
SZDB= ShenZhen Development Bank 
SPDB= Shanghai Pudong Development Bank 
*The remaining shares of the JSCBs are not allowed to be traded on the stock market. 
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Due to incomplete information, the full picture of the ownership structure of Chinese 
banks is still unavailable. Therefore, Table 4 only presents a partial picture. As 
mentioned earlier, all the banks in China were state-owned before 1984 except the 
foreign capital banks. With the establishment of Joint-stock Commercial Banks and 
city commercial banks, the local government and state-owned enterprises started to 
share the ownership of the commercial banks. Most of the city commercial banks are 
supported by the local governments. Therefore, to a significant extent the operation 
of the city commercial banks is controlled or influenced by the local governments. It 
is hard to figure out the percentage of the ownership by central government, local 
government or state-owned enterprises. The information presented in Table 4 is only 
made available because of the information disclosure requirement for a bank to be 
listed on the stock market. Therefore, it is high time that the Chinese banks adopted 
a common consistent standard concerning accounting practices and information 
disclosure. 
 
2.6 A brief introduction to the Joint-stock commercial banks 
As the second biggest group of commercial banks, the JSCBs are expected to play 
an important role in stimulating the competiveness in the Chinese banking industry. 
The JSCBs hardly have the power to compete with the SOCBs nationwide. However, 
they have been working hard to expand their business in the central cities and more 
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developed area in China. It is necessary to have a brief review on the JSCBs‘ 
business and strategy. 
 
Bank of Communications (BOCOM), which is founded in 1908, is one of four oldest 
banks in China and one of the early note-issuing banks of China. In 1958, while the 
Hong Kong Branch continued to operate, the mainland business of BOCOM was 
merged with People‘s Bank of China and the People‘s Construction Bank of China 
on BOCOM‘s foundation. BOCOM was restructured on July 24, 1986 with approval 
from the State Council and began operation anew on April 1, 1987, thus becoming 
China‘s first state-owned shareholding commercial bank. Its head office was in 
Shanghai. In June 2004, with the banking reform in China well under way, the Sate 
Council approved BOCOM‘s general plan on deepening the reform of its 
shareholding structure in a bid to further develop BOCOM into a modern banking 
enterprise under a century old national brand with improved corporate governance, 
adequate capital, strict internal controls, safe operations, excellent services and 
return, and strong international competitiveness. Through the reform, BOCOM has 
completed financial reorganisation, successfully introduced mainland and overseas 
strategic investors like HSBC, the national Social Security Fund and China SAFE 
Investment Ltd., and enhanced its organizational structure. On June 23, 2005, 
BOCOM was listed in Hong Kong, the first China based commercial bank of its 
kind to get listed outside of the Chinese mainland.  As the fifth largest bank, 
BOCOM has branch in most of the provinces, except Qinghai and Tibet. 
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China Everbright Bank (CEB), which is established in August of 1992, completed 
joint-stock reform in January 1997, thus becoming the first nation-wide joint-stock 
commercial bank with State Government as controlling shareholder and equity 
investment from international financial institutions. As at the end of 2003, China 
Everbright Bank had established over 370 banking offices in 36 major cities 
throughout 23 provinces, autonomous regions and city provinces throughout the 
country, and has become a nation-wide joint-stock commercial bank with 
considerable influence on the economic and social development of China. 
 
Huaxia Bank is established in October, 1992, which started joint-stock reform by the 
approval of PBC in 1995. It was listed in Shanghai Stock Exchange on 12 
September, 2003. The influence of its business is limited to some central cities. 
 
Guangdong Development Bank, as was announced in December 2005, is going to be 
the first public bank in China which is going to be acquired by a foreign bank. The 
bank was founded in 1988. After a year of battling, a joint bid group led by 
Citigroup, IBM and China Life Insurance Company won the bid at mid November 
of 2006. 
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Shenzhen Development Bank is established in 1999, which is the first listed 
commercial bank in stock market in China. 
 
China Merchants Bank, is founded on April 8, 1987 with its head office in Shenzhen, 
China Merchants Bank is the first share-holding commercial bank wholly owned by 
corporate legal entities. Since its establishment, the bank has undergone capital 
enlargement by 3 times, and launched IPO with the issuance of 1.5 billion common 
shares in March 2002, and was successfully listed in Shanghai Stock Exchange on 
April 9, 2002. It is the first listed company passed external auditing appraisal based 
on the international accounting standard. After the conversion of capital reserve to 
share capital in May, 2004, The Bank's total shares have been increased to 6.4 
billion. At present, the total asset of China Merchants Bank is above RMB 600 
billion. It is China's sixth-largest commercial lender by assets. 
 
Shanghai Pudong Development Bank, SPDB, incorporated on January 9, 1993 with 
the approval of the People's Bank of China (28th, August, 1992), is a joint-stock 
commercial bank with its headquarters located in Shanghai. Shanghai Pudong 
Development Bank launched a 400 million A-share offer on September 23 on the 
Shanghai Stock Exchange becoming the first shareholding commercial bank to list 
with both central bank and China Securities Regulatory Commission‘s approval 
since the enforcement of "Commercial Bank Law" and "Securities Law". Thus the 
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registered capital reaches RMB2.41 billion and 320 million shares of the issue were 
listed on the Shanghai Stock Exchange on November 10, 1999. 
 
Industrial Bank was the old short name that was more commonly used in China from 
June 2001 thru March 3, 2003 for Industrial Bank Co. The former Fujian Industrial 
Bank was established on August 26, 1988, and had its first name change in June 
2001, renaming itself as Fujian Industrial Bank Joint-Stock Corporation, Limited, 
The bank was referred by others in China simply as Industrial Bank instead. The 
bank had yet another name change on March 3, 2003 to finally settle for its current 
name Industrial Bank Joint-Stock Corporation, Limited. 
 
China Minsheng Bank is established in January, 1996, and is national joint stock 
commercial bank approved by State Council and the People's Bank of China with a 
registered Capital of 1.38 billion RMB, and with the headquarter in Beijing. 
 
Evergrowing Bank is established in October, 1987, known as Yantai Residents 
saving bank. The bank is joint-stock reformed in 2003 and named as 
EVERGROWING BANK CO., LTD. 
 
Some of the JSCBs have been developing very fast after 2000. But their expansion 
mainly focuses on the eastern provinces. They have been competing with the SOCBs 
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in this area. More or less, the SOCBs have been facing the pressure from these banks. 
The JSCBs are seen as having lighter debt burdens and are expected to achieve 
better financial performance. The major operational aims of the JSCBs are to 
develop business in central cities. In fact, they have achieved a relative successful 
performance in some of the central cities comparing to the SOCBs. But the JSCBs 
have their own weaknesses. Their business is limited to the traditional loan-deposit 
business. The non-interest income in the seven listed SOCBs only accounted for 
8.47 percent in 2006. The figure is lower than the SOCBs‘ 10.06 percent in average. 
The share of JSCBs‘ total assets was 12.34 percent in 2006. Meanwhile, the share of 
SOCB‘s total assets was 51.3 percent. The four SOCBs are still having the most 
important impact on the market. 
 
2.7 The current competitive environment and market structure  
A central purpose of banking reform in China over the past three decades is to 
encourage competition among banks within the state-owned sector as well as across 
the entire banking sector. The extent of competition in the Chinese banking market 
is fundamentally determined by the structure of the banking market, policy 
intervention and the historical and institutional factors underlying banking 
operations in China. As the ultimate owner of the SOCBs, the government still have 
the most profound impact on their business. 
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2.7.1 The extension of the SOCBs in banking market 
In terms of the structure of the banking market, it is immediately clear that the 
SOCBs dominate in every measure of banking operations, including banking 
infrastructure and share of total deposits and loans.  
 
Table 5 shows total number of branches in the SOCBs, as compared with the other 
banks (including central bank and policy banks), has dropped from around 1.7 
million, 63 percent in 1998 to1.3 million, 55 percent in 2004. The total number of 
employees has dropped from 144 thousand, 71 percent to 78 thousand, 65 percent. If 
only commercial banks counted, the weights of SOCBs in both figures will be over 
70 percent (Guo, 2002). It shows the SOCBs have the most extensive network in the 
market. The SOCBs have been closing down some non-profitable branches and 
reducing the number of employee in some area. At the same period, the Chinese 
government has been encouraging the other types of commercial banks to compete 
with the SOCBs. 
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Table 5. Number of workers and number of branches in Chinese banking sector 
(1998 to 2004) 
 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 
Number of workers 
PBC 182326 179427 169302 166984 165945 160020 140450 
PB 58494 53989 54189 62664 63859 64762 55417 
SOCB 1667784 1601649 1493630 1421566 1467849 1415214 1284088 
JSCB 92034 96485 67914a 71353a 129852d 13678d 129893 
Others 645285 887792 937270b 902741b 701295c 879615e 707742f 
Total 2645923 2819342 2722305 2625308 2528800 2533289 2317590 
Number of branches 
 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 
PBC 2290 2251 2222 2228 2224 2199 2189 
PB 2409 2318 - - 2327 2328 2321 
SOCB 144148  135704  120909  109212  97952  88489  77992  
JSCB 4501 4753 - - 5128d 5786d 4171 
Others 49997 43004 10756b 105113b 96591g 91393e 33731f 
Total 203345 188030 133887 216553 204222 190195 120404 
Source: ACFB 1999- 2005 
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PB=Policy Banks, include China Development Bank, Export-Import Bank of China 
and Agriculture Development Bank. 
a: including Bank of Communications, CITIC Industrial Bank, China Everbright 
Bank, Huaxia Bank and China Minsheng Banking Co. 
b: including rural credit cooperatives and rural commercial banks 
c: including rural credit cooperatives, rural commercial banks and city commercial 
banks 
d: including Bank of Communications, Shanghai Pudong Development Bank, CITIC 
Industrial Bank, China Everbright Bank, China Minsheng Banking Co., Huaxia 
Bank, China Merchants Bank, Guangdong Development Bank, Industrial Bank, 
Shenzhen Development Bank, and Evergrowing Bank. 
e: including rural credit cooperatives and postal savings 
f: city commercial banks, urban credit cooperatives, rural commercial banks, rural 
cooperative bank, rural credit cooperatives, trust and investment companies, finance 
companies and financial-leasing companies. 
g: rural credit cooperatives and rural commercial banks 
 
2.7.2 The market concentration of Chinese banking sector 
The extent of market concentration is usually measured by the n-bank concentration 
ratio (CRn) or the Herfindahl-Hirschman Index (HHI) (Berger, et al. 2004). One 
commonly used concentration ratio is the four-firm concentration ratio, or CR4, 
44 
 
which consists of the market share, as a percentage, of the four largest firms in the 
industry. The HHI is the sum of the squares of individual firms‘ market shares, 
expressed mathematically as: HHI= S
2
1 + S
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2 + S
2
3 +…+ S
2
k =


K
i 1
2
iS
(where K is the 
number of firms in the industry, Si is the market share of firm i). The HHI 
approximates 0 for a perfect competitive industry and equals 10,000 for a monopoly. 
In general, the more firms there are in an industry, the lower is the value of the HHI. 
 
The SOCBs are the top four commercial banks in the Chinese banking market. The 
study adopts the data for CR4 and HHI in the national-wide commercial banks 
(including SOCBs and JSCBs) to measure the market concentration. The indexes 
include ratios on assets, deposits, loans and net profit over the years 1998 to 2004.  
 
Table 6. The concentration ratios and HHI over recent years (1998-2004) 
(percent) 
Year Index Assets Deposits Loans 
Net 
profit 
1998 
CR4 79.45 78.10 76.96 37.19 
HHI 24.10 18.16 17.38 13.22 
1999 
CR4 78.55 77.23 75.30 59.88 
HHI 20.79 17.53 16.73 16.11 
2000 CR4 73.36 76.15 72.67 54.45 
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HHI 15.19 16.87 15.45 16.87 
2001 
CR4 74.70 85.48 73.82 55.43 
HHI 15.59 19.95 16.23 12.71 
2002 
CR4 73.32 83.87 72.66 52.41 
HHI 14.93 19.13 15.56 16.12 
2003 
CR4 74.03 82.65 72.39 83.70 
HHI 14.95 19.40 15.11 22.60 
2004 
CR4 72.38 78.48 69.90 67.41 
HHI 14.37 17.63 14.45 26.54 
*The figures are derived from ACFB 1999-2005 
The banks include ICBC, ABC, BOC, CCB, Bank of Communications, CITIC 
Industrial Bank, China Everbright Bank, Huaxia Bank, Guangdong Development 
Bank, Shenzhen Development Bank, China Merchants Bank, Shanghai Pudong 
Development Bank, Industrial Bank, China Minsheng Banking Co. and Evergrowing 
Bank. The other types banks are not includes due to the small market share and lack 
of data. 
 
The high concentration ratio shows the degree of competition among the commercial 
banks. As is shown in table 6, the SOCBs took over 79 percent of assets, 78 percent 
of deposits and 77 percent of loans in 1998. The figures remained a high level in 
2004 (72 percent of assets, 78 percent of deposits and 70 percent of loans). JSCBs 
have increased their market share on loans in this period. On the other side, the share 
46 
 
of deposit in the SOCBs has increased among these years. The reason for this is the 
loan/deposit ratio is lower in the SOCBs than that in the JSCBs. Compare to other 
index, the share of net profit in SOCBs was viable, from 37 percent in 1998 to 52 
percent in 2002 then jumped to nearly 84 percent in 2003. The net profit of CCB and 
BOC jumped to 22.3 billion and 28.7 billion in 2003(the figure was 4.3 billion and 
9.4 billion in 2002, the data are different in ACFB 2004 and 2005, this study use the 
data from ACFB 2005). They were floated in the stock market this year. The SOCBs 
are forced to improve their financial performance under the pressure of shareholders. 
 
The HHI index needs to time 10,000 in practice. According to the practice in other 
countries: If the HHI is greater than 1800, the market is seen as highly concentrated; 
if HHI is between 1000 and 1800, the market belongs to a moderate concentration 
market; if HHI is smaller than 1000, the market fall into a lower concentration 
catalogue. (Guo, 2002) In table 6, all of the figures are greater than 1200: the figures 
were greater than 1800 on assets in 1998 and 1999, on deposits in 1998, 2001, 2002 
and 2003 and on net profit in 2003 and 2004. It shows the Chinese commercial 
banks are in a highly concentrated market. The figures have been dropping steadily 
on assets and loans from 1998 to 2004. It shows the same trends with the 
concentration ratios. The high net profit in 2003 and 2004 is due to CCB and BOC 
floated in stock market in 2003.  
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To summarise, the Chinese banks operate in a highly concentrated market. In urban 
areas, the SOCBs account for 70 percent of the market share in the major business: 
loans and deposit. The concentration ratios have been decreasing from 1998 to 2004. 
The degree of competition is increased. Even though the government has devoted a 
great deal of effort to encourage the other types of commercial banks to compete, the 
SOCBs are still the main players in the market. The SOCBs have been trying to 
improve their financial performance by cutting off the number of staff and branches. 
How effective are such efficiency-enhancement policies remain an open question. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
48 
 
Chapter III. Internal Organisation, Competitive Strategies and Performance of 
the Banking Groups 
 
Having examined the macroeconomic environment and the market conditions that 
determine the competitiveness of Chinese domestic banks, this chapter turns to 
investigate the internal factors that affect the competitiveness of individual banking 
groups. In particular, the internal organisation and competitive strategies adopted by 
the state-owned commercial banks will be examined in detail. In the meantime, 
empirical evidence will be presented to give a general qualitative indication of the 
performance of the banking groups, whilst a formal assessment of the performance 
will be conducted and presented in some later chapters. 
 
To examine the performance of the banking groups, it is useful to evaluate the 
internal organisation and risk management system. Since the market-oriented 
economic reform in 1978, China has entered into a stage of financial deregulation 
and liberalization. With the growth of the national economy, more and more 
financial institutions are set up, which brought great changes in the financial 
structure. From recapitalisation of three big SOCBs to the current trend in 
liberalisation through stock market floatation, the process of reform is being 
accelerated.  
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3.1 Internal organisation and management 
In the spirit of Chandler's historical research (Chandler, 1962), Williamson and 
Bhargava (1972) classifies the organisational structure into three basic types: unitary 
structure, holding structure and multidivisional structure. Unitary structure is a 
highly centralized to the functional structure applicable to small and middle-scale 
enterprise with a single business. The holding structure is a diversification holding 
company structure. Its subsidiary companies have disparate businesses with each 
other. Their products are unrelated. They may have more independence in their 
business operations. The multidivisional structure is developed from the unitary and 
holding structures. Multidivisional structure has a higher degree of centralisation, 
but outstanding overall coordination functions. It has become the mainstream 
structure of international companies, particularly large companies in Europe and the 
United States. 
 
To examine the organisational and management structure of the Chinese banks, it is 
useful to categorise the banks operating in China by their administrative territory. 
The first group consists of nation-wide banks including the four SOCBs, three policy 
banks, some of JSCBs and the postal savings and Non-bank Financial Institutions. 
The second group covers the territorial banks, including city commercial banks, 
rural commercial banks, urban credit cooperatives (UCCs) and rural credit 
cooperatives (RCCs). The third group is the foreign-funded financial institutions.  
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The branches are set up in accordance with administrative divisions. The basic 
setting mode is: the head offices are located in the Chinese political and cultural 
capital- Beijing; the provincial branches are located in the province capitals; the 
city-level branches are located in the district central cities; the county-level branches 
are located in the county centres. The sub-branches and savings offices under 
city-level and county-level branches are the main business-dealing institutions. 
There are three management levels: head office, provincial and city (or county) level 
management offices. The main business dealing institutions are the sub-branches 
and the saving offices. The different management levels have different 
decision-making rights. One of the advantages is that it can reduce the management 
risk. But it increases the management cost and reduces efficiency. 
 
To strengthen banking supervision, China set up a new cabinet-level agency—China 
Banking Regulatory Commission (CBRC) in March 2003, which took over the 
functions of banking supervision from PBC and headed by Liu Mingkang, the 
reform-minded former chairman of Bank of China. CBRC is the primary banking 
regulatory authority in China in contrast to the multiple and overlapping regulatory 
agencies in the US. Since then, it has made strenuous efforts to establish and improve 
China‘s banking supervisory standards and practices. A key goal of the agency is to 
bring Chinese rules on capital adequacy, loan classification system, and risk 
management and corporate governance standards substantially more in line with 
international norms. For example, the minimum capital requirement is 8 percent 
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according to the Market Risk Management of Commercial Banks Guidelines, 
published by CBRC in 2004. Loans are classified according to the so-called 
5-category grading system: normal, attention, substandard, doubtful and loss, with the 
latter three categories classified as non-performing loans (NPL). Comparing the old 
3-category grading system, the new system is a great progress. In addition to 
establishment of a mandatory reporting system, CBRC conducts on-site bank 
examination to evaluate banks‘ financial health and adequacy in internal control and 
risk management. Despite the resource constraints and the lack of experience, CBRC 
has done an impressive job in strengthening China‘s bank supervision and improving 
the bank sector‘s soundness. 
 
In early 2003, the State Council also accelerated the reform to banking industry. Vice 
Premier Huang Ju oversaw the overall banking reform program, and Zhou Xiaochuan, 
the governor of PBC, led the task force on a day-to-day basis. In December 2003, the 
State Council injected US$ 45 billion in fresh capital into Bank of China and China 
Construction Bank to strengthen their capital base. The capital injection was 
accomplished through a newly set up PBC arm—China SAFE Investments (Huijin), 
and the source of funding is China‘s official foreign exchange reserves. In August 
2004, Huijin joined the Ministry of Finance and National Social Security Fund to help 
re-capitalise Bank of Communications. And in May 2006, Huijin and Ministry of 
Finance jointly contributed US$ 30 billion to recapitalize ICBC-China‘s largest bank. 
As part of the bank restructuring plan, there were further carve-outs of 
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non-performing loans from these banks. Following the capital injection and NPL 
carve-outs, these banks‘ balance sheet showed dramatic improvements, with 
substantially lower NPL ratios and much higher Tier 1 capital adequacy ratios. 
 
As an integral part of the banking reform program, the Chinese government has since 
2003 promoted foreign strategic investment in the banking industry. China hopes that 
foreign investors will bring about badly needed banking expertise and risk 
management technology as well as capital. In light of the widely known problems 
plaguing the Chinese banking sector, and the restrictive ownership cap of 20 percent 
for any single foreign investor (25 percent for combined foreign interests), the 
outcome has defied even the most optimistic predictions. Within just three years, 
more than 20 international financial institutions have made equity investment totalling 
US$ 16 billion. In 2005 alone, China attracted US$ 14 billion in foreign investment 
into its banking sector. Bank of Communications was the first mainland-based bank to 
successfully launch an IPO of US$ 2.2 billion overseas, its shares were listed in the 
Hong Kong Stock Exchange in June 2005. It was followed by the IPO of US$ 9.2 
billion in October 2005 for China Construction Bank, also in the Hong Kong Stock 
Exchange. Since the debut of BOCOM in international capital markets, Chinese banks‘ 
share performance has been nothing short of spectacular. BOCOM‘s share rose by 
95percent since IPO, CCB by 53 percent, and BOC (Hong Kong) which was listed in 
2002, by 94 percent (ACFB, 2003). All three banks are traded at a hefty premium 
over their Asian and international peers. BOCOM‘s 2006 price-to-book ratio, at 2.6 
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folds (ACFB, 2006), for example, is higher than its strategic investor 
institution—HSBC whose shares are trading at a multiple of 1.9 folds (Xinhua news, 
2006). The strong performance of Chinese banks and public market valuation reflect 
rising investor confidence in China‘s banking sector and represent a strong 
endorsement to the country‘s banking reform. As Table 4 in Chapter 2 shows, for the 
newly listed banks, only about 10 percent of the shares are allowed to be traded on the 
market. 
 
Issuing shares is a precarious solution to the Chinese bank‘s problems due to the 
incomplete development of the security markets. The high price-to-book ratio reflects 
the government intervention in the market. The bankers have realized the importance 
of internal risk management. Jiang Jianqing, the president of ICBC, advocated 
establishing the head office-branch organisation model to shorten the management 
chain (CBRC, 2006). He also stated the state-owned commercial banks should 
achieve multidivisional management system to raise management efficiency of the 
commercial banks. 
 
3.2 Competitive strategies by individual banking groups 
The banks in China were all state-owned before 1984 except the foreign capital 
banks. With the establishment of Joint-stock Commercial Banks and city 
commercial banks, the local government and state-owned enterprises started to share 
the ownership of the commercial banks. Most of the city commercial banks are 
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supported by the local governments, and thus the local governments are still highly 
influential in the decision-making process of these banks. The current organisational 
structure of Chinese banks resembles the unitary organisational structure, which is 
set according to the regionalism transversely and business functions breadth-wise. 
China's state-owned commercial banks adopt the branch system. Their branches 
spread throughout the country. In recent years, they establish a number of branches 
(office) abroad eventually. They have huge amount of workers and branches. As 
shown in the tables below, the number of workers and branches in ICBC and ABC 
remain much higher than these in BOC and CCB. Some analysts (e.g., Li, et al., 
2001; Chen, et. al., 2005) ascribe the poor performance of ICBC and ABC to the 
excessive amount of workers and branches. The SOCBs have implemented changes 
to consolidate operations and increase efficiency. During 1998-2005 the number of 
branches of SOCBs has declined by 46 percent while the number of employees has 
declined by 23 percent. 
 
Table 7. Share of workers in SOCBs (percent) 
 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 
ICBC 34.01  33.81  31.54  30.23  27.63  27.49  29.26  
ABC 31.45  33.67  34.12  34.54  32.76  36.14  38.11  
BOC 11.84  12.27  12.87  12.98  11.92  12.14  12.79  
CCB 22.70  20.25  21.47  22.25  27.69  24.23  19.83  
Total 100.00  100.00  100.00  100.00  100.00  100.00  100.00  
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The figures are derived from ACFB 1999-2005 
 
Table 8. Share of branches in SOCBs (percent) 
 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 
ICBC 27.74  27.20  26.19  25.95  26.50  27.27  27.21  
ABC 40.56  41.66  41.80  40.67  39.09  40.84  39.75  
BOC 10.56  10.59  10.69  11.47  12.34  13.12  14.50  
CCB 21.14  20.55  21.31  21.90  22.07  18.77  18.54  
Total 100.00  100.00  100.00  100.00  100.00  100.00  100.00  
The figures are derived from ACFB 1999-2005 
 
We focus on the four SOCBs, which is the major part of the banking system in 
China. Officially, the four SOCBs have become financially independent commercial 
banks. Nevertheless, the SOCBs are more like the combination of speciality banks 
and commercial banks due to the characteristic of the Chinese banking system, as 
they are still obligated to provide credit to the state-owned corporations. 
 
At the end of 2005, the four SOCBs accounted for 52.5 percent of banking system 
assets. As shown in the table below, the lending account for 65 percent, 64.5 percent, 
48.5 percent and 53.2 percent in ICBC, ABC, BOC and CCB of the total bank assets. 
These shows lending is still the main business of the SOCBs. There are slight 
differences across the banking groups.  
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Table 9. The asset structure of Chinese State-owned Commercial Banks 
1998-2005 (percent) 
Type of asset Year ICBC ABC BOC CCB Average 
 
 
 
Loans 
 
 
 
1998 70.14 69.50 53.03 67.40 63.74 
1999 68.57 69.85 43.49 54.56 56.75 
2000 60.74 66.98 42.83 54.76 55.22 
2001 61.59 65.12 47.99 54.46 56.22 
2002 62.48 64.27 49.13 57.29 58.29 
2003 63.87 64.92 53.73 59.71 60.56 
2004 67.20 64.53 50.26 55.59 59.40 
2005 44.64 59.30 47.12 52.23 50.82 
 
 
Security and 
investment 
 
1998 8.45 8.37 11.91 8.47  9.3 
1999 9.15 7.89 15.07 22.76 13.72 
2000 19.94 10.80 22.26 24.64 19.41 
2001 18.40 11.82 28.13 25.62 18.49 
2002 20.97 14.12 26.37 27.17 22.16 
2003 22.33 16.49 26.39 23.85 22.27 
2004 24.42 19.26 28.91 28.33 25.23 
2005 31.91 26.35 33.29 30.83 30.60 
 
 
1998 0.77 0.77 0.49 0.80 0.69 
1999 1.21 1.45 1.08 1.5 1.34 
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Cash 2000 0.74 1.13 0.64 0.96 0.90 
2001 0.59 0.86 0.69 0.85 0.75 
2002 0.59 0.78 0.65 0.81 0.71 
2003 0.56 0.73 0.72 0.83 0.71 
2004 0.59 0.69 0.67 0.69 0.66 
2005 0.46 0.64 0.60 1.56 0.82 
Deposit in 
Central Bank 
1998 10.83 10.54 4.35 12.77 9.32 
1999 8.61 10.74 5.00 10.41 8.71 
2000 7.44 10.11 4.95 9.30 8.08 
2001 8.06 10.80 4.97 10.66 8.62 
2002 8.69 10.86 6.62 8.27 8.61 
2003 8.16 10.32 7.55 8.63 8.67 
2004 9.49 9.81 6.66 9.53 8.87 
2005 8.11 9.00 6.68 9.54 8.33 
Note: The figures are derived from ACFB 1999 to 2006. Security and investment 
includes central bank bonds，government bonds, financial securities and financial 
bonds. 
The main assets include cash, deposit in central bank, loans and security and 
investment. In general, 60 percent of the assets are loans. The primary function of 
SOCBs is financial intermediation between depositors and borrowers. Apart from 
loans, the share of securities and investment operations increased from 9.3 percent to 
30.6 percent. The securities here refer to treasury securities, corporate bonds and 
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financial securities. Treasury securities take most proportion of the investment as it 
is relative safer than other securities. The SOCBs have been trying to improve the 
asset structures. This is helpful to control the market risk. As the Chinese central 
bank pay interest to the commercial bank‘s deposit, the weight of deposit in Central 
Bank is rather stable at around 8 to 9 percent. Cash holdings have fallen from 1.34 
percent in 1999 to 0.66 percent in 2004. This shows the SOCBs‘ profit requirement 
has been strengthening after they were floated in the stock market. 
 
Three out of the four SOCBs, except ABC, have reduced the weights of loans in 
their assets. They turned to invest in security market. The table shows the change of 
competition strategies among the SOCBs. They are more concerned about their 
profit before and after floating in stock market. As they are not allowed to trade in 
stock market, they invest in security market. This kind of asset portfolio makes their 
assets safe when the financial crisis came in 2007. 
 
3.2.1 Industrial and Commercial Bank of China (ICBC) 
The bank was created on January 1, 1984. It was formed from the vast branch 
network of the People‘s Bank of China. It is China‘s largest financial institution. At 
the end of 1985, the Bank‘s first full year of operation, its total loans outstanding 
were 300.8 billion Yuan (Almanac of China‘s Finance and Banking 1986, p. III-28). 
That was 51 percent of total bank lending of 590.5 billion Yuan (Almanac of 
China‘s Finance and Banking 1986, p. II-24). Its personnel of more than 405 
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thousand members of staff were distributed over a geographically far-flung network 
consisting of more than 21.5 thousand branches and savings stations (Almanac of 
China‘s Finance and Banking 1986, p. II-46). Despite the creation of a number of 
new banks in the 1980s and the 1990s, the Bank continued to be by far China‘s 
largest financial institution. By the end of 2004, the Bank has nearly 21 thousand 
branches and 376 thousand employees (Almanac of China‘s Finance and Banking 
2005). More importantly, its assets have grown by more than 15.7 times to reach 
US$ 686.5 trillion (Almanac of China‘s Finance and Banking 2005). However, due 
to restructuring of the public sector in recent years, the number of branches and staff 
members in 2004 declined by 45percent and 34percent respectively from the top of 
38.6 thousand and 570 thousand in 1995 (Almanac of China‘s Finance and Banking 
1996). 
 
On April 21, 2005, the Chinese government formally approved ICBC's plan of 
shareholding structural reform and injected US$ 15 billion. ICBC afterwards 
successfully completed the financial structuring and international audit. On October 
28, 2005, ICBC was officially transformed from a state-owned commercial bank 
into a share holding company and renamed as Industrial and Commercial Bank of 
China Limited. The new entity has a registered capital RMB 248 billion and 248 
billion shares, with a face value of RMB 1 per share. The Ministry of Finance and 
Central SAFE Investments Limited are its two shareholders holding 124 billion 
shares respectively. Through financial restructuring, issuance of long-term 
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subordinated bonds and asset portfolio optimization, ICBC has substantially 
improved its capital management and, in turn, its capital adequacy. By the end of 
2005, ICBC had seen distinctively higher quality in its assets. The core capital 
adequacy ratio has reached 8.11percent, and capital adequacy ratio 9.89percent. 
 
ICBC runs the largest corporate banking business in China and supports many 
infrastructural construction, primary industries, pilot projects, key enterprises as well 
as small and medium-sized enterprise development. In 2005, ICBC had endeavoured 
to construct a standardized marketing platform and multi-hierarchy marketing 
system. Focus had still been laid on marketing efforts in core primary industries 
such as petroleum and chemicals, public utilities, telecom, road and railways, civil 
aviation and ports and infrastructure construction. Loans towards urban 
infrastructure construction, high-tech zone construction, real estate development had 
been moderately and discriminatively increased. More loans had been directed to 
modern manufacturing, logistics, environmental protection and new service sector, 
cultural undertakings, medical and healthcare services in a selective manner. ICBC 
had also ambitiously explored the multinationals and small and medium-sized 
enterprises credit market. Thus it had continued to optimise its industrial structure 
and clientele. Apart from its effort in traditional business lines, ICBC had 
proactively expanded many high-growth, high-tech and high value-added services 
such as cash management, investment banking, asset trust and other finance products. 
It had also developed high-end businesses including syndicate loans, financial 
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advisory, structural financing, comprehensive financial service solutions, optimizing 
its product and yield structure. 
 
By the end of 2005, its Bank-to-Bank deposit balance had reached RMB 2,543.8 
billion and Bank-to-Bank loan balance had reached RMB 2,762.2 billion which 
mainly consisted of medium- and long-term loans and instrument financing (ACFB, 
2006). ICBC had newly added gap-filling loans, stand-by loans and import 
guarantee plus export loan services. Its domestic syndicate loans had amounted to 
RMB 72.3 billion (ACFB, 2006). The bank has entered into all-round cooperation 
agreements with 12 insurance companies at home and abroad. It has also signed 
various partnership agreements with over 140 securities and futures companies and 
formed correspondent relationships with 45 domestic banking institutions (ACFB, 
2006). Its agent payment and collection business and agent clearing services have 
been expanding and the Bank-Customs Link, Bank-Money Link, Online 
Bank-Money Link and Bank-Tax Link system are constantly improving.  
 
In 2005, ICBC remained in the first position in RMB settlement. Its RMB settlement 
services amounted to RMB 185trillion (ACFB, 2006). It also launched the Smart 
Finance brand products to provide integrated services and promote the brand value. 
By the end of 2005, its cash management customers had amounted to 17,663(ACFB, 
2006). ICBC has reported the investment banking revenues of RMB 2.018 billion. It 
is among the first few financial institutions that have been granted the qualification 
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as the lead underwriter for short-term financing and has already successfully 
underwritten three financing bonds.  
 
By the end of 2005, its trust assets had amounted to RMB 213.2 billion and trust 
services revenue RMB 263 million (ACFB, 2006). ICBC has remained as the market 
leader in securities investment fund trust area. Its insurance asset trust, enterprise 
annuity trust and QFII trust services are expanding. It is the first banks that has 
provided securitized trust services and among the first few domestic trust banks that 
have passed the SAS70 International Control Audit Certification. ICBC has also 
been awarded the 2005 Best Trust Bank in China by Global Trustee and Financial 
Capital. In 2005, ICBC had granted trust loans of RMB 43 billion, provided the 
agent service for the State Development Bank to supervise loans and cash settlement 
of RMB 32.1 billion and for China Import and Export Bank with export seller credit 
and settlement services of RMB 13.7 billion (ACFB, 2006). ICBC provides agent 
cash clearing services for 85 out of 128 members of Shanghai Gold Exchange 
(hereafter refers to SGE) (ACFB, 2006). The total amount of cash clearing was 
RMB 54.2 billion, ranking first in the total cash clearing in SGE. It has 130 gold 
agent accounts, with agent gold trading volume of 29 tons and agent platinum 
trading volume of 3.2 tons (ACFB, 2006). ICBC is among the first few that has been 
granted the qualification as enterprise annuity fund account manager and trustee and 
is the only institution in the domestic commercial banks that has acquired two 
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qualifications. By the end of 2005, ICBC had managed 296,000 personal accounts 
and annuity trust funds of RMB 4.3 billion (ACFB, 2006).  
 
Personal banking business. The bank has put in place a personal intermediary 
business system focusing on personal settlement, bank card services and personal 
finance products. ICBC has the largest customer base in personal finance and bank 
card services. In 2005, ICBC continued to dominate the market in various retail 
banking service areas including resident savings, personal loan, personal 
intermediary services and bank cards. Its clientele structure has been improving; the 
core competency of its business offices and multi-channel application capability has 
substantially enhanced. ICBC has consecutively been elected as the Best 
State-owned Retail Bank in China by the Asian Banker magazine for three years.  
 
By the end of 2005, its savings deposit balance had amounted to RMB 3,116.6 
billion and personal loans balance RMB 527.4 billion in which personal housing 
loans balance totalled RMB 459.3 billion (ACFB, 2006). Its personal loans 
continued to rank the first among its peers. 
 
In 2005, ICBC reported the net personal commission income of RMB 5.993 billion, 
accounting for 56.8 percent of its total commission income (ACFB, 2006). Personal 
settlement, bank card services and personal finance product sale constituted the main 
source of its personal intermediary service income. Targeted at the high-end 
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personal banking clients, ICBC had introduced a number of new functions and 
services such as SMS Bill, Finance Classroom, and Bank Keeper. By the end of 
2005, the Elite Club accounts had totalled 1.88 million, a year-on-year increase of 
51.6 percent (ACFB, 2006). ICBC remains as the market leader in major agent 
services areas. It occupies 31.2percent of the certificate T-bond brokerage market 
and is the largest distributor. It sells open-ended funds of RMB 70.7 billion and 
insurance products for the premium totalling RMB 32.2 billion (ACFB, 2006). By 
the end of 2005, ICBC had issued 145.22 million bank cards with a total 
consumption amount of RMB 241 billion and bank card services revenue of RMB 
2.346 billion. It had developed the EMV multi-functional credit card based on the 
chip which further improved the security of credit cards (ACFB, 2006).  
 
Cash Management. ICBC also actively participate in cash operations in the 
inter-bank market, instrument market, bond market and forex market. In 2005, ICBC 
was among the first that acquired the qualification as the lead underwriter for 
corporate short-term financing. It conducted the first bond forward transaction in the 
Chinese market, launched the ICBC Bond Market Link (a legal person RMB 
personal finance product), and issued the first batch of subordinated bonds of RMB 
35 billion.  
 
For the year of 2005, ICBC loaned out RMB 1,613.1 billion by means of inter-bank 
repurchase and borrowing, borrowed in RMB 140 billion. Its central bank 
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instrument trade volume totalled RMB 661.9 billion in which the spot transactions 
accounted for RMB 188.6 billion (ACFB, 2006). In 2005, its annual instrument 
financing transactions amounted to RMB 1,007.6 billion, for the first time in history 
exceeding RMB 1,000 billion (ACFB, 2006). Its balance of instrument discount 
services was RMB 392.8 billion, accounting for 11.9percent of total loan balance. Its 
instrument discount interest income amounted to RMB 9.045 billion (ACFB, 2006). 
In 2005, ICBC had a bond interest income of RMB 44.084 billion and bond 
investment spread yield of RMB 429 million (ACFB, 2006). 
 
Internet Banking. ICBC‗s e-banking service system consists of self-service 
banking, telephone banking, mobile banking and internet banking. As the largest 
internet banking service provider in the domestic market, in 2005 ICBC had reported 
an internet banking trade volume of RMB 46.8 trillion, accounting for 26 percent of 
the total trade volume of its overall operations (ACFB, 2006). Its operation profit 
amounted to RMB 421 million, a year-on-year growth of 79.1 percent (ACFB, 2006). 
More than a quarter of ICBC's operations are conducted over-the-counter. ICBC is 
the largest e-commerce online payment service provider in China. In 2005, ICBC 
introduced a number of new products including online banking professional version 
Bank-Enterprise Interlink and One-Stop Payment, as well as such brand products as 
ICBC e-Fortune Link and USB Shield. All the local and other regional online bank 
accounts have been placed under central management. Online banking transactions 
amounted to RMB 42.2 trillion, personal and corporate online bank accounts 
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amounted to 14,860,000 and 320,000 respectively. E-commerce online payment 
transactions amounted to RMB 11.6 billion, a year-on-year growth of 100 percent 
(ACFB, 2006). It is the third consecutive year that ICBC has been elected the Best 
Personal Internet Bank in China by the Global Finance magazine, as well as many 
other awards by the domestic online banking survey and polls. ICBC is the first bank 
in China that has introduced the telephone banking pan-China interactive travelling 
services within the mainland China as well as between Hong Kong and the mainland. 
Two tele-banking trust systems (north and south) have been set up and 26 
institutions already included in the ICBC‘s integrated tele-banking system. By the 
end of 2005, ICBC had owned a total number of 18,270 ATMs and 1,473 
self-service bank offices. There are 141 million transactions processed by the 
self-service banking network, with the trade volume of RMB 134 billion (ACFB, 
2006).  
 
International Banking. ICBC has constantly boosted its cross-border operations 
and tried to achieve a balance between RMB and Forex business and between 
domestic and overseas business. It commits to delivering credit and financing 
services for more and more enterprises competing in the global market. As of 
December 31, 2005, its total forex assets amounted to US$ 61.2 billion, EBIT from 
its overseas branches and agencies was US$ 180 million (ACFB, 2006). Total forex 
deposits balance was US$ 29.1 billion and net forex loans were US$ 29.1 billion 
(ACFB, 2006). ICBC has set up the international instrument settlement centre with a 
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capacity of US$ 292.8 billion per annum. In 2005, its agent forex cash transaction 
volume was US$ 143.2 billion in which the forex settlement and sale was US$105.2 
billion, agent forex trade US$ 30.4 billion, and agent finance and risk management 
transactions US$ 7.6 billion (ACFB, 2006). ICBC is among those first financial 
institutions that were granted the qualification as the inter-bank forex market maker. 
As of December 31, 2005, ICBC had entered into partnership with 1,165 banks in 
114 countries and territories and had or controlled 106 branches and subsidiaries in 
major financial centres around the globe (ACFB, 2006). As of December 31, 2005, 
Industrial and Commercial Bank of China Asia Limited (ICBC Asia) had annual 
average ROE of common stocks 11percent, average ROA 0.9percent, capital 
adequacy ratio 15.7 percent, bad debts percentage 0.9percent. In October 2005, 
ICBC Asia announced that its merger with Belgian Bank was completed (ACFB, 
2006). 
 
3.2.2 Agricultural Bank of China (ABC) 
This bank was recovered in February 1979. At the beginning, it was appointed as a 
specialised bank, which was in charge of rural finance (ACFB, 1986, p. II-9). As the 
separate business scope gradually diminished, the bank has developed rapidly in the 
urban financial market since the 1980s. By the end of 2004, the Bank has nearly 31 
thousand branches and 489 thousand employees, and its asset reached US$ 485.9 
trillion (ACFB, 2005). 
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ABC has set up branches in Singapore and Hong Kong, established the offices in 
London, Tokyo, and New York, etc. The scope of business has developed from the 
original rural credit and settlement to a wide range of financial businesses with RMB 
or foreign currencies. Except over-the-counter services, the bank operates telephone 
banking, online banking and self-service banking as well.  
 
ABC has established the largest financial electronic network in China. In 2004, 
ABC's correspondent banks extend to 101 countries; the total number of 
correspondent banks reaches 983 (ACFB, 2005). The data operation centre at the 
Head Office that deals with data integration has a daily transaction number of about 
8 million, accounting for one fourth of the total daily transaction amount of the 
Agricultural Bank of China Integrated Banking (ABIS) system of ABC. By the end 
of 2004, the issuance quantity of bank cards had amounted to 178.16 million. The 
business revenue of bank cards increased greatly, reaching RMB 3.8 billion with an 
increase rate of 369 percent (ACFB, 2006).  
 
ABC is widely seen as the most inefficient bank among the SOCBs. It pitches the 
business to normal customer in both rural and urban area, using the huge amount of 
branch throughout the country. Given the disadvantage in its infrastructure in the 
rural areas and the generally backward state of the rural economy, this bank still has 
a long way to go to catch up with the other banks that are largely located in the cities 
69 
 
and towns and are associated with the rapidly growing sectors of the Chinese 
economy. 
 
3.2.3 Bank of China (BOA) 
The Bank has the most extensive overseas branches among the SOCBs. By the end 
of 2003, it has 549 overseas branches (BOC Annual report 2003, p. 17). It was 
separated from the People‘s Bank and made an economic entity directly 
subordinating to the State Council in March 1979. At the same time, the State 
Council vastly expanded the bank‘s authorised business scope, primarily to support 
China‘s economic opening to the outside world. Before 1985, the bank had the sole 
monopoly to carry out all types of foreign exchange business (Almanac of China‘s 
Finance and Banking 2003, Statistics section, p. III-9). The State Administration of 
Exchange Control allowed more and more branches of the specialised banks, as well 
as nonblank financial institutions, to enter the foreign exchange business gradually 
during 1980s and 1990s. Its assets reached 2.9 trillion Yuan (Almanac of China‘s 
Finance and Banking 2003, Statistics section, p. II-7). In 1994 and 1995, the bank 
became the third note issuing bank in Hong Kong and the second one in Macau 
respectively. On October 1st 2001, Bank of China (Hong Kong) Ltd. was 
incorporated as a result of the merging of 10 member banks of the former Bank of 
China Group. In July 2002, Bank of China (Hong Kong) Limited was successfully 
listed on the Hong Kong Stock Exchange. It became the first State-owned 
Commercial Bank that was listed on the international capital market. BOC 
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completed the financial restructuring in 2004, and the introduction of strategic 
investors in 2005. On 1st June and 5th July 2006, the bank was successfully listed on 
the Stock Exchange of Hong Kong and the Shanghai Stock Exchange respectively. 
Thus the bank became the first Chinese bank to be listed in both international and 
domestic capital markets. 
 
The Bank is mainly engaged in commercial banking, including corporate and retail 
banking, treasury business and financial institutions banking. Corporate banking is 
built upon credit products, to provide customers with personalized financial services 
as well as financing and financial solutions. Retail banking focuses on providing 
customer with such services as savings deposit, consumer credit bankcard and 
wealth management business. Treasury business includes domestic and 
foreign-currency trading and investment, fund management, wealth management, 
value-secured debt business, domestic and overseas financing and other fund 
operation and management services. Financial institution banking refers to services 
offered to banks, securities brokerages, fund companies and insurance companies 
worldwide ranging from clearing, inter-bank lending to agent and custodian 
services.  
 
BOC has built up a modern management system and started to expand its overseas 
developments through issuance of shares and introduction of strategic investors. The 
bank claims in the Annual Report 2007 that, ―the Bank develops in a comprehensive, 
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coordinated and sustainable manner, thereby creates greater value for shareholders‖. 
Following the other commercial banks strategy in domestic business, BOC has been 
reducing the number of the branch in the last decade. This strategy has affected its 
performance in domestic banking market. This will be examined in detail in chapter 
six. 
 
3.2.4 China Construction Bank (CCB) 
The Bank was removed from the administrative control of the Ministry of Finance in 
October 1979, and elevated to an organisation subordinating directly to the State 
Council, placing it on the same administrative level as China‘s other banks (ACFB, 
1986, pII-13). In 1980, for the first time, it also began to accept deposits and to 
engage in lending to support investment projects, rather than simply acting as a 
pass-through for government budgetary funds. By the end of 2004, its assets reached 
US$ 686.5 trillion with a network of approximately 14 thousand branches and 255 
thousand employers (ACFB, 2005). In addition, the bank has two joint-venture 
subsidiaries in China and maintain overseas branches in Hong Kong, Singapore, 
Frankfurt, Johannesburg and Seoul; representative offices in New York and London; 
and a subsidiary bank, Jian Sing Bank Limited (The company has been renamed as 
China Construction Bank (Asia) Limited with effect from Nov 2, 2005), in Hong 
Kong. The bank was listed on Hong Kong stock market in 2005. According to The 
Banker magazine (2006), the Bank based ranked 11th among the world‘s top 1,000 
banks. 
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CCB intend to strengthen historically relationships with its large corporate 
customers by focusing on industry leaders in strategic industries such as power, 
telecommunications, oil and gas, and infrastructure, as well as major financial 
institutions and government agencies, and by selectively developing relationships 
with small- and medium-enterprise customers. In the personal banking segment, the 
bank intends to increase revenue from high-income retail customers. On wholesale 
and retail products, the bank intends to develop fee-based businesses, including 
payment and settlement services, personal wealth management and corporate 
treasury management and grow proactively personal banking business with a focus 
on residential mortgages and diverse savings products, and to build an 
industry-leading credit card business. The bank prioritizes the efforts in the major 
cities of the more developed geographical markets of the Yangtze River Delta, Pearl 
River Delta and Bohai Rim regions and accelerates development in the capital cities 
of inland provinces in China. 
 
3.2.5 The competitive advantage of the State-owned commercial banks 
A significant competitive disadvantage of Chinese banks relative to their international 
peers is the reliance on corporate lending and on interest income. Corporate loans 
accounted for 88 percent of the loan portfolio of ICBC, China‘s largest bank, with 
retail loans at only about 12 percent. And nearly 90 percent of earnings at ICBC are 
derived from interest income, though net interest margin has shown modest 
improvement for ICBC and other Chinese banks in recent years. 
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Despite a fast growth and the large current size of China‘s banking industry, banking 
products and services remain substantially under-penetrated by international standards. 
The favourable macroeconomic trends not only provide exceptionally attractive 
growth opportunities for China‘s banking industry, but also offer opportunities for 
them to revamp the existing business model and diversify businesses and income. 
Two under-developed but high potential areas of business growth are retail banking 
and fee income. 
 
At the same time, China continues to improve the institutional framework to build a 
modern and vibrant banking industry. Key areas of focus include legal and judiciary 
reforms to allow for effective bankruptcy mechanism and gradual interest rate 
liberalisation to allow banks to more efficiently price credit risks, establishment of a 
nationwide credit rating service and a consumer credit reporting bureau, 
harmonisation of PRC accounting and auditing standards with the International 
Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS), a more reasonable tax regime that avoids over 
taxation and encourages banks for prudent provisioning, and a relaxation of outdated 
regulations preventing banks from growing their fee-based business (ACFB, 2008). 
Needless to say, all these limitations cast a shadow over the prospect of the Chinese 
banking industry and likely hobble its tremendous potential to become a world-class 
banking system. 
 
74 
 
3.3 Performance of the banking sector 
Comparing to the international banks, the efficiency of Chinese commercial banks is 
rather low. As shown in the table below, the numbers of staff and branched in SOCBs 
are ten and twenty-six times as great of that of international banks. Consequently, in 
terms of some qualitative indicators of bank performance, such as deposit per worker 
and per branch, international banks are usually far more productive than the Chinese 
SOCBs by up to one hundred seventy-three times!  
 
Table 10. Comparison of banking operations in 2004 
 Number of 
Staff 
Number of 
Branches 
Total 
deposit 
(Billion 
US$) 
Deposit per 
worker 
(Thousand 
US$) 
Deposit per 
branch 
(Million US$) 
ICBC 375781 21223 581.8 1548.2 27.4 
ABC 489425 31004 413.7 845.28 13.3 
BOC 164193 11307 258.1 1571.9 22.8 
CCB 254689 14458 387.3 1520.7 26.7 
Average 321022 19498 410.2 1371.5 22.6 
Top 10* 30716 753 148.3 12930.0 3902.5 
* Top 10 banks in the world in average in 2003 
Source: ACFB, 2005 
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3.3.1 The income structure of SOCBs 
The growth in banking assets, deposits and loans has been spectacular in recent years 
across all the SOCBs, but the growth in the more market-oriented and riskier 
businesses has been rather limited. Although the business scope of the SOCBs is 
expanding, the traditional banking businesses still remain the dominant source of 
commercial income for the SOCBs (see Table 11). Non-interest income accounted for 
only around 10 percent of total income for the Chinese SOCBs (with the only 
exception of ABC that recorded a 26 percent share of non-interest income in 2005), 
compared with roughly 48 percent for the global banking market. Therefore, the 
traditional market for deposits and loans still remain the main battleground for the 
SOCBs. 
 
Table 11. Share of interest earnings in total operating revenue (percent) 
  CCB ICBC ABC BOC 
1998 98.3 76.8 94.8 72.5 
1999 95.8 75.5 94.8 73.9 
2000 75.7 77.4 91.8 92.6 
2001 90.0 69.8 88.8 90.0 
2002 94.6 95.4 87.9 79.9 
2003 92.7 93.7 85.8 79.9 
2004 92.2 83.0 80.8 83.9 
2005 93.5 81.8 73.7 87.6 
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Source: Authors‘ calculation from various issues of the ACFB 
 
SOCBs reported a net income of $19 billion in 2006, $5 billion higher than the net 
income for 2005 (ACFB, 2007). The net incomes of ABC are $1.4 billion in 2006 and 
$0.13 billion in 2005 (ACFB, 2007), indicating an astonishing year-on-year rate of 
increase of 980%! The increased amount of net interest income, fee-based income and 
public subsidy are $586 million, $55 million and 354 million (ACFB, 2007). This 
shows the current competition situation of the SOCBs. Their business scope is still 
restricted to traditional business- deposits and loans. Unlike other SOCBs, ABC 
increased share of non-interest income steadily from 1998 to 2005. This is based on 
its huge network around both rural and urban area. This is one example of how the 
Chinese banks exploit their location advantage.  
 
3.3.2 The financial performance of the state-owned commercial banks 
To measure the performance of a firm, two of the most preferred ratios are Return 
on Equity (ROE) and Return on Assets (ROA) (Hollis, 2005). Each ratio provides 
insight into a financial institution that allows management to make strategic 
decisions that can dramatically affect its structure and profitability. In the case of 
credit unions, ROA has been the predominant analytical tool to measure profitability; 
however, ROE is just as comprehensive and could be the better indicator (Hollis, 
2005). Return on assets equals Net Income divided by Total Assets. It shows how 
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efficient asset is used. Return on equity is calculated by dividing Net Income by 
average Equity. This tells us how efficient the invested capital is used.  
Further evidence to show that the SOCBs are unlikely to behave as profit maximisers 
comes from the usual measures of financial performance for business firms. As Table 
12 reveals, the usual measures of financial performance such as ROA and ROE for the 
SOCBs are simply unreliable and subject to huge swings from time to time. This is 
simply because the business operations of the SOCs were subject to frequent 
government interference such as asset-stripping and capital injections. Thus, all the 
data on costs, income and profits are substantially distorted market outcomes (see 
Table 12). 
 
Table 12. Return on assets and return on equity for the Chinese SOCBs (percent) 
 CCB ICBC ABC BOC 
ROA: 
1998 0.06 0.11 -0.05 0.10 
1999 0.23 0.12 -0.02 0.11 
2000 0.07 0.13 0.01 0.07 
2001 0.10 0.14 0.05 0.10 
2002 0.14 0.13 0.10 0.33 
2003 0.01 0.04 0.06 0.15 
2004 1.25 0.60 0.05 0.60 
2005 1.03 0.53 0.02 0.70 
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ROE: 
1998 1.08 1.88 -0.68 1.69 
1999 4.64 2.27 -0.26 1.98 
2000 1.63 2.72 0.22 1.17 
2001 2.20 3.09 0.87 1.21 
2002 4.01 3.47 2.13 4.33 
2003 0.22 1.24 1.39 2.46 
2004 25.08 -5.60 2.57 10.22 
2005 16.37 13.30 1.31 11.76 
Source: Authors‘ calculations from various issues of the ACFB. 
 
One particular example is the ROE of ICBC for 2004 which reported to be -5.60 
percent. This substantial deterioration in the ROE was because the bank used the 
income to write off the huge amount of bad assets in 2004 (ACFB, 2005). The figure 
jumped to 13.30 percent next year. This shows the bank management of ICBC 
intended to make the bank‘s balance sheets look more profitable after the new reform 
measures had been introduced from 2004. The banks are not as good as they looked in 
their financial reports. The other hidden issue is that the amount of non-performing 
loans is usually transferred into new loans to make the quality of the loans appear 
normal. 
 
As a summary, given the market conditions under which the SOCBs operated (and are 
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still operating, though to a lesser extent), there was little incentive or obligation for 
individual banking groups within the SOCB sector to pursue maximum profit as an 
operating objective. In fact, how successful the individual banks perform in the 
traditional markets for deposits and loans fundamentally determine their overall 
competitiveness and financial performance, particularly during the time period under 
investigation. It is questionable to make direct comparisons of the financial or 
efficiency performance between SOCBs and other domestic banks or foreign banks 
(as in Li, et. al, 2001; and Lin and Zhang, 2008), since these banks operated under 
distinctly different market models. A model of banking efficiency and competitiveness 
of the SOCBs must take these aspects into consideration. This is the conceptual basis 
for the empirical models that are used for assessing the efficiency level of the SOCBs 
in chapters five and six.  
 
3.4 The formation and normalisation of NPLs 
This section single out the NPL problem as it seems that it is no longer the major 
concern of the SOCBs as most of the NPLs have been transferred to the AMCs. The 
SOCBs all claimed they have a low ratio of bad loans (ACFB, 2008). However, the 
huge burden of low quality assets had been broadly discussed from the mid of 1990s 
to mid of 2000s. Studies by Xu (1998) and Lardy (1998) claimed that China‘s four 
major state banks were technically insolvent by the late 1990s. They were estimated 
that by 1997, 35 percent of state owned enterprises had debts greater than assets. 
Despite the fact that the Chinese government had set up asset management companies 
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to take over about RMB 1.4 trillion (US$ 169 billion) of bad debts off the state banks‘ 
accounts, China‘s Central Bank Governor, Dai Xianglong (2001) disclosed that the 
Chinese banks‘ non-performing loans (NPL) ratio was alarmingly high – a quarter of 
the state banks‘ loans were still overdue. In 2003, the nonperforming loans (NPLs) of 
these ‗big four‘ banks were officially estimated to be RMB 2.4 trillion (US$290 
billion), or 23 percent of total loans, but the unofficial estimate from the credit-rating 
agencies suggested the figure to be close to 3.5 trillion Yuan or 34 percent of total 
loans (ACFB, 2004). The figure was dramatically dropped to less than 3% by end of 
2008 (CBRC, 2008).  
 
3.4.1 Formation of NPLs 
a) Emergence of NPLs 
In the 1980s, by using banks as the primary intermediary to allocate funds instead of 
relying on direct fiscal grants, the government attempted to reduce the role of central 
planning and impose more financial discipline on state-owned enterprises (SOE). In 
order to maintain control over aggregate credit, the PBC established an annual credit 
plan for the nation as a whole and for each of the specialized banks. However, both 
PBC and the state banks were subject to extensive government influence and actual 
credit growth consistently exceeded the targets as set by the credit plan. 
 
SOEs seemed to have insatiable appetite for borrowing as they regarded loans from 
state-owned banks as ―essentially free‖. A substantial amount of bank loans were 
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directed by government to finance priority projects and support commercially 
unviable SOEs. The political support for even chronic loss-makers was such that there 
was no credit culture of honouring debt obligations. As the banks‘ loan portfolio grew, 
so did the non-performing assets. By the early 1990s, the problems of swollen bad 
assets in the banking system had become so severe that the government was forced to 
reconsider the wisdom of pervasive political interference with banks‘ credit decisions. 
Therefore, the logistical next step was to separate the so-called policy lending from 
commercial lending. Policy lending not only includes subsidized credit (i.e., lower 
interest rates than for other similar activities) to particular uses, but also includes the 
channelling for funds to specific activities and priority sectors designated to spearhead 
national development, notwithstanding the underlying commercial risks. Typically 
policy lending is mandatory as banks are required, irrespective of its commercial 
merit, to extend such credit to meet the objectives of government economic and 
industrial policies. The outstanding stock of policy loans was estimated at RMB 699.6 
billion in 1991. PBC accounted for 4 percent, and the rest were all extended by the 
Big 4 banks. Policy lending accounted for a staggering share of the Big-four‘s loan 
portfolio- 58 percent for CCB, 51 percent for ABC, 67 percent for BOC, and 
18percent for ICBC (see table 13).  
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Table 13. Policy Lending by the State-Owned Commercial Banks in 1980s 
(percent share of total loan portfolio) 
 ICBC ABC BOC CCB Overall 
1985 11 42 88 48 32 
1986 11 38 82 50 31 
1987 12 38 77 51 31 
1988 12 38 78 51 31 
1989 14 42 77 51 34 
1990 14 48 73 53 36 
1991 17 51 67 58 38 
Source: ACFB, 1992 
The massive scale of policy lending not only caused colossal misallocation of credit 
and undermined the banking system‘s financial health, but also hindered PBC‘s 
conduct of monetary policy. Even in the face of strong inflationary pressures, PBC 
found it extremely difficult to rein in credit expansion because of the political 
pressure to maintain policy lending. But the risk of runaway inflation in early 1990s 
also led to greater resolve on the part of the central leadership to enable PBC to 
exercise more effective monetary control. To free specialized banks from the burden 
of policy lending and transform them into true commercial banks, China in 1993 set 
up three policy banks-China Development Bank (CDB), China Export-Import Bank, 
and China Agricultural Development Bank, to take over policy lending functions from 
state-owned specialized banks. The main function of CDB, which started operations 
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in the spring 1994, is to finance large-scale infrastructure projects and strategic 
industries of national priority. It is a not-for-profit institution but is expected to break 
even. It can extend the so-called soft loans at subsidized interest rates. Since their 
establishment, CDB and Export-Import Bank have been functioning in line with or 
exceeding initial expectations. CDB in particular has proven to be more commercial 
than it was set up to be. Starting from a clean slate, it has picked the most viable state 
projects and corporate clients, hence its loan portfolios exhibit surprisingly good asset 
quality. As an unexpected consequence, CDB is in effect in competition with 
non-policy banks as a commercial long-term credit institution. 
 
b) The magnitude of NPLs 
Since the middle of the 1990‘s, the Chinese government has paid increasing attention 
to the problem of NPLs of banks. In 1995, the annual meeting of the National 
Banking Operation and Management explicitly pointed out the NPL problems of 
SOCBs. At the annual meeting of the National Financial Work Conference of 1997, 
the problems were again referred to. In January 1998, the Governor of the PBC, for 
the first time, disclosed data regarding NPLs at a press conference. According to the 
report (PBC, 1998), the NPL ratio reached 25 to 26 percent at end-1997, of which 
past-due loans constituted 15 percent, past-due beyond 2 years 8 percent, and bad 
loans 2 percent. The 1997-2003 data of NPLs, reported by the Governor of the PBC, 
are shown in Table below. 
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Table 14. Formally Released Ratios of NPLs in SOCBs 
 NPLs/Total Loans 
(percent) 
Amount of NPLs 
(Billion US$) 
NPLs/GDP 
(percent) 
1997 25 22.6 17.2 
1998 10 75.6 7.9 
1999 25 199.2 20 
2000 25 197.4 18.2 
2001 25.3 213.6 18.4 
2002 25.3 245.1 19.8 
2003 22.2 242.1 17.1 
Source: ACFB, 1998-2004 
 
The data released on NPLs are likely to be underestimated for several reasons. First, 
the 1998‘s figure of 10 percent appears puzzling given that the NPL ratio of SOCBs 
reached more than 25 percent in other years. Some have pointed out that 10percent 
was meant to refer to the ratio of bad loans, thus it is likely that the NPL ratio reached 
about 25 percent in 1998 as well. Second, the NPL data of 1999 is also somewhat 
doubtful. After the SOCBs transferred RMB 1.4 trillion of NPLs to the four AMCs, 
the PBC unambiguously stated that this enabled the NPL ratio of the SOCBs to be 
reduced to 10 percent. However, this adjustment appears not to be reflected in the 
official data. Shi (2003) estimated that the NPL ratio of SOCBs reached 39 percent in 
1999 and 29.2 percent in 2000. 
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Based on data released by the government, foreign research institutions and credit 
rating agencies also carried out several estimates. For example, Moody‘s Investors 
Service estimated that the NPL ratio of SOCBs was in the range of 35 percent to 70 
percent in 1996, while Morgan Stanley Dean Witter estimated that the ratio was 36 
percent in 1998 (Li, 2002). Regardless of which data or estimates are correct, the fact 
is that the sheer amount of China‘s banking sector NPLs is immense, and the 
problems it presents are serious. For example, at the end of July 2001, in ChaoYang 
City, the balance of loans issued by all financial institution was RMB 6.76 billion, of 
which NPLs were RMB 4.9 billion. This means that the NPL ratio was 72.4 percent 
(Wu Liang 2002). Given that the accounting and auditing systems were opaque before 
2002, collecting reliable data is an extremely difficult task. Furthermore, as pointed 
out earlier, the four-category classification basis allows some banks to falsify reports 
by adopting the practice of making new loans to pay back old loans so that on the 
balance sheet some NPLs can be concealed. 
 
According to figures provided by the CBRC, the amount of NPLs totalled RMB 2.54 
trillion at end-June 2003 (CBRC, 2003). The amount includes NPLs of major 
financial institutions (such as the four SOCBs, three policy banks and 11 joint-stock 
commercial banks), whose aggregate loans accounted for 82 percent of the total loans. 
The amount of NPLs of SOCBs reached about RMB 2 trillion. At the end of 
September 2003, NPL ratios of various financial institutions under the 5-category 
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classification were 21.4 percent for SOCBs, 18.1 percent for policy banks, and 8.4 
percent for joint-stock commercial banks (ACFB, 2004). NPL problems of UCCs and 
RCCs appear more serious than those of SOCBs and other banks. Based on the 
four-category classification, the NPL ratio of UCCs is estimated to have reached more 
than 30 percent--much greater than the national average (Economic Daily, 2002). The 
ratios of RCCs are likely to be even greater than those of the UCCs, although relevant 
data are not available. 
 
c) Soft budget constraints and moral hazard 
Soft budget constraint of state banks is widely cited as a major cause of China‘s 
non-performing loan problem (Yuan, 2000; Zhang, 1999; Li, 1999; Xu, 1998). Lack 
of hard budget constraint in banks themselves leads to the failure of the banks to 
impose hard financial constraint on the borrowers, causing the development and 
accumulation of non-performing loans. 
 
It is, therefore, more comprehensible that the banks‘ more generous lending to 
high-risk SOEs was driven by moral-hazard behaviour, especially in the backdrop of 
the 1.7-trillion-yuan bailout for the four big banks in the period 1998 to 1999. 
Meanwhile, on finding that bank lending bias towards SOEs became more severe in 
this period contradicts the ex ante bailout hypothesis, but lends support to the 
hypothesis of reckless lending induced by possible future ex post bailout plans. Such 
ex post bailout did happen again. In January 2004, the PBC injected US$ 45 billion of 
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China‘s foreign reserves to boost the capital-adequacy ratios of CCB and BOC, two of 
the four big state-owned commercial banks. A major purpose of this ‗indirect bailout‘ 
was to refresh the banks‘ balance sheet with the injected funds so that they could soon 
list their shares on the stock market and be able to make new, supposedly more 
profitable, lending. In an efficient market, assistance to financially troubled firms can 
only be arranged through a mutually beneficial agreement between the bank and the 
borrowing firm in the event of default. The pre-condition for such arrangement is 
adequate legal protection for creditors, which China still lacks. Without such 
protection, the banks should have resorted to credit-cutoff as deterrence to the 
worst-risk firms‘ irresponsible borrowing. Stiglitz and Weis (1983) argue that an 
effective threat of denying credit might have important incentive effects on borrowers‘ 
behaviour, causing borrowers to take less risky projects. Such a sub-optimal scenario, 
unfortunately, did not emerge in China during the late 1990s, plausibly due to 
expectation for ex post government bailout. Reckless lending was aggravated during 
1998 to 1999 when the Chinese government took over a huge number of bad loans 
from the major state banks through its four state-sponsored asset management 
companies.  
 
With the NPL ratio in China‘s banking sector standing at nearly a quarter of banks‘ 
assets, just removing the bad debt from bank account is not enough. Although, in time 
of transition, there could be good reasons for the government to take over bad loans to 
give banking business a fresh start, such interventions must follow carefully specified 
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legal procedures and must not cultivate expectations by lenders and borrowers for 
implicit government guarantees for future loans. Firm government commitments to 
enforce hard budget constraints on both SOEs and state banks are badly needed to 
prevent the formation of a new vicious cycle of non-performing loan accumulation.  
 
3.4.2 Asset management companies (AMCs) 
By the middle of 1998, the State Council had decided to set up AMCs to absorb NPLs 
at face value and to recover as many NPLs as possible. The four AMCs, Cinda, 
Changcheng, Huarong and Dongfang, which took over NPLs from China 
Construction Bank, the Agricultural Bank of China, Industrial and Commercial Bank 
of China, and the Bank of China respectively, each received 10 billion RMB in initial 
capital from the MOF. On that basis, the four AMCs issued 1.4 trillion RMB in 
financial bonds to the state banks and used the funds to purchase 1.4 trillion in NPLs 
from the Big Four state banks at face value (ACFB, 2002). AMCs each had a charter 
of ten years and were suppose to recover as many of the NPLs as possible through 
debt-to-equity swap, bankruptcy and restructuring debt. At the end of the ten-year 
charter, the MOF will issue bonds or inject government surplus to write-off the 
remaining amount. In this manner, state banks replaced 1.4 trillion RMB in NPLs 
with 1.4 trillion RMB in MOF-backed AMC bonds, thereby getting rid of some 
two-fifths of the estimated 3.3 trillion in NPLs. Meanwhile, the MOF did not have to 
list the 1.4 trillion in special bonds on the official budget, since it merely guaranteed 
bonds issued by the AMCs. The AMCs, on the other hand, were saddled with 1.4 
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trillion RMB in NPLs. Although AMC officials initially resisted purchasing NPLs at 
face value, the opposition soon dissolved as they realized that the MOF was 
ultimately responsible for the pool of NPLs. 
 
Table 15. Details of AMCs (Billion US$) 
 Cinda Huarong Changcheng Dongfang Total 
Time of 
establishment 
1999.4 1999.10 1999.10 1999.10  
Related SOCB 
 
China 
Construction 
Bank 
Industrial and 
Commercial Bank 
of China 
Agricultural 
Bank of China 
Bank of 
China 
 
NPLs removed 
(Billion US$) 
45.2 49.4 41.9 32.4 168.8 
Capital (Billion 
US$) 
1.2 1.2 1.2 1.2 4.8 
Central Bank 
Lending (Billion 
US$) 
0 11.5 41.8 13.0 66.3 
Financial Bonds 
(Billion US$) 
45.2 37.9 0 19.4 102.4 
Source: ACFB, 2002; Cinda, 2007; Huarong, 2007; Changcheng, 2007; Dongfang, 
2007. 
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AMCs took over SOCBs‘ NPLs, which had been contracted before 1996. In principal, 
the past-due and bad loans classified under the four-category loan classification were 
purchased at their book value. This indicates that the government took over the NPLs 
produced in the era of planning economy. The total NPLs received by the four AMCs 
were RMB 1.4 trillion, which accounted for 15.6 percent of the total assets of the four 
SOCBs. The four AMCs financed this transfer by issuing bonds of RMB 850 billion 
and borrowing RMB 55 billion from the PBC. This operation, however, did not 
increase reserves, since the SOCBs‘ total borrowings of RMB 55 billion from the 
PBC were deducted from their liability (and the total amount of RMB 85 billion in 
bonds issued by AMCs appeared on the asset side of SOCBs in exchange for a 
reduction of transferred NPLs of RMB 1.4 trillion.) The interest rate for the PBC 
lending was 2.25 percent. The purchase of RMB 1.4 trillion NPLS was completed by 
end-2000. In fact, the quality of the transferred NPLs was extremely poor. More than 
70 percent of the debt assets are credit loans, which are largely loans made by the 
state-owned enterprises for investing in equipment and production capacity. Quite a 
few of the loans include those guaranteed by the government. It has been pointed out 
that 40 percent of SOCBs‘ assets are NPLs and should be written off (Economic Daily, 
2001). As for measures to cope with the RMB 1.4 trillion worth of NPLs transferred, 
the AMCs have used two approaches. One is to conduct a debt-equity swap for firms 
(largely, state-owned enterprises) that are relatively better performing and thus can be 
regarded as candidates for becoming public companies. The other is to directly deal 
with transferred NPLs to firms that are unlikely to survive. 
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a) Debt-equity Swaps and Problems 
The debt-equity swaps scheme involves the following measure. Initially, the State 
Economic and Trade Commission investigate insolvent enterprises and makes 
recommendations to the relevant AMCs. The conditions for such a recommendation 
are stringent for several reasons. First, the enterprise debtor must have the necessary 
management skills, employ competent managers, maintain good accounting standards, 
have an element of competitiveness, etc. The enterprises whose debts were transferred 
to the AMCs were mostly state-owned, and only a few were foreign trading 
enterprises. The companies had been established without any equity and their 
liabilities consisted totally of loans. Second, based on the enterprises book value, the 
AMCs are supposed to pay principal and interest to the SOCBs that own the debt of 
the particular enterprise. Third, the AMCs are in charge of arranging debt-equity 
swaps and signing contracts with enterprises after their own investigation. Such 
contracts become effective after being examined and confirmed by the State 
Economic and Trade Commission, the Ministry of Finance and the PBC, and are then 
followed by the issuance of the certification of the State Council. Fourth, the AMCs 
as shareholders are supposed to encourage the enterprises to improve their 
management in order to realize a public listing, and thereby recover the costs of their 
acquisition by selling stocks on the stock market, or by facilitating the enterprises 
ability to buy back their stocks. 
 
By the end of 2000, the AMCs had performed debt-equity swaps of RMB 341 billion 
92 
 
in respect of 587 enterprises (ACFB, 2002). But the impact of the debt-equity swaps 
was not as successful as expected. This was because those enterprises made little 
progress in terms of reforming their management. The debt-equity swaps enabled 
firms to lower the ratio of their liabilities, on average, from 73 percent to 50 percent. 
In 2000, the balances of 80 percent of firms performing debt-equity swaps shifted 
from deficit to surplus. The main reason for such an improvement came from a 
reduction in the cost of funding. According to the available statistics, from April 2000 
when firms were allowed to escape paying any interest for up to April 2003, 
enterprises could lower their interest payment burden to a significant degree. For 
example, in the case of 5-year loans with an interest rate of 5.76 percent, enterprises 
could save RMB 69 billion worth interest, which accounted for one third of their total 
profit (ACFB, 2004). 
 
On the other hand, the debt-equity swaps also had problems: First, the operation of the 
debt-equity swaps was de facto equivalent to debt relief for both the insolvent firms 
and banks. The original scheme of debt-equity swaps didn‘t work out, so that the 
swaps gave rise to moral hazards for both banks and enterprises alike.  
 
Second, the State Economic and Trade Commission limited the authority of the 
AMCs in respect to the supervision of enterprises; so that the AMCs could not fully 
monitor those enterprises. One of the reasons for limiting the authority was because 
the AMCs‘ involvement in firms met with strong resistance from local governments 
93 
 
and individuals with vested interests in the effected enterprises. Furthermore, in the 
early days of the debt-equity swaps operation, the programs also included a stock 
repurchasing plan, such that firms conducting debt-equity swaps would be able to 
repurchase those stocks held by the AMCs within the specified period without them 
being publicly listed. This plan was supposed to guarantee asset recovery for the 
AMCs and thus protect them. However, the government cancelled the plan because 
firms, being unsatisfied with the purchase prices and the costs needed, were not 
willing to do so. 
 
b) Asset Disposition Methods 
The direct measures to cope with the NPLs include bidding, auctions, restructuring of 
debt, liquidation and bankruptcy, contracting agreements, Asset Backed Securities 
(ABS) and so on. The most widely used methods have been bidding and auction. The 
AMCs held various auction fairs and exhibitions of the assets they had for sale 
(including land, buildings and tangible assets such as vehicles). They also used 
package selling for disposing debts by category. The assets were packaged on the 
basis of the characteristic of the areas or industries. Generally used practices are (1) 
packaging debts and establishing an AMC with foreign investors; (2) directly selling 
the package to domestic or foreign investors, and entrusting the asset package to 
foreign investors; (3) setting up a securitization fund for each package. In November 
2001, Huarong established a first Joint AMC with Morgan Stanley and Rongsheng 
with Goldman Sachs (Pei and Shirai, 2004). As of June 2003, the data on the amount 
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of NPLs recovered by the AMCs is shown in the table below. The AMCs have made 
some progress in cash recovery; not only in terms of the cash recovery but also the 
recovery rate. 
 
Table 16. Balance of AMCs’ Retrieving NPLs (March 2006) 
 Cinda Orient Changcheng Huarong Total 
Purchased Sum 45.2 32.4 41.9 49.4 168.9 
Rate of asset 
settled (percent) 
64.7 56.1 80.1 70.1 68.6 
Settled Asset 
Sum (Billion 
US$) 
25.8 17.7 33.8 30.8 108.1 
Rate of Recovery 
(percent) 
34.5 27.2 12.7 26.5 24.2 
Recovery of 
Cash Sum 
(Billion US$) 
8.1 4.1 3.5 6.8 22.5 
Recovery Rate of 
Cash (percent) 
31.6 23.1 10.3 22.2 20.8 
Source：CBRC, 2006 
 
After purchasing NPLs, the main strategy by which AMCs converted bad asset into 
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performing asset was debt-for-equity swap, or transforming the debt owed by SOEs to 
share ownership for AMCs. Instead of deciding which SOEs qualified for the swap 
themselves, AMCs received State Economic and Trade Commission (SETC) 
―recommendations.‖ Because a debt-for-equity swap drastically reduced a company‘s 
debt level, eager SOE managers and local officials waited in a ―long line of Red Flag 
sedans‖ in front of the SETC for the privilege. In choosing beneficiaries, the SETC 
focused on large SOEs and state corporations, especially those with personal 
connections and factional ties.  
 
Despite the short-term success of the AMC programme to reduce NPLs, rescue SOEs 
and reduce fiscal pressure, a main outcome was to transfer fiscal pressure to the future. 
While official announcements optimistically claimed that AMCs would recover 30 to 
50 percent of the NPLs (ACFB, 2004), analysts and officials involved in setting up 
AMCs agreed that the actual ratio is likely to be 10 to 20 percent (Hu and Liu, 2009). 
Recovering transferred asset in real estate proved to be extremely difficult because of 
collapsing real-estate prices in some localities. Moreover, while debt-to-equity swap 
gave AMCs sufficient preferred shares to pay interest on their bonds; they ultimately 
needed to find buyers for their shares of SOEs to repay the principal of the bonds. As 
of March of 2006, AMCs have thus far dealt with 866.3 billion RMB ($108.1 Billion) 
in NPLs, cash recovery was 180.6 billion RMB ($22.5 Billion), or 21 percent of the 
total. Among the four AMCs, the asset recovery rate of Changcheng Asset 
Management Corporation was only 12.70 percent as over 80 percent of the transferred 
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NPLs have been written off. The NPLs are taken from ABC. Attempts to sell NPLs to 
foreign institutional investors yielded a return of 6 percent, and offering of NPLs by 
an AMC failed to attract sufficient bidders even after the assets were greatly 
discounted. Despite these troubling indicators, State Council officials were not 
perturbed because they knew that the main objective of the NPL policies was to 
minimize short-term burden for the Central Government. 
 
Studies by Klingebiel (1999) claimed that as the initial conditions for AMCs were 
significantly weaker in the developing economies while at the same time AMCs in 
these countries had to deal with a notably larger problem as assets transferred to these 
agencies accounted for a large amount of banking system assets. For example, the 
legal framework was considerably weaker in developing countries and capital markets 
were less developed, as indicated by the low bond market capitalization. Governments 
tried to compensate for the weak legal framework by granting superpowers to their 
respective AMCs. In both cases this strategy proved ineffective as despite 
strengthened creditor rights the courts remained either debtor friendly or the overall 
efficiency of the court system did not improve. 
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Chapter IV Research Methods 
 
Before 1994, the state-owned commercial banks were strictly limited to operating in 
their designated business segments. The market structure was highly fragmented and 
concentrated. Competition only existed in the overlapping areas of businesses. With 
the set-up of joint-stock commercial banks and the commercialisation of the 
state-owned banks in 1994, the level of competition in banking sector has increased 
significantly. Following China‘s accession to the WTO in 2000, foreign banks were 
allowed to conduct Renminbi business in 2004 and three out of the four state-owned 
banks were floated on the stock market to attract foreign investors in order to improve 
their competitiveness.  
 
As banking reform and banking development in China sped up in the 1990s, empirical 
research on the Chinese banking sector also took off. The initial focus of the research 
was mainly on qualitative issues concerning the introduction of market-based 
incentive schemes into the state-owned banks and competition from other types of 
banks in the whole banking sector. The focus of research gradually shifted to 
quantitative analysis of banking performance and measurement and evaluation of 
efficiency. However, a general weakness of the quantitative work is a lack of 
systematic examination of the market condition and the competitive environment for 
the banks. The empirical work was largely based on simple aggregate banking 
statistics without a consistent underlying conceptual framework. A detailed literature 
98 
 
review on the empirical research on Chinese banking sector will be developed in 
section 3 in this chapter. 
 
In the economics literature, there is no clear definition of competitiveness of business 
firms or banks. Instead, analysts have proposed a wide range of indicators of the 
competitiveness of a bank (firm) that are broadly related to either its competitive 
capabilities or business and financial performance. The former approach focuses on 
the amount and quality of firm-specific productive factors and assets as well as 
mechanisms to effectively deploy such factors and assets. In the area of commercial 
banking, a bank‘s competitive capabilities are reflected in a number of dimensions 
including source and cost of financing management, asset allocation management, 
liquidity management, risk management and innovation management. Since banks 
may differ substantially across such a wide range of capabilities, different measures 
may give different indications of a bank‘s competitiveness. Therefore, an alternative 
and also the most common approach to the examination of a bank‘s competitiveness is 
to focus on the bank‘s underlying business and financial performance as measured by 
productivity (efficiency) performance or financial performance (e.g., ROA, ROE) – 
the implicit assumption being that productive efficiency or superior financial 
performance is the ultimate indicator of competitiveness. Therefore, the measurement 
of banking profitability and efficiency forms a significant part of the literature on 
banking competitiveness. Moreover, following the industrial organisation literature, 
research on banking has also adopted a consistent conceptual framework for 
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explaining and determining competition and performance.  
 
The research on banking competition and performance has evolved mainly in two 
directions: the structural and non-structural approaches. Traditional industrial 
organisation theory focuses on the Structure-Conduct-Performance (SCP) paradigm. 
The non-structural approach posits that factors other than market structure and 
concentration, such as entry/exit barriers and the general contestability of the market, 
may also affect competitive behaviour and performance. The literature has covered 
two broad issues concerning measurement and economic modelling. The 
measurement issue concerns the construction and estimation of indicators for banking 
market structure, conduct, and performance. Economic modelling is then employed to 
determine the significant factors underlying banking performance. The following 
sections provide a critical review of the general theoretical framework and empirical 
literature before the specific literature on Chinese banking is reviewed.  
 
4.1.Theoretical framework for the determination of banking competitiveness 
The methods to examine the banking competitiveness include structural and 
non-structural tests. We will focus on the structural test in this research. There are 
generally four distinct theoretical hypotheses in the structural tests: 
structure-conduct-performance (SCP), relative-market power (RMP), x-efficiency and 
scale efficiency hypotheses. The non-structural tests will also be reviewed in this 
section. 
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4.1.1. The S-C-P Paradigm 
a) Early stage of research on the S-C-P Paradigm 
The SCP paradigm is introduced to measure the performance of an industry in the late 
1930s and 1940s. It was developed by Bain (1959, 1968), Clodius and Mueller (1961), 
Slater (1968), and Bateman (1976).The traditional SCP approach assumed that certain 
elements of market structure increase the likelihood of collusive behaviour and the 
collusive behaviour results in higher price and profits (Bain, 1956). 
 
The approach assumes that there is a well-defined link between structure, conduct and 
performance: the market structure (the environment) determines market conduct (the 
behaviour of economic agents within the environment) and thereby sets the level of 
market performance. It is an attempt to compromise between formal structures of 
economic theory and empirical observations of organisational experience in imperfect 
markets. It is a standard tool for market analysis. The definition of structure, conduct 
and performance differs from one author to the other, depending on the sector and 
region being studied and the perception of the researcher. The key words used here are 
based on Clodius & Mueller (1961), Van Tilburg (1988) and Lutz and Van Tilburg 
(1992). 
 
Market structure is defined as ―the characteristics of the organization of a market 
which seem to influence strategically the nature of the competition and pricing within 
the market‖ (Bain, 1959). The research on banking market structure includes 
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concentration ratio, the Herfindahl-Hirschman Index (HHI), entry and exit barriers, 
etc. The factors affecting market structure include internal and external. The internal 
factors are decided by the character of product and technology level, for example, the 
speed and security of the service. The external factors include government policy and 
central bank‘s supervisory policy and etc.  
 
There are several measures of market concentration ratio. The traditional oligopoly 
theory uses aggregate concentration for some particular measure. The problem is the 
concentration ratio does not reflect the distribution of market shares among the top 
firms. Albert Hirschman and Orris Herfindahl (1964) proposed the HHI to measure 
the number of firms and the inequality of market shares. The HHI is defined as the 
sum of the squares of individual firms‘ market shares, expressed mathematically as: 
HHI= S
2
1 + S
2
2 + S
2
3 +…+ S
2
k =


K
i 1
2
iS
(where K is the number of firms in the industry, 
Si is the market share of firm i). The HHI approximates 0 for a perfect competitive 
industry and equals 10,000 for a monopoly. In general, the more firms there are in an 
industry, the lower is the value of the HHI. 
 
Market conduct refers to the set of competitive strategies that firms use to achieve 
more profit or higher market share. Complete monopoly and perfect competition are 
two extreme market structures. In the real economy, the market structure is often a 
transitional form between the two. One of the important goals of industrial 
organisation research is to analyse the relationship between market structure and 
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market behaviour to determine whether there is unfair competition in the market. On 
the one hand, the market structure decides market behaviour. On the other hand, the 
market structure itself is changing. The market structure is often the result of 
interaction between market performance and market behaviour. For example, large 
banks take over small banks; efficient banks buy bankrupt banks. Such practices 
would enhance market concentration.  
 
Market performance according to Stern et al. (1996) is a multi-dimensional 
concept, which can be assessed by considering a number of dimensions including 
effectiveness, equity, productivity, and profitability. Market performance refers to 
economic results: product suitability in relation to consumer preferences 
(effectiveness); rate of profits in relation to marketing costs and margins; price 
seasonality and price integration between markets (efficiency). In sum, market 
performance refers to the impact of structure and conduct as measured in terms of 
variables such as prices, costs, and volume of output (Bressler and King, 1979). By 
analysing the level of marketing margins and their cost components, it is possible to 
evaluate the impact of the structure and conduct characteristics on market 
performance (Bain, 1968). To measure the performance of a firm, two of the most 
preferred ratios are Return on Equity (ROE) and Return on Assets (ROA). Each 
ratio provides insight into a financial institution that allows management to make 
strategic decisions that can dramatically affect its structure and profitability. In the 
case of credit unions, ROA has been the predominant analytical tool to measure 
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profitability; however, ROE is just as comprehensive and could be the better 
indicator. Return on assets equals Net Income divided by Total Assets. It shows how 
efficient asset is used. Return on equity is calculated by dividing Net Income by 
average Equity, which tells us how efficient the invested capital is used.  
 
Applying SCP to the banking sector, the researchers seek to establish that the more 
concentrated the market, the more market power banks have, and thus the stronger 
they are in a position to afford to be inefficient without being forced out of the 
market. Traditionally, the SCP hypothesis stipulates a causal relationship running 
from market structure to firm conduct and performance: a concentrated market 
structure leads to anti-competitive behaviour, a loss in efficiency, and/or the capture 
of monopolistic profits (Stigler, 1964). Structure of the market is determined by the 
interaction of cost (supply) and demand. Conduct is a function of the numbers of 
sellers and buyers, barriers to entry and the cost structure- a firm‘s conduct is 
reflected chiefly on its pricing decisions. Performance is often measured by 
profitability. To carry out empirical work on banking industry with industrial 
economics theory, we need to measure some quantitative indicators. According to 
traditional industrial economics theory, these indicators include concentration ratios, 
the HHI, profitability, and barriers to entry.  
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b) Application of the S-C-P hypothesis on the banking sector 
Since the early 1990s, spurred by an accelerated pace in economic and financial 
globalisation, there has been a rapid growth in empirical research on the measurement 
and explanation of bank performance in both the developed and developing countries 
(see, for example, the survey article by Berger, et al. 2004). The early empirical 
research in the banking sector was almost exclusively based on the SCP hypothesis.  
Insofar as measurement is concerned, alternative empirical measures of market 
structure, conduct and bank performance have been adopted and tested.  The 
measure of market concentration is usually captured by the n-bank market share in 
deposits or loans or the combination of the two, or more comprehensively, the 
Herfindahl-Hirschman Index. The anti-competitive behaviour is normally measured 
by banks‘ pricing behaviour as reflected by, e.g., the lending-deposit (or 
domestic-foreign) interest spread (as in Berger and Hannan, 1989; and Peria and 
Mody, 2004) or the bank revenue elasticity to input prices (as in Claessens and 
Laeven, 2004). In measuring banking performance, the most widely adopted measures 
are the traditional short-run accounting measures of return-on-assets (ROA) and 
return-on-equity (ROE), although recently researchers have also used alternative 
measures that reflect banks‘ long-run performance (e.g. the stock market-based 
franchise values of banks as adopted by De Jonghe and Vander-Vennet, 2008) on the 
basis that changes in banking market conditions may take time to have an impact on 
bank performance. Moreover, a considerable amount of literature has been devoted to 
the measurement of banking efficiency as an indicator of performance. As is shown in 
105 
 
a survey article by Berger and Humphrey (1997), numerous concepts of efficiency 
such as technical efficiency, scale efficiency, cost-based or profit-based x-efficiency 
have been defined and alternative estimation methods have been proposed.  
 
Therefore, under the general umbrella of the SCP framework, two sub-strands of 
empirical literature have emerged with one focusing on the structure-conduct 
relationship and the other on the structure-performance relationship. Both strands of 
literature associate a concentrated market with anti-competitive behaviour and 
existence of monopolistic profits, and thus justify the use of regulatory measures to 
prevent the over-concentration of markets or to curtail the monopoly power of large 
firms. However, the early empirical application of the SCP hypothesis in the banking 
sector generated inconclusive evidence and also questioned the interpretation as well 
as the validity of the SCP hypothesis (see e.g. the studies on the U.S banking sector by 
Rhoades, 1982 and Gilbert, 1984; see also Goldberg and Rai, 1996). For example, 
Berger (1995) found little evidence to support the SCP hypothesis in US banking; 
whereas in Europe, structural factors appeared to be important and the SCP hypothesis 
seemed to hold (Goddard et al., 2001). Therefore, subsequent developments in 
banking research have extended the original lines of inquiry or sought to provide 
alternative hypotheses about the relationship among market structure and more 
general market conditions, conduct and performance. 
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4.1.2. The R-M-P hypothesis 
The RMP hypothesis is a variant of the SCP hypothesis. Unlike the traditional SCP 
that focuses on the market as a whole, RMP focuses on the market power of 
individual firms/banks. A firm possesses market power when it has ―the ability 
profitably to maintain prices above competitive levels for a significant period of 
time‖ (Lerner, 1934, p. 171). In empirical research, an individual firm‘s market 
power is usually proxied by its share of the market. Firms with a higher market share 
can exert more market power and earn higher profits, independent of how 
concentrated the market is. The firms can gain more market power through higher 
concentration ratio. The traditional SCP hypothesis asserts that the setting of prices 
that are less favourable to consumers (lower deposit rates, higher loan rates) in more 
concentrated markets as a result of competitive imperfections in these markets. The 
RMP hypothesis asserts that only firms with large market shares and 
well-differentiated products are able to exercise market power in pricing these 
products and earn supernormal profits (Shepherd 1982). 
 
4.1.3. The efficient structure hypotheses 
The interpretation of the firms‘ market shares as measures of their relative market 
power has been questioned by other analysts. An alternative interpretation treats a 
larger market share of a firm to be an indication of a higher level of its efficiency. 
This is known as the ‗Efficient Structure‘ (ES) hypothesis, which states that due to 
economies of scale and scope in the collection and use of information, adoption of 
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new technology and business models, as well as provision of banking products and 
services, large banks may be inherently more efficient and thus more profitable than 
smaller ones. Consequentially, large efficient banks will be able to expand at the 
expense of small ones, leading to market concentration. Due to the differences in 
how firm/bank efficiency is measured, the ES hypotheses include sub-strands of 
approaches: the x-efficiency and scale-efficiency hypotheses. In stark contrast to the 
traditional SCP analysis that treats market concentration as an exogenous indicator 
of non-competitiveness in the marketplace, ES depicts market concentration as 
arising endogenously from the efficiency of large firms. The policy implications of 
the ES hypotheses are also in stark contrast to those of the SCP hypothesis. Opposite 
to the SCP that justifies the use of regulatory measures to prevent the 
over-concentration of markets or to curtail the monopoly power of large firms, the 
ES hypotheses regard such policy interventions totally unjustified and unnecessary. 
 
Past empirical research has normally included market share of individual banks as an 
independent variable alongside the usual measures of market concentration in the 
regression analysis of bank conduct or performance, with a positive coefficient for 
market share being taken to support the ES hypothesis, that is, the higher an 
individual bank‘s market share, the more efficient it is, and the more profitable it 
becomes (Smirlock, et al., 1984). However, this interpretation was challenged by 
Shepherd (1986), who argued that the interpretation of individual market shares is 
ambiguous: it can be a proxy for either the efficiency level or market power of banks. 
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If the latter interpretation is valid, a positive coefficient would support a variant of the 
SCP hypothesis – the RMP hypothesis, rather than the ES hypothesis. Further, only 
firms with large market shares and well-differentiated products are able to exercise 
market power in pricing these products and earn supernormal profits (Shepherd 
1982).Thus, having both individual market shares and market concentration as 
explanatory variables was insufficient to differentiate the RMP and ES hypotheses. 
 
A procedure for clarifying the ambiguity was provided in Berger (1995) which 
incorporated measures of banking efficiency directly into the model, alongside 
variables of market shares and market concentration, so that the hypotheses of SCP, 
ES and RMP can be jointly tested.  
 
4.1.4. Non-structural hypotheses 
Subsequent developments in banking research have typically attempted to encompass 
alternative hypotheses by incorporating indicators of the efficiency, service quality, 
and risk of the banks as additional measures of bank conduct and performance (Berger, 
et al. 2004). Moreover, apart from market structural variables, non-structural factors 
may also affect competitive behaviour, such as entry/exit barriers (Bain, 1956), the 
general contestability of the market (Baumol et al. 1982; Bresnahan, 1989; Panzar and 
Rosse, 1987) and the institutional approach (Berger et al. 2004).  Non-structural 
approaches do not observe the competitive environment but they attempt to 
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measure/infer it. Casu and Girardone (2005) argued that the most important advantage 
of non-structural approaches probably is that ―it cannot be assumed a priori that 
concentrated markets are not competitive because contestability may depend on the 
extent of potential competition  and not necessarily on market structure‖ (Casu and 
Girardone, 2005, P4). They also indicated that another advantage of non-structural 
models is that there is no need to specify a geographic market, since the behaviour of 
individual banks gives an indication of their market power. Non-structural measures 
of competition are mainly based on the Lerner (1934) measure of monopoly power. 
Specifically, they include measures of competition between oligopolists (Iwata, 1974) 
and those that test for the competitive conditions in contestable markets (Bresnahan, 
1989; Panzar and Rosse, 1987). These latter approaches have been developed in the 
context of the New Empirical Industrial Organisation (NEIO) literature. 
 
a) Market entry/exit barriers 
The existence of barriers to entry helps the firms in an industry to maintain their price 
above the competitive level over time. The commonly used measures of barriers to 
entry include economies of scale, capital requirement and product differentiation. 
Bain (1956) examined the entry conditions of 20 US manufacturing sectors. He 
defined three types of barrier: a) low cost of existing firms, b) product differentiation 
and c) the existence of scale economies. A careful study of these aspects for each 
industry enabled Bain to give a qualitative classification of industries according to 
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whether barriers were ‗very high‘, ‗substantial‘, or ‗moderate-to-low‘. He examined 
the eight-firm concentration ratio for each sector for 1936 to 40 and 1947 to 51. 
Bain‘s result suggested that barriers to entry were the main determinant of 
profitability:  higher barriers to entry lead to higher profit rates. Market barriers and 
the major bank's price behaviour will affect the entry of new banks, leading to 
changes in market structure. 
 
b) Market contestability 
The market is contestable when ―market is one into which entry is absolutely free, and 
exit is absolutely costless.‖ (Baumol, 1982, P3). A market is perfectly contestable 
when entry into and exit out of the market is costless. The reality is that no market is 
perfectly contestable. There are always some ―barriers to contestability‖. Virtually 
every market is contestable to some degree even when it appears that the monopoly 
position of a dominant seller is unassailable.  
 
Bresnahan (1989) developed a method of testing competitive behaviour in industries, 
where demand equations are jointly estimated with marginal cost equations. The 
method was applied to the banking industry in some studies. Most studies have found 
little evidence of anticompetitive market behaviour at the overall bank level. For 
example, Suominen (1994) estimated the competitive behaviour for two separate 
markets, aggregated loan and deposit markets. His study found mixed results on the 
market behaviour of Finnish banks. The result of their researches are coherent with 
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the argument raised by Shepherd (1986). 
 
c) Institutional approach 
It is worth noting that the main-stream literature on banking competition has largely 
ignored a substantial and growing literature on spatial agglomeration and 
institutional complementarity approaches to firm conduct, competition, and 
performance. According to the relevant literature, firm conduct and performance are 
moulded by the historical, location and institutional settings within which firms 
operate and there are complementary institutional mechanisms that generate synergy 
and cumulative causation effects in specific locales and the wider economy. This 
literature has a long economic lineage that dates back to Myrdal (1957), Hirschman 
(1958), Kaldor (1966), Richardson (1972) and has been recently revived by Porter 
(1998) and formalised by Krugman (1980, 1991, 1996). Insofar as banking is 
concerned, banking development is an important factor influencing firms‘ resources 
acquisition, hence their economic performance. Improved economic performance in 
turn generates favourable demand and supply conditions for banks. Indeed, it has 
been argued that a more developed banking sector is more effective in screening and 
monitoring investors, thus increasing the efficiency of resource allocation (see, e.g. 
Goldsmith 1969; Greenwood and Jovanovic 1990). This greater ability to collect and 
process information might result in lower costs of bank financing (Rajan and 
Zingales 1998) and greater availability of funds (Bencivenga and Smith 1991; 
Levine 1992). Furthermore, these positive effects may be particularly beneficial for 
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firms that are more dependent upon financial intermediaries for their external 
financing (Benfratello et al. 2006). The institutional complementarity mechanisms 
have given rise to rather complex relationships between banks of different sizes and 
their clients, as is shown in the survey article by Berger et al. (2004). Therefore, a 
comprehensive explanation of bank conduct and performance must also consider 
such institutional factors, particularly in the context of the Chinese economy where 
non-market-based mechanisms as well as market incentives are all necessary 
ingredients to business and economic processes. 
 
Having examined the conceptual frameworks for evaluating the relationship among 
market structure, market conditions, conduct and performance, the following 
sections discuss the measurement of banking inputs, outputs and productivity in 
banking sector. 
 
4.2. Measurement issues concerning banking performance 
As is mentioned above, in examining banking competition and performance, a 
crucial aspect of the research is to measure the business or financial performance of 
banks. The early literature tended to focus on the traditional financial measures of 
ROA and ROE, but the recent banking literature is dominated by the measurement 
of the banks‘ underlying performance in banking efficiency or productivity. This 
section discusses a number of the major issues concerning the concepts, definitions 
and techniques for measuring banking efficiency as an indicator of performance. 
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4.2.1. Measuring banking inputs and outputs 
Productivity (or productive efficiency) is widely considered to be at the heart of the 
competitiveness of firms and industries. As the measurement of productivity 
necessitates the measurement of inputs into and outputs from a production process, 
the application of the concept in banking requires the appropriate definition of the 
mode of production for banking and financial services in the national economy and 
the measurement of banking inputs and outputs. However, serious controversies 
surround the treatment of banking and financial services as well as the measures of 
banking and financial output in national accounts and the economics literature (see 
Triplett, 1990; Fixler and Zieschang, 1991; and Berger and Humphrey, 1992; 
Triplett and Bosworth, 2004). The controversy stems from the ways in which 
banking and financial services derive their main sources of income: by applying 
differential interest rate to borrowers and lenders to obtain net interest income and 
by explicitly charging fees for the provision of certain services. Because banks do 
not charge fees for many services they offer to their customers, the service charges 
are usually insufficient to cover non-interest costs of operation (e.g., wages, rents 
and materials). Thus banks and financial institutions typically rely on interest 
income to cover all the operating costs. However, opinions differ on how interest 
income should be treated in the measurement of banking output and value added. 
 
Traditionally interest is viewed by national accounts statisticians as a transfer 
payment from borrowers to lenders for the foregone consumption. On this view, 
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interest payments are not considered to be payments for a ―real‖ service rendered, 
but a form of property income, and so are recorded in the generation of primary 
income account, but not the production account. This treatment inevitably means 
that the operating surplus of banks would show as a negative item. As this would 
give a false impression of the size of the operating surplus of banks compared with 
other firms, the original system of national accounts (SNA) adopted a somewhat 
peculiar solution. On the one hand, net interest income, alongside other banking 
services that are explicitly charged for, was counted as part of banking net output. 
On the other hand, total net interest income was deducted from the total operating 
surplus for all the other industries so that the calculation of national GDP remained 
unaffected (the net interest income was not allocated to particular industries or final 
users though).  
 
Alternatively, in the economics literature on the bank production function approach 
to banking output and productivity (see the discussion in Baltensperger, 1980; 
Santomero, 1984; and Berger and Humphrey, 1997), interest is viewed as a payment 
for services that banks and financial institutions provide to the economy (payments 
services, money creation, management of liquidity and risk), to depositors 
(record-keeping, safe-keeping, and interest payments on deposits) or to borrowers 
(funding and credit rating). In this view, apart from the explicitly priced banking 
services, banking output also includes gross interest earnings from bank loans as 
well as imputed charges for depositor services that banks offer to their customers 
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free of charge. Although there is little difference in the measured net banking output 
or value added between the above two approaches, the difference in the measured 
total banking output is substantial with the economists‘ measure being significantly 
higher than the national statisticians‘ measure.  
 
More recently, an eclectic approach has been adopted by economists and national 
accountants to incorporate the contribution by banking and finance to the national 
product through a statistical term called Financial Intermediation Services Indirectly 
Measured (FISIM). In essence, the method assumes that FISIM is purchased 
implicitly by borrowers paying higher interest than would be necessary if FISIM 
were charged for explicitly and by lenders receiving lower interest than would be 
necessary if FISIM were charged for explicitly. FISIM is then allocated to sectors 
and industries so as to identify the purchase of these services explicitly and to 
classify them as intermediate consumption, final consumption expenditure or 
exports according to which sector incurs the expenditure. The implication of the 
implementation of FISIM is far-reaching – not only banking output, in both net and 
gross terms, but also the output and value added for both the aggregate economy and 
the other industrial sectors will all be altered. A simple example here can help to 
illustrate the issues more clearly. Let L, D, RL, RD and I denote the volume of loan, 
deposit, the bank lending rate, the deposit rate and the net interest income. In the 
conventional national accounts treatment, the net interest income is defined to be I = 
RL L – RD D. In the FISIM framework, there will be a reference interest rate that 
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represents the pure charge for the financial intermediary services that the banks 
provide to both depositors and borrowers. Let RF denote this reference rate (which 
lies between the deposit and lending rates), then the new level of net interest income 
is IF = (RF – RD) D + (RL – RF) L = I + RF (D – L). Since under normal conditions 
D > L, the new measure of bank net output is larger than the old measure by the 
amount RF (D – L), which represents the amount of additional charges for financial 
services offered by the banks. It is worth noting that such charges are shared by both 
depositors and borrowers, hence their income, expenditure and net output have to be 
adjusted accordingly. However, how the reference rate is determined is still highly 
controversial (see further discussion in Triplett and Bosworth, 2004). 
 
Corresponding to such controversies, it is little wonder that despite the substantial 
number of studies on banking output and productivity, there is still no coherent 
definition of either banking inputs or outputs. In the empirical literature, the 
selection and classification of banking inputs and outputs have been guided by three 
general models of banking and are also constrained by data availability in practice. 
The three general models are ―financial intermediation‖, ―production function‖ and 
the ―hybrid‖ model. The financial intermediation model is consistent with the 
traditional national accounts view that any interest-related banking activity is 
non-productive and the primary role of banks is to offer financial intermediation 
between depositors and borrowers. In this model, banks use the traditional factors of 
production (e.g. labour and capital) together with deposits as inputs to produce 
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outputs of loans and other fee-based services (e.g. Sealey and Lindley, 1977). In the 
production function approach, banks are treated essentially the same as any other 
non-financial firm – they employ the traditional factors of production, viz. labour 
and capital, to produce a range of (flows of) banking and financial outputs as 
measured by the deposit and loan accounts as well as other services (see, e.g., 
Benston and Smith, 1976; Berg, et. al., 1991; Berg, et. al., 1993; Berger and 
Humphrey, 1991). More recently, a number of researchers have proposed hybrid 
models that focus on the efficiency of banks in reducing costs or generating 
revenue/profit (e.g., Hancook, 1985; Berger, et. al., 1993; Berger and Mester, 1997, 
2003). In contrast to the earlier two approaches that focus on banking assets and 
liabilities in measuring technical and scale efficiencies, this third approach focuses 
on costs and earnings in measuring X-efficiency (see detailed discussion below). 
Moreover, the classification of inputs and outputs in the hybrid model is also 
flexible – a financial product can be classified either as an input or an output, 
depending on whether or not the product makes a negative or positive net 
contribution to bank revenue.  
 
Insofar as the financial intermediation and the production function approaches are 
concerned, the fundamental difference between the two is whether or not bank 
liabilities should be treated as inputs or outputs. It is nonetheless increasingly 
recognised that banks, like many other non-financial firms, use scarce economic 
resources to produce a range of banking outputs, including outputs that are offered 
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free-of-charge mainly to depositors. Such outputs include free cheques cashed, 
automatic teller machine (ATM) transactions, and other transactions services. 
Although there is no explicit charge for using such services, depositors do pay for 
these services in the form of interest that depositors forego. Banks accordingly earn 
implicit revenue from these depositor services. At the same time, banks incur costs 
for producing the services, in the form of the resources employed in cheque clearing, 
ATM operations and other transactions services provided to deposit holders. In the 
spirit of Benston and Smith (1976), what a bank produces facilitates both 
inter-temporal and intra-temporal transfers of consumption, which corresponds to 
demands for both deposits and loans. Therefore, in principle a model of bank 
production and output needs to incorporate both deposit-related and lending-related 
services as well as other explicitly charged services. In the context of the Chinese 
SOCBs, there is an additional incentive for the banking groups to compete for 
deposits in order to support the burden of NPLs that arise largely from lending to the 
state-owned enterprises. It is no wonder that the amount of deposits that a branch 
attracts features prominently in the criteria against which the performance of the 
branch is judged by the management. Although a rigorous approach must take the 
measurement of every element of banking outputs seriously, such an approach is still 
eluding analysts. 
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4.2.2. Measuring banking efficiency 
In the literature, alternative concepts and definitions of efficiency have also been 
proposed. Conceptually the overall bank efficiency can be decomposed into scale 
efficiency, scope efficiency and X-efficiency. ―Scale efficiency measures whether 
banks are operating with an efficient level of outputs; scope efficiency measures 
whether banks are operating with an efficient mix of outputs; and X-efficiency 
focuses on whether banks are operating with an efficient mix of inputs‖ (Liu and 
Tripe, 2002, p. 63). The bank has scale efficiency when it operates in the range of 
constant returns to scale. Scope efficiency occurs when the bank operates in 
different diversified locations. X-efficiency includes technical efficiency and 
allocative efficiency. When the bank maximises output from the given level of 
inputs, pure technical efficiency occurs. Technical efficiency is the major method 
that this study employs to measure bank efficiency due to the constraint of data 
availability. Allocative efficiency happens when the bank chooses the revenue 
maximizing the mix of outputs. Theoretically, a bank is fully efficient if it produces 
the output level and mix that maximize profits and minimize possible costs.  
 
X-efficiency can be measured in terms of cost or profit but the emphasis of much of 
the banking literature is on cost X-efficiency. Since managers have the ability to 
control costs (cost X-efficiency) or revenues (profit X-efficiency), greater 
X-efficiency can be achieved by superior management. Cost X-efficiency gets far 
more attention than profit X-efficiency as the former represents managements‘ 
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ability to control costs and employ resources to generate outputs. X-efficiencies 
have been shown to be more important in determining overall firm and market 
performance than scale or scope inefficiencies (Berger & Humphrey, 1997). 
However, estimation of x-efficiency entails the separation of price and quantity data, 
which is not straightforward or even meaningful, particularly in the banking sector 
due to the complexity in measuring banking outputs (see more detailed discussion 
below).  
 
There is so far no consensus view on the best way to measure efficiency in the 
banking sector, although the majority of studies employ some form of frontier 
analysis. Berger and Humphrey (1997) suggest that the essence of frontier analysis 
is its sophisticated method of benchmarking the relative performance of decision 
making units (DMUs). At least five different frontier approaches to evaluating 
efficiency have been employed in the literature, three of which are parametric and 
two are non-parametric. The three parametric frontier approaches are the stochastic 
frontier approach (SFA), the distribution-free approach (DFA), and the thick frontier 
approach (TFA). DEA and free disposal hull (FDH) are non-parametric approaches. 
There are both advantages and disadvantages of each approach. In general, the 
parametric approaches allow for random errors in measuring inputs and outputs as 
well as in specifying the functional relationship between inputs and outputs. 
However, these approaches have to assume particular statistical distributions for the 
error term and also adopt specific functional forms for the input-output relationship. 
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In contrast, the non-parametric approaches do not impose any restrictive 
assumptions on the input-output relationship (e.g. a particular production function or 
returns-to-scale characteristics). Nevertheless, no allowance is made for any 
measurement error in inputs or outputs. 
 
4.3.Empirical literature on Chinese banking competition and performance 
4.3.1. Review of current empirical study on measurement of banking 
performance in China 
Despite the substantial difficulty in obtaining adequate and reliable data on Chinese 
banking
2
, a growing body of empirical research has shed light on various aspects of 
the effectiveness of this reform programme in recent years (e.g., Li, et al., 2001; Chen, 
et. al., 2005; Fu and Heffernan, 2007, 2009; Lin and Zhang, 2008). The literature to 
date has focused on the financial performance of the banking groups as a whole (Li, et 
al., 2001) and how the performance relates to the asset structure and ownership of 
individual banking groups as well as the structure of the Chinese banking market 
(Chen, et. al., 2005; Fu and Heffernan, 2007, 2009; Lin and Zhang, 2008). What has 
generally emerged from these studies is that, compared with banks of other ownership 
types, such as domestic joint-stock, foreign-domestic joint stock, domestic private and 
foreign ownership, the SOCBs are heavily burdened with problems of bad loans, low 
efficiency and poor financial performance. Despite the huge effort put into the reform 
                                                        
2 Such difficulties include very limited disclosure of financial information due to lack of regulatory 
requirement, inconsistent accounting standards across banking groups and misreporting of information 
even in official data sources (see a detailed discussion in Li, et al., 2001). 
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programme for nearly three decades, there is so far limited improvement in the 
relative inefficiency or underperformance of the SOCBs. It might be argued that if the 
Chinese SOCBs operated in a genuinely competitive market environment, they would 
perhaps have gone out of business a few years ago. It then becomes even more 
puzzling that the recent floatation of three of the four Chinese SOCBs received 
unprecedented levels of enthusiasm from both Chinese domestic and international 
investors. Various explanations might be offered that are based on the irrationality or 
rationality hypothesis of investors‘ behaviour, but it is also likely that the true nature 
and state of the competitiveness of the SOCBs are still not properly measured and 
understood. A sound assessment of the competitiveness and performance of the 
Chinese SOCBs in the broad context of the special characteristics and structure of the 
Chinese economy compounded by the forces of globalisation remains a challenge for 
analysts and policymakers. A comprehensive assessment of such issues is beyond the 
remit of the current study. 
 
Insofar as specific research on the Chinese banking market is concerned, the empirical 
literature to date is rather limited and dominated by measurement of banking 
efficiency (see e.g. Huang, 1998; Chen, et. al., 2005; Fu and Heffernan, 2007), 
although systematic studies of bank conduct and performance have also been 
conducted recently (e.g. Fu and Heffernan, 2008; Lin and Zhang, 2008). In measuring 
banking efficiency in China, researchers have employed both non-parametric DEA 
(e.g. Chen, et al., 2005) and parametric SFA (e.g. Fu and Heffernan, 2007) to estimate 
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the efficiencies of individual banks, including SOCBs and the joint-stock banks, 
relative to their most efficient peers. In these studies, different concepts of efficiency 
such as cost efficiency, allocative efficiency, technical efficiency and cost-based 
x-efficiency have been adopted. The extant studies also differ in their selection of 
banks and the time periods for investigation. It is little wonder that the empirical 
results for banking efficiency in the Chinese banks also differ. For example, in their 
study of the big four SOCBS and ten joint-stock banks over the period 1985-2002, Fu 
and Heffernan (2007) estimated the cost-based x-efficiencies using the SFA. For the 
fourteen banks as a whole, the average x-efficiency for the whole period was between 
0.41 and 0.52. The joint-stock banks were found to be significantly more x-efficient 
than the SOCBs. Chen et al. (2004) studied banking efficiency for forty-three Chinese 
banks (including the four SOCBs) during the period 1993-2000 using DEA. For the 
whole sample, the cost efficiency varied between 0.42 and 0.58; the allocative 
efficiency between 0.53 and 0.69; and the technical efficiency between 0.69 and 0.85 
over the study period. Although their cost efficiency estimates were broadly in line 
with those of Fu and Heffernan, their findings concerning the technical efficiency 
were rather surprising: the SOCBs were significantly more efficient than the 
joint-stock banks – a result that is the opposite to the previous findings on the 
technical efficiency of Chinese banks by Wei and Wang (2000). 
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4.3.2. Review of research on relationship between market structure and 
performance in China 
The study by Fu and Heffernan (2009) provided the first attempt to empirically test 
the alternative hypotheses of structure, conduct and performance in the Chinese 
banking market. Adopting the same framework as in Berger (1995) and Goldberg and 
Rai (1996), and using data for the fourteen banks as mentioned above, Fu and 
Heffernan (2009) examined the Chinese banking market from 1985-2002. Their 
empirical results showed a declining trend in efficiency in the Chinese banking sector 
as measured by the cost-based x-efficiency index. They provided support to the RMP 
hypothesis during the first stage of the study period (1985-1992), but rather weak 
support to the ES hypothesis for the second stage (1993-2002). Moreover, they found 
no relationship between market concentration and bank efficiency. They also found 
that ―there were no dramatic change in market structure‖ (Fu and Heffernan, 2009, 
P50) though the JSCBs are relatively more X-efficient. They claimed the regulatory 
bodies should liberate interest rate and increase market entry to improve the 
competitive structure. Zou (2004) adopted the fixed effects models to examine the 
scale efficiency of China banking industry during period 1993-2003. He found that 
the efficiency of most banks had experienced a period of increase at first then a 
decrease afterwards during the study period from 1993 to 2003. He also noticed that 
there were distinct differences in the efficiency among the joint-stock commercial 
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banks. He concluded that total commercialisation does not always improve 
performance in efficiency. 
 
4.4.Research methods for the current study 
There is so far very little empirical study of banking efficiency of Chinese banks at 
the sub-group (e.g., provincial or branch) level and there is very limited hard evidence 
on differences in banking efficiency across the provinces. Due to the sheer dominance 
of the SOCBs in the whole Chinese banking market, it is perhaps more important to 
examine issues of competition and efficiency among the SOCBs in different regions 
than to compare SOCBs with non-state-owned banks. Without enhancing the state of 
competition and performance across different administrative regions within the SOCB 
sector, further encouragement of competition between state-owned and 
non-state-owned banks is likely to yield rapidly diminishing returns. Yet the lack of 
hard evidence of banking efficiency and performance at the individual provincial 
branch level presents serious difficulties for evaluating the effectiveness of banking 
reform so far as well as for informing the design and implementation of further 
banking reform at the micro/branch level. 
 
The purpose of this study is to fill in this empirical gap. There are two broad 
objectives in the empirical investigation. First, the study will obtain precise measures 
of inter-group and inter-provincial differences in banking efficiency in the Chinese 
SOCB sector using the DEA technique and decompositional analysis. Second, a panel 
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econometric model will be employed to investigate the significant factors and 
mechanisms that underlie the inter-group and inter-provincial differences in banking 
efficiency. The following sections discuss the research methods in detail. 
 
4.4.1. Measuring within-group and between-group efficiencies 
In the literature on banking efficiency measurement, there are still substantial 
controversies over the concept, definition and estimation technique. In the present 
study, given the complete absence of data on bank cost, price, income and profit at the 
provincial level in the published official sources, the only concepts of efficiency that 
can be empirically measured are technical and scale efficiencies. In light of the 
theoretical controversies and data limitations, this study adopts an eclectic production 
function approach to banking efficiency measurement in the spirit of Baltensperger 
(1980), Santomero (1984) and Berger and Humphrey (1997). Applying DEA and 
decomposition analysis, this paper conducts a thorough investigation into the 
technical input efficiencies, scale efficiencies and returns-to-scale characteristic of the 
Chinese SOCBs at the provincial level. Moreover, the total input efficiency of each 
provincial branch is decomposed into the product of within-group (or local provincial 
level) and between-group (or banking group level) efficiencies. 
 
In contrast to the existing studies that treat the four state-owned banking groups as 
four DMUs alongside other banking groups of different ownership structures, this 
study focuses exclusively on the big four SOCBs and treats their provincial branches 
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as individual DMUs
3
. There are several reasons for doing this. First of all, the SOCBs 
differ substantially from other types of banks in terms of scale of operation, 
governance, market conditions and business conduct. Whilst the SOCBs have branch 
networks across the entire country and their business operations are subject to severe 
policy interventions and protection, many other types of banks (e.g. joint-stock or 
private) only operate within very specific locations and under highly competitive 
market conditions. Since the efficiency measures of individual banks are relative to 
the most efficient peers (or the ―outliers‖) that form the efficient frontier for the whole 
sample, the measures are very sensitive towards the selection of samples. It is little 
wonder that due to different samples being selected, as well as differences in the 
variables and estimation methods adopted, the empirical measures of efficiency of 
Chinese banks differ substantially. For example, in a study on the cost x-efficiencies 
of the SOCBs and other types of banks in the 1990s by Chen, et al. (2005), the 
SOCBs were found to be more x-efficient than the joint-stock banks, contradicting the 
results in Fu and Heffernan (2007, 2008). By restricting the samples to the SOCBs in 
the current study, the results may be more comparable and convincing. Second, by 
treating the provincial branches of the SOCBs as DMUs, the present study has 
overcome a statistical problem common among all the existing studies that arises from 
the small number of DMUs selected and hence a lack of degree of freedom. 
                                                        
3 Each of the four banking group has hundreds or thousands of branches in each of the thirty-one 
provinces, autonomous regions and directly administered municipalities on Mainland China. As 
detailed data are only available at the provincial/municipal level, each province or municipality under a 
banking group is treated as a DMU and the term ―provincial branch‖ here refers to all the branches of a 
particular group within a particular province. Therefore, there should be 124 DMUs. But due to data 
omissions in official publications, the actual number of DMUs in this study is 122. 
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In light of the theoretical controversy surrounding the definition and measurement of 
banking output, market conditions and data limitations, this research adopts a bank 
production function approach in the spirit of Baltensperger (1980), Santomero (1984) 
and Berger and Humphrey (1997) to examine the efficiency of the Chinese SOCBs 
over the period 1998-2003
4
. Applying DEA and decomposition analysis, this resaerch 
conducts a thorough investigation into the technical input efficiencies of the Chinese 
SOCBs at the provincial level. Although the DEA technique has been employed in 
various existing studies of banking efficiency in China, the present study extends the 
empirical work in a number of ways. First, for the first time this study examines 
banking efficiency of the SOCBs at the provincial level and almost all the provincial 
branches for the big four banking groups. Using the DEA technique, the present study 
will obtain values for total input efficiency, pure technical efficiency, scale efficiency 
and returns-to-scale characteristic for all provincial branches of the SOCBs. As data 
on banking costs, revenues and net incomes is generally unavailable at the provincial 
level due to confidentiality reasons
5
, such analysis provides an informed judgement 
on the efficiency and competitiveness of the SOCBs using data that is more accurate 
and more readily available. The empirical findings also reveal valuable information 
for judging the scale economy, unit cost of production and thus potential profitability 
of the banking groups. Second, the total input efficiency of each provincial branch is 
                                                        
4 2003 is the latest year for which there is a full set of data for conducting the present DEA analysis. 
5 Although such data exist for the whole banking groups, there is a significant extent of distortion to 
the data arising from government interference, as is discussed in more detail in a later section. 
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decomposed into the product of within-banking-group and between-banking-group 
efficiencies to separate the efficiency arising from within the provinces from the 
efficiency arising from the banking group as a whole. The rationale for such a 
decompositional analysis is that due to historical and political reasons, individual 
banking groups may be particularly advantaged or disadvantaged relative to the other 
groups. It is useful to empirically find out whether or not and to what extent this 
hypothesis is true. Moreover, the within-group versus between-group decomposition 
analysis can reveal the effectiveness of the banking reform programmes at the micro 
(province/branch) level as compared with the efforts at the mezzo (group/market) 
level. In short, the empirical results can enable policymakers and the management of 
SOCBs to target specific operational areas for further efficiency improvement. 
 
Following the literature, the current study uses the number of employees and the 
number of bank branches as inputs and the total amount of deposits and loans (in 
RMB Yuan) as outputs. Moreover, the present study also uses the number of cash 
cards as an input and the amount of card transactions as an output. Since the 
issuance and maintenance of cards incur additional capital and technology related 
costs and the average amount of card transactions per card can reflect the 
cardholders‘ average spending power, this practice can capture the efficiency of the 
branches in attracting wealthy individuals who also have demands for other 
fee-based banking products and services such as personal asset management. It 
should be pointed out that ideally all the outputs should be flow measures but the 
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outputs adopted here are stock measures. This practice is imposed by the lack of 
flow data on deposit and loan accounts (which was also noted by other studies on 
Chinese banking, e.g., Fu and Heffernan, 2007). Moreover, the outputs here 
correspond to total, not net, banking outputs. 
 
Having clarified the selection of inputs and outputs, the next step is to specify the 
method for measuring the efficiency of bank branches in transforming inputs into a 
variety of outputs. Since there are multiple inputs and outputs in the present case, the 
natural tool of analysis is the non-parametric Data Envelopment Analysis that was 
originally developed by Charnes et al. (1978). DEA is ideally suited for benchmarking 
the relative operational efficiency of business units (termed decision making units, or 
DMUs) against their most efficient peers under similar market conditions and 
business models when multiple inputs and outputs are involved in the production 
process. The analysis indicates the necessary changes in individual inputs and outputs 
of a particular DMU so that the performance of the unit becomes as efficient as its 
most efficient peers. This method, now routinely adopted in a broad range of 
application areas, has been applied extensively in the banking and financial service 
sector. Conditional upon the appropriate choice of inputs and outputs as well as the 
sample of DMUs, the kind of mathematical programming procedure used by DEA for 
efficient frontier estimation is found to be comparatively robust (Seiford and Thrall, 
1990). Further evidence of the robustness of DEA as compared with other similar 
estimation methods is presented in Bauer et al. (1998).  
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Due to the constraint of data availability at the provincial level, the present study 
focuses on the technical input efficiency of the provincial branches of the SOCBs, 
that is, the maximum proportional contraction in any observed input that can be 
achieved if all inputs by a branch contract radially as far as possible without 
detriment to its output levels (Thanassoulis, 2001, p.24). The focus on input 
efficiency is consistent with real world developments in the Chinese banking sector 
that was characterised by limited scope for further growth in deposits and loans for 
the SOCBs due to severe competition from other banks that were expanding rapidly. 
Therefore, the present study will adopt the production function approach but employ 
proxy measures for deposit-related, lending-related and other outputs. Such proxy 
measures are also widely used in the literature (e.g. see Berger, et al. 1993; 
Humphrey, 1993; Mester 1997). 
 
The estimation of the technical input efficiency is performed under alternative 
assumptions about the returns to scale characteristic in the production process. 
Following the original model of Charnes, et al. (1978), which has become widely 
known as the CCR model, the overall technical input efficiency (termed θCCR) of each 
branch is estimated under the assumption of constant returns to scale. The CCR model 
is also extended to obtain the slacks in inputs and outputs by a two-stage estimation 
procedure (see, Cooper, et. al., 2002). Let j denote the jth DMU (or bank branch, j = 
1, …, N), xi the ith input (i = 1, …, M), and yk the kth output (k = 1, …, S), SXi the 
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slack in the ith input, and SYk the slack in the kth output. In the first stage, for any 
particular DMU (denoted by j0) the following linear programming problem is solved 
to obtain its efficiency score (i.e. θj0
CCR
): 
Minimise: θj0 
Subject to: 
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In the second stage, the optimal value θj0
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problem: 
Minimise: 



S
k
k
M
i
i SYSX
11  
Subject to: 
Nj
SkSYyy
MiSXxx
j
k
N
j
jkjjk
i
N
j
jijjij
,...,1,0
,...1,
,...,1,
1
,0,
1
,0,
*
0










 
 
If θj0
*
 = 1 and SXi = 0 (i = 1,…,M), SYk = 0 (k = 1,…,S), the operation of DMU j0 is 
defined to be Pareto-efficient, otherwise it is Pareto-inefficient and the extent of 
technical inefficiency is measured by 1- θj0
*
. One limitation of the above model, 
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however, is that all the DMUs, regardless of their size, are assumed to be operating 
under constant returns to scale, which is a very restrictive assumption. Banker et al. 
(1984) modified the CCR model to allow for the DMUs to operate under variable 
returns to scale (and the modified model is termed the BCC model). The modification 
is rather straightforward: the following convexity constraint is introduced into the 
CCR model: 1 j . The resultant efficiency score for DMU j0 is now termed the 
pure technical input efficiency (denoted by θj0
BCC
). On the basis of the two efficiency 
scores, the scale-efficiency score for DMU j0 (denoted by θj0
S
) can be obtained as: 
BCC
j
CCR
j
S
j 000 /  . Moreover, using the optimal values for λ (denoted by λ
*
), the 
returns-to-scale characteristic of DMU j0 can also be determined as follows: 1) If 
1*  j for all the optimal solutions to the CCR model, then decreasing returns to 
scale (DRS) hold locally for DMU j0; 2) If 1*  j for at least one optimal solution 
to the CCR model, then constant returns to scale (CRS) hold locally for DMU j0; 3) If 
1*  j for all the optimal solutions to the CCR model, then increasing returns to 
scale (IRS) hold locally for DMU j0. The optimal scale size is at where CRS holds. 
Given the absence of any data on bank profit at the provincial level, such information 
is valuable in identifying the potential unit cost of production and thus profitability of 
the branches.  
 
In the above procedures, all the branches of all the banking groups are pooled 
together to estimate a global efficient frontier against which every branch is 
compared. However, it is probable that for historical as well as political / 
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administrative reasons, branches within a particular banking group may face a 
separate group efficient frontier from that for another banking group. In other words, 
irrespective of the efficiencies at the provincial level, a banking group may be 
intrinsically more effective than the other groups in improving the operational 
efficiencies of all its branches across the provinces. This is particularly pertinent in 
the Chinese SOCBs as historically these banking groups were severely restricted in 
the economic sectors within which they could operate. As a result, the level of 
efficiency of individual banking groups may be related to the conditions and 
performance of those economic sectors. Moreover, over different time periods 
different banking groups received policy priority treatments by the Chinese 
government, which again may have led to differences in efficiency performance at 
the group level. Therefore, similar to the procedure developed by Charnes et al. 
(1981), this study decomposes the technical efficiency score for a provincial branch 
into the product of within-banking-group efficiency and between-banking-group 
efficiency. For convenience such efficiencies are termed local efficiency and group 
efficiency respectively in subsequent discussions.  Local efficiency is obtained by 
estimating the technical input efficiency of all the provincial branches within the 
same banking group in the first-step estimations. In the second step, the observed 
input-output levels of all the branches for all the banking groups are replaced by 
their targeted optimal levels that are calculated from the first-step estimations. All 
the branches with the new optimal input-output levels are then pooled together to 
estimate the efficiency score for the branches again. Since in the second step, the 
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inefficiencies at the local level have already been removed by the use of optimal 
inputs and outputs, any new inefficiency must be due to the group effect. 
 
Having examined the efficiency level of all the provincial branches, several questions 
may be raised. Specifically, the central questions need to be investigated are: How 
efficient were the SOCBs in deploying resources to provide banking services in recent 
years? How did banking efficiency differ across different groups as well as different 
provinces? How did banking efficiency across groups and provinces change over the 
study time period? These questions are answered by measuring and decomposing the 
technical efficiency of the four SOCBs across the thirty-one provincial units on 
mainland China over the period 1998-2003. By so doing, the current study overcomes 
or alleviates a number of the problems associated with the existing studies. First of all, 
given the distorted profits and costs for the SOCBs due to routine policy interventions, 
it is more useful to reveal their underlying efficiency in utilising resources to produce 
banking outputs. Secondly, by focusing on the SOCBs, the measured efficiency levels 
are economically more meaningful, as is explained in detail later. Finally, by treating 
the provincial branches as the units of analysis, the number of data points increases 
significantly. 
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4.4.2. Panel econometric modelling of within-group and between-group 
efficiencies 
Once the efficiency levels of the provincial bank branches have been estimated, the 
study will go on to explain the inter-provincial differences in banking efficiency 
using a panel econometric modelling approach. The econometric model is 
constructed on the basis of an extended conceptual framework that encompasses the 
alternative hypotheses as discussed above. In the present study, since no data on 
banks‘ cost, income or profit is available at the provincial level, any measure of 
bank performance on the basis of profit or cost is ruled out. Therefore, banking 
efficiency is used instead as a measure of bank performance. A considerable amount 
of literature has been devoted to the measurement and explanation of banking 
efficiency, as is shown in a survey article by Berger and Humphrey (1997).  
 
As the literature review in the previous sections suggest, the level of efficiency of 
individual bank branches in the provinces depend on a wide range of factors, both 
structural and non-structural. Therefore, the estimated technical efficiencies of 
individual provincial branches are used as the dependent variable in the following 
panel regression model: 
itijtitit zvxTE   '''           (1) 
In the above model, TE is technical efficiency; i: the number of provinces; j: the 
number of provincial-level bank branches; t: time; x‘: a vector of variables that refelct 
the economic, banking and institutional conditions of the provinces; v‘: a vector of 
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variables that capture branch-specific conditions; z‘iα: a term for the ‗individual effect‘ 
(Greene, 2003, p.285) which contains a constant term and a set of unobserved branch 
specific variables; ε: the usual random error term. Contingent on the data, model (1) 
can turn out to be either of three variants: i) if z‘iα contains only a constant term, 
model (1) becomes the standard pooled regression model; ii) if z‘iα contain 
unobserved variables that are correlated with x‘, model (1) can be transformed into a 
‗fixed-effect‘ model; iii) if z‘iα contain unobserved variables that are uncorrelated 
with x‘, model (1) can be transformed into a ‗random-effect‘ model (Greene, 2003, 
p.285).  
 
The econometric estimation strategy is as follows. The initial model started with all 
the explanatory variables listed above and the number of explanatory variables was 
reduced round by round. In every round, the Breusch-Pagan Lagrange Multiplier test 
was conducted and the pooled regression model was rejected on each occasion in 
favour of the individual effects models. Therefore, model selection was restricted to 
the ‗fixed-effects‘ and ‗random-effects‘ models. The Hausman procedure was 
followed for this purpose. Indeed, the Hausman procedure, together with the condition 
number for testing the significance of the multi-collinearity problem as well as the 
p-values for the estimated coefficients, were used as the criteria for dropping 
explanatory variables from each round of estimation. For example, if the presence of a 
variable caused the value of the condition number to rise and rendered Hausman‘s χ2 
test statistic negative as well as the p-value showed statistical insignificance, then it 
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was dropped from the next round of estimation. For the final set of explanatory 
variables, the ‗random-effects‘ model was chosen as best suited for explaining the 
inter-provincial differences in the technical efficiencies of the 122 provincial-level 
bank branches. Details of the final estimated ‗random-effects‘ model using Stata are 
presented in Table 26 in chapter 6. In the final model, as the condition number of the 
matrix formed by all the explanatory variables is substantially below 20 (Table 26), 
multi-collinearity is not a serious concern here. The Hausman‘s test statistic strongly 
suggests the acceptance of the null hypothesis that the individual effects are 
uncorrelated with the other explanatory variables. Thus the random-effects model is 
justified. 
 
4.5.Summary of conceptual issues and framework for empirical investigation 
This chapter has reviewed the conceptual and empirical issues concerning the 
examination of banking competition and competitiveness. Due to the lack of a clear 
definition of competitiveness, alternative measures have been adopted as indicators 
of competitiveness. Insofar as the banking industry is concerned, the most 
commonly adopted measure is bank performance, measured either by financial 
performance (i.e. profitability) or efficiency. There are also numerous concepts of 
efficiency as well as alternative methods for estimating efficiency. This chapter has 
also reviewed the literature on the determination of bank efficiency. The literature is 
represented by alternative hypotheses about the relationship among market structure, 
market condition, bank conduct and performance.  
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On the basis of literature review, and given the business models of the Chinese 
SOCBs in the study period as well as the constraint of data availability, this study 
proposes to adopt the DEA method to estimate technical input efficiency for 
individual provincial bank branches and then employ a panel econometric model to 
investigate the significant factors in explaining the inter-provincial differences in 
banking efficiency. The next two chapters present details of the data, specification of 
the empirical estimation procedures and models, selection of explanatory variables, 
and the empirical findings. 
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Chapter V. Measurement of Banking Efficiency at Provincial Level 
 
5.1 Current market conditions and business model of the Chinese SOCBs 
Existing empirical studies of banking efficiency in China have largely followed the 
literature on estimating the cost x-efficiency of banking and financial institutions 
(mainly in the U.S.) with little consideration for the market conditions and business 
conduct in the Chinese banking market (Heffernan, 2005). An implicit assumption 
underlying the estimated cost function is that the banks in question operate in an 
imperfectly competitive (e.g. monopolistically competitive) market as profit 
maximisers. In a standard monopolistically competitive model, the firms have 
complete discretion over the design and launch of their products, the prices to charge, 
the markets to compete in, and the price and non-price aspects to compete against or 
collude with their rivals. However, in the Chinese SOCB sector during the study 
period, such conditions were far from reality. Although the Chinese SOCBs had come 
a long way to be commercially viable, they were still severely restricted to function 
independently as profit maximisers, largely due to historical reasons and policy 
interventions. The SOCBs were, and are still, closely monitored and regulated in their 
corporate governance, deposit-taking and lending decisions and the deposit-lending 
interest spread. Their flow of funds was largely allocated on a geographical and 
sectorial formula basis and they had little control over their cost bases. As a legacy of 
the historical administrative division of business scopes coupled with the very nature 
of banking that is based on information, reputation, trust and network between the 
141 
 
bank and the clients, the SOCBs and the colossal state-owned industrial sectors are 
inextricably linked to maintain stability in national output and particularly 
employment. In a sense, the SOCBs were still playing the role of the ―treasurer‖ for 
the state-owned corporations. Therefore, the Chinese government always stands ready 
to rescue any failing SOCBs through capital injections and taking-over of bad assets
6
.  
 
The business model of the SOCBs was also shaped by the stage of China‘s economic 
development in general and banking development in particular. Compared with 
established foreign banks, the Chinese domestic banks, particularly the SOCBs, have 
many disadvantages. Although the basic structure of a modern banking system is in 
place, the management of specific business areas such as credit and risk remains 
primitive. Despite a significant rise in the capital adequacy ratio achieved by capital 
injection by the government, stripping off bad assets, and stock market floatation, the 
formation and accumulation of bad assets still haunt the SOCBs disproportionally as a 
result of the ties with the state-owned enterprises. The rapid development of the stock 
markets and venture capital markets in China pose an increasing challenge to the 
banking sector‘s traditional sources of commercial income and thus the profit model. 
                                                        
6 The SOCBs‘ defence against market risk is not always or exclusively policy intervention. One further 
buffer for the SOCBs to withstand the problem of significant proportion of NPLs is the very high 
liquidity level in the economy that arises from impressive economic growth at an annual rate of 8-10 
percent for nearly two decades and also a culture of high savings ratio by Chinese households. In the 
past decade, the annual average growth rate in total banking assets, deposits and lending is almost 
twice the growth rate in real GDP. The ratio of banking assets to GDP in China increased from 151.8 
percent in 2000 to 245.2 percent in 2005, suggesting a very high level of liquidity in the Chinese 
economy that is very similar to the level in the Euro area (see also Fu and Heffernan, 2007). This high 
level of liquidity has enabled the SOCBs to spread the burden of NPLs over a rapidly expanding asset 
base and over a longer time horizon. 
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The new fee-based or capital-gains-based businesses also face tough challenges as 
China has little history or culture of paying for banking and financial services. If the 
SOCBs were to move rapidly to a pure profit-based market model, it would entail 
significant levels of unemployment in the SOCB sector itself and probably a credit 
crunch for the state-owned enterprises – an economic as well as political risk too high 
for the Chinese government to bear. 
 
Therefore, it can be argued that the most appropriate conceptual framework for 
describing the conduct of SOCBs is the principal-agent theory (Shi, 2006). A full 
development of the principal-agent model of the conduct of the Chinese SOCBs is 
beyond the scope of the current study. Nevertheless, it can be argued that significant 
moral hazard problems can arise from the peculiar ownership and governance 
structure of SOCBs. Whilst the objective of the principal (the government) is to 
sustain rapid economic growth and social stability by maintaining a constant flow of 
credit to the economy in general and the state enterprises in particular, that of the 
agents (managers of the SOCBs) is to maximise their market power that is manifested 
through their market share of deposits, loans and the size and quality of the client base. 
In other words, the competition among the SOCBs mainly took the form of non-price 
competition. In the meantime, the principal maintains control through a number of 
mechanisms including direct involvement in the corporate governance and control of 
the cost base to influence productivity, efficiency and profitability of the SOCBs. 
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This characterisation of the behaviour of the SOCBs is consistent with empirical 
observation. As is already mentioned in a previous chapter, the growth in banking 
assets, deposits and loans has been spectacular in recent years across all the SOCBs, 
but the growth in the more market-oriented and riskier businesses has been rather 
limited. Although the business scope of the SOCBs is expanding, the traditional 
banking businesses still remain the dominant source of commercial income for the 
SOCBs (see Table 16 in chapter 3). Non-interest income accounted for only around 
10percent of total income for the Chinese SOCBs (with the only exception of ABC 
that recorded a 26 percent share of non-interest income in 2005), compared with 
roughly 48 percent for the global banking market. Therefore, the traditional market 
for deposits and loans still remain the main battleground for the SOCBs. 
 
As revealed in the ―performance‖ section in chapter 3, the SOCBs are unlikely to 
behave as profit maximisers comes from the usual measures of financial performance 
for business firms. The usual measures of financial performance such as ROA and 
ROE for the SOCBs are simply unreliable and subject to huge swings over time. This 
is simply because the business operations of the SOCBs were subject to frequent 
government interference such as asset-stripping and capital injections. Therefore, 
having examined the market conditions, the business model of the SOCBs, and the 
availability and quality of existing data sources, the present study will focus on the 
underlying efficiencies of the provincial branches of the SOCBs in utilising resources 
to produce a range of banking services.  The remaining sections of this chapter will 
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discuss how the DEA and decomposition analyses as discussed before are 
implemented and present the empirical findings. 
 
5.2 Implementation of the empirical DEA and decomposition analyses 
All the data for the present study are obtained from the Almanac of China‘s Finance 
and Banking (1998-2003 issues). The full dataset contains all the defined inputs and 
outputs from 1998 to 2003 for the branches of the four banking groups in 31 
provinces, autonomous regions and provincial-level municipalities on mainland China 
(with the exception of Tibet which has partial data), giving rise to a sample size of 
122 provincial level DMUs for each year. The following table presents the relative 
share of the inputs and outputs by each banking group as a whole.  
 
Table 17 Share of inputs and outputs by banking groups in 2003 (percent) 
 Branch Employee Card
7
 Deposit Loan 
Card 
Transaction 
CCB 18.8  24.2  33.5  23.7  22.7  30.6  
ICBC 27.3  27.5  21.5  37.6  37.4  15.7  
ABC 40.8  36.1  31.3  23.9  25.0  50.7  
                                                        
7 It should be pointed out that the term ―bank cards‖ refers to different measures for the four banking 
groups at the provincial level in the Almanac of China‘s Finance and Banking: for ABC, CCB and 
ICBC, the term contains both cash cards and credit cards, whilst for BOC only credit cards are counted. 
Therefore, the card-related inputs and outputs for BOC had to be adjusted to be consistent with the 
figures for the other three groups using a variety of sources including statistical year books for 
individual provinces. 
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BOC 13.1  12.1  13.8  14.8  14.9  2.9  
Total 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 
Source: ACFB, 2004 
Clearly, ABC has the most extensive banking infrastructure among the four SOCBs, 
with the largest share in the number of branches and employees and second largest 
share in the number of cards issued. It also has a significant share of all the outputs, 
with more than half of the market in card transactions. Compared with ICBC, ABC‘s 
relatively smaller shares in deposits and loans were mainly due to the historical and 
administrative reasons that the operations of ABC were largely restricted to the 
agricultural sectors and the rural areas whilst ICBC was traditionally the dominant 
player in the state-owned industrial and commercial sectors. However, over the recent 
years, ABC was very aggressive in venturing into new business areas such as bank 
card related businesses. BOC has the smallest market share in either inputs or outputs. 
This is largely due to the fact that it was primarily dealing with banking businesses 
involving foreign currencies and thus accessible to a small proportion of domestic 
individuals and firms. Of course, there are significant variations in market shares of 
inputs and outputs across all the provinces. By estimating the CCR and BCC models 
the technical input efficiency scores as well as the decomposed pure technical and 
scale efficiency scores for all the provincial branches are obtained. Table 5 shows the 
average efficiency scores for the banking groups from 1998 to 2003
8
. 
 
                                                        
8 All the DEA models were implemented in the GAMS modelling system developed by GAMS 
Development Corporation. 
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Table 18. Group average input efficiencies of the Chinese SOCBs (1998 – 2003) 
  1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 
Technical:             
All 0.53 0.49 0.51 0.59 0.53 0.61 
CCB 0.48 0.40 0.47 0.54 0.62 0.54 
ICBC 0.42 0.44 0.46 0.64 0.62 0.74 
ABC 0.58 0.50 0.52 0.62 0.40 0.56 
BOC 0.62 0.60 0.58 0.56 0.46 0.63 
Pure:             
All 0.59 0.55 0.56 0.62 0.57 0.64 
CCB 0.52 0.43 0.50 0.55 0.65 0.55 
ICBC 0.51 0.54 0.54 0.67 0.66 0.75 
ABC 0.69 0.61 0.59 0.64 0.44 0.59 
BOC 0.68 0.66 0.62 0.62 0.52 0.66 
Scale:             
All 0.90 0.89 0.91 0.96 0.93 0.96 
CCB 0.94 0.94 0.94 0.98 0.95 0.97 
ICBC 0.88 0.85 0.88 0.96 0.95 0.98 
ABC 0.87 0.84 0.89 0.97 0.92 0.95 
BOC 0.92 0.92 0.93 0.91 0.90 0.95 
Note: due to rounding errors, figures for technical efficiencies do not exactly equal the 
products of pure technical and scale efficiencies in the table. 
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For the Chinese SOCBs as a whole, there was clear evidence of significant levels of 
operational inefficiency as compared with the most efficient provincial branches – the 
average score was 53 percent in 1998 and then fluctuated between 49 percent and 59 
percent until it improved to 61 percent in 2003. The generally low level of efficiency 
was primarily due to the low pure technical efficiency, which was 59 percent in 1998 
and 64 percent in 2003. The low pure technical efficiencies were reflected in the loss 
of efficiency for all the inputs. At the start of the study period, compared with the 
efficient targets, around 57 percent of branches, 49 percent of employees and 49 
percent of cards for the whole sector could have been cut to achieve the same or even 
higher level of outputs. In 2003, despite the significant reductions in the number of 
branches and employees over the years of further reform, the percentage of wastage 
was still 42 percent for branches, 45 percent for employees and 39percent for cards. 
Therefore, the cost-cutting measures by the banking groups did have the desired 
effects, but the effects were only partial and the process of reform was very slow. 
These results are consistent with the gradualist approach to economic and banking 
reform adopted by the Chinese government to avoid potentially large scale 
unemployment and credit crunch problems that could arise from a ―shock-therapeutic‖ 
approach. Some other benefits of the reform started to be evident at the end of the 
period. For example, the pure technical efficiency started to improve for the whole 
sector in 2003, and the average scale efficiency increased steadily from 0.9 in 1998 to 
0.96 in 2003. 
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Having briefly examined the overall efficiency performance of the whole SOCB 
sector, the focus now turns to the performance of individual banking groups. As Table 
18 shows, BOC was the clear leader in operational efficiency in the first half of the 
period but its leading position was taken over by ICBC in the second half. The 
performance of ICBC in the second period was particularly noticeable as this group 
was the worst performer in the first three years. The other groups showed a mixed 
fortune over the period. CCB had the lowest score for 3 out of the 6 years and was at 
the bottom of the league table in 2003. ABC came second in the table in the first four 
years but its position dropped to the bottom in 2002 and second from the bottom in 
2003. More detailed results regarding various aspects of the operational efficiencies 
are reported in Table 19. 
 
Table 19. Operational efficiencies of individual groups of the SOCBs (1998-2003) 
 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 
No. of Pareto-efficient provinces:       
   CCB 3 2 3 4 4 4 
   ICBC 2 1 1 2 5 5 
   ABC 3 2 2 3 1 2 
   BOC 6 6 5 4 2 4 
No. of branches operating at CRS:       
   CCB 3 2 3 4 4 4 
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   ICBC 2 1 1 2 5 5 
   ABC 4 2 2 3 1 2 
   BOC 7 6 5 4 2 4 
No. of branches operating at IRS:       
   CCB 10 18 21 16 1 4 
   ICBC 11 10 11 5 2 16 
   ABC 6 8 8 3 5 7 
   BOC 15 18 17 19 12 22 
No. of branches operating at DRS:       
   CCB 18 11 7 11 26 23 
   ICBC 17 19 18 23 23 9 
   ABC 20 20 20 24 24 21 
   BOC 9 7 9 8 17 5 
percent of target level - by no. of branches      
   CCB 46.9 38.3 45.9 53.4 56.7 52.9 
   ICBC 36.7 34.3 35.3 57.4 42.0 67.9 
   ABC 38.2 36.0 34.0 50.5 38.1 55.0 
   BOC 50.7 48.9 47.0 48.8 28.7 56.0 
percent of target level - by no. of employees     
   CCB 41.9 36.3 42.7 43.7 59.4 47.0 
   ICBC 42.0 43.7 46.3 63.1 62.4 73.6 
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   ABC 57.5 50.4 51.4 61.1 19.6 35.3 
   BOC 61.9 59.8 58.0 55.1 46.4 62.7 
percent of target level - by no. of cards      
   CCB 44.5 35.9 45.5 53.5 61.9 53.0 
   ICBC 39.2 40.9 43.3 64.3 59.6 73.6 
   ABC 57.2 50.5 51.7 61.9 40.3 55.5 
   BOC 62.1 59.9 58.0 56.4 45.9 62.7 
Note: percent of target level is expressed as the ratio between the level of an input that 
a DMU would require were it operating as efficiently as its most efficient peer and the 
actual level of that input. Thus, 1 minus this figure can be regarded as the percentage 
of wastage in that input. 
 
A number of significant results have emerged. First, among the 122 provincial 
branches, just over 10 percent operated at an efficient scale (13 percent in 1998 and 
12 percent in 2003). Around half of branches operated at decreasing-returns-to-scale 
(52 percent in 1998 and 48 percent in 2003), suggesting that these branches were 
operating at a scale that is above the most productive level. Given the dominance of 
interest income in banks‘ total revenue and the very limited autonomy by the banks to 
change their interest rates, it can be deduced that these branches were not operating at 
the profit-maximising scales and thus could benefit from a reduction in their scales of 
operation. The problem was particularly acute for CCB and ABC throughout the 
period. ICBC also experienced a significant problem of DRS in every year apart from 
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2003. In contrast, the most significant problem for BOC over the entire period was 
IRS, thus there was scope for many branches in this group to increase the scale of 
operation. Second, related to the problem of above-optimal operational scales, there 
was also a significant problem of surplus inputs of branches, employees and bank 
cards. Relatively speaking, ICBC had the least surpluses whilst CCB and ABC had 
the most surpluses in all the inputs. The problem of surplus labour was particularly 
severe for ABC. To shed further light on the areas where improvement is required, the 
decompositional analysis of local versus group efficiencies is conducted and the 
results are presented in Table 20.  
 
Table 20. Local and group efficiencies of the SOCBs (1998 – 2003) 
 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 
SOCBs: 
   
Local 
 
0.70 
 
0.73 
 
0.70 
 
0.68 
 
0.68 
 
0.68 
   
Group 0.77 0.71 0.76 0.90 0.85 0.94 
CCB: 
   
Local 
 
0.64 
 
0.66 
 
0.72 
 
0.61 
 
0.68 
 
0.54 
   
Group 0.80 0.68 0.66 0.90 0.96 0.99 
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ICBC: 
   
Local 
 
0.79 
 
0.80 
 
0.77 
 
0.76 
 
0.69 
 
0.76 
   
Group 0.53 0.56 0.61 0.86 0.92 1.00 
ABC: 
   
Local 
 
0.75 
 
0.84 
 
0.73 
 
0.73 
 
0.71 
 
0.74 
   
Group 0.74 0.60 0.77 0.85 0.66 0.78 
BOC: 
   
Local 
 
0.63 
 
0.62 
 
0.61 
 
0.60 
 
0.64 
 
0.66 
   
Group 1.00 0.99 0.99 0.99 0.87 0.98 
 
It is clear that for the whole sector of SOCBs, efficiency at the local provincial level 
declined but efficiency at the group level generally improved over the entire period. 
Moreover, efficiency at the group level dominated efficiency at the local level and the 
gap was rising in recent years, suggesting that in general the source of inefficiency 
was from the local level. Therefore, further efficiency gain can be obtained more 
effectively by targeting reform efforts at the micro/branch level than at the group level. 
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Insofar as the individual banking groups are concerned, BOC was the most efficient at 
the group level. This is not really surprising given this group‘s significant exposure to 
international markets and foreign competition. Nevertheless, compared with the most 
efficient peers within the BOC group, the level of local efficiency was the lowest 
among the four banking groups. Again, this result was not really surprising as it is 
expected that those provinces in the interior parts of China were not as exposed to 
foreign-currency related businesses as their counterparts located in the east coastal 
provinces. In the remaining three groups, some interesting contrasts have emerged. 
Although ABC was not the worst performer in the first few years, it fared worst in the 
efficiency score by 2003. For CCB and ICBC, although these two groups compared 
unfavourably with the BOC in the first few years, they had become almost as efficient 
as BOC in 2002 and 2003. Therefore, ABC seemed to be particularly disadvantaged 
in its operational efficiency over the study period. At the local level, the level of 
inefficiency was very significant across all the banking groups, especially within the 
CCB group. 
 
Finally, this chapter presents the six-year average technical and scale efficiency scores 
for all the provincial branches of the Chinese SOCBs over the examination period. 
Not surprisingly, provinces on the eastern coast and the major cities were associated 
with much higher technical input efficiency scores than those provinces in the interior 
parts of China, although the difference in scale efficiency was rather limited. 
Therefore, the cross-province differences in technical input efficiency mainly arose 
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from the differences in pure technical efficiency. The charts in the Appendix show the 
distribution of efficiency scores among all the provincial branches. Apparently, with 
the exception of 2001 and 2003, the peak of the distribution occurred at an efficiency 
level of less than 50 percent (shown in figure 2). By 2003, the provincial branches 
were more uniformly distributed across the efficiency range of 0.4 to 1, suggesting an 
across-the-board, albeit limited, efficiency improvement. 
 
Table 21: Average technical input efficiency of SOCBs across Chinese provinces 
and major cities (1998 – 2003) 
Provinces CCB ICBC ABC BOC 
Beijing 1.00  1.00  0.69  1.00  
Tianjin 0.66  0.53  0.51  0.73  
Hebei 0.36  0.50  0.57  0.51  
Shanxi 0.59  0.64  0.49  0.48  
Inner Mongolia 0.37  0.48  0.44  0.43  
Liaoning 0.54  0.64  0.47  0.72  
Jilin 0.41  0.72  0.37  0.79  
Heilongjiang 0.49  0.70  0.57  0.78  
Shanghai 0.95  0.89  0.87  1.00  
Jiangsu 0.39  0.65  0.48  0.50  
Zhejiang 0.63  0.48  0.51  0.42  
Anhui 0.30  0.42  0.43  0.43  
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Fujian 0.78  0.70  0.85  0.45  
Jiangxi 0.51  0.61  0.42  0.39  
Shandong 0.44  0.63  0.44  0.44  
Henan 0.49  0.71  0.60  0.43  
Hubei 0.27  0.44  0.33  0.64  
Hunan 0.29  0.33  0.35  0.55  
Guangdong 0.44  0.64  0.39  0.71  
Guangxi 0.45  0.39  0.55  0.43  
Hainan 0.42  0.50  0.46  0.65  
Chongqing 0.54  0.34  0.39  0.47  
Sichuan 0.54  0.44  0.41  0.57  
Guizhou 0.32  0.29  0.54  0.47  
Yunnan 0.29  0.38  0.55  0.63  
Tibet 0.96  - - 0.89  
Shaanxi 0.42  0.57  0.55  0.43  
Gansu 0.55  0.54  0.67  0.69  
Qinghai 0.53  0.59  0.82  0.39  
Ningxia 0.43  0.41  0.75  0.47  
Xinjiang 0.38  0.48  0.46  0.38  
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Table 22. Average scale efficiency of SOCBs across Chinese provinces and major 
cities (1998 – 2003) 
Provinces CCB ICBC ABC BOC 
Beijing 1.00  1.00  0.99  1.00  
Tianjin 0.94  0.98  0.97  0.94  
Hebei 0.97  0.81  0.82  0.98  
Shanxi 0.97  0.94  0.94  0.97  
Inner Mongolia 0.98  0.97  0.97  0.97  
Liaoning 0.95  0.76  0.86  0.96  
Jilin 0.94  0.91  0.94  1.00  
Heilongjiang 0.96  0.83  0.83  1.00  
Shanghai 0.99  0.91  0.97  1.00  
Jiangsu 0.97  0.82  0.71  0.92  
Zhejiang 0.92  0.94  0.83  0.96  
Anhui 0.98  0.98  0.91  0.99  
Fujian 0.97  0.99  1.00  0.98  
Jiangxi 0.98  0.85  0.95  0.98  
Shandong 0.93  0.80  0.79  0.96  
Henan 0.83  0.84  0.76  0.99  
Hubei 0.97  0.87  0.83  0.91  
Hunan 0.95  0.97  0.97  0.98  
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Guangdong 0.77  0.69  0.73  0.75  
Guangxi 0.99  0.99  0.99  0.98  
Hainan 0.98  0.97  0.99  0.99  
Chongqing 0.90  0.96  0.99  0.80  
Sichuan 0.98  0.94  0.86  1.00  
Guizhou 0.92  0.99  0.90  0.90  
Yunnan 0.94  0.99  0.96  0.95  
Tibet 0.98  - - 0.89  
Shaanxi 0.98  0.94  0.95  0.92  
Gansu 0.99  0.98  0.92  0.94  
Qinghai 0.99  0.96  0.94  0.56  
Ningxia 0.99  0.95  0.94  0.72  
Xinjiang 0.97  0.98  0.97  0.81  
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Figure 2. Distribution of efficiency scores among provincial branches 
  
 
  
 
  
 
5.3  Conclusions  
Given the significance of banking and finance in the modern economy and the still 
dominant position of the SOCBs in the Chinese banking sector, substantial resources 
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and efforts have been deployed by the Chinese government to improve the level of 
efficiency and competitiveness of the SOCBs in recent years. How successful the 
efforts have turned out to be remains an open question. A combination of conceptual 
problems with a proper definition of the banking production process and the lack of 
consistent and reliable data for the Chinese SOCBs has made the empirical 
assessment difficult to carry out. By adopting a banking production function approach, 
and using data on banking inputs and outputs that are relatively reliable, the present 
study focuses on the measurement of technical input efficiency and scale efficiency of 
the SOCBs at the provincial branch level. On the whole, the empirical results 
represent rather uncomfortable readings for the Chinese policymakers and 
management of the SOCBs. For the whole sector of SOCBs, the level of technical 
input efficiency remained very low throughout the study period, even though there 
was a small improvement in 2003. The technical input inefficiency was mainly due to 
pure technical inefficiency, but also to scale inefficiency. Despite the substantial 
reduction in the number of branches and employees over recent years, the problem of 
surplus branches and employees was still significant in 2003. A related problem was 
that around half of the provincial branches were operating at an above-optimal scale 
(larger than the most productive scale size), particularly among CCB, ICBC and ABC. 
In contrast, the most significant scale problem for the BOC group was increasing 
returns to scale (i.e. operating below the most productive scale size). Therefore, for 
the first three groups, further efforts should be directed at consolidating existing 
banking inputs (e.g. branches) further, whilst for BOC the main focus should be on 
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further expanding banking outputs and new business opportunities. 
 
Looking at the sources of inefficiency from an administrative point of view, different 
patterns have emerged among the banking groups. For BOC, the inefficiency is 
almost entirely due to local inefficiency in the provinces whilst the group as a whole 
remained efficient throughout the study period. ICBC and CCB made significant 
improvements over the years and by 2003 were almost as efficient as BOC. Therefore, 
by the end of the study period, there was little difference in operational efficiency at 
the group level among CCB, ICBC and BOC. In contrast, the group level efficiency 
for ABC stayed low until the end of the study period. It seemed that the Chinese 
government‘s efforts to prepare CCB, BOC and ICBC for stock market floatation in 
recent years had put ABC in a considerably disadvantaged position in terms of 
operational efficiency. It remains to be seen whether or not the on-going effort by the 
Chinese government to float ABC will bring its efficiency performance in line with 
the other three groups. Moreover, compared with the efficient provincial branches, the 
majority of the provincial branches were operating at a too low level of technical 
efficiency. A casual inspection of the empirical results reveals that the inefficient 
branches were mostly but not always located in the interior parts of China, suggesting 
a potential link to the state of economic and banking development in different 
provinces. The detailed explanation of the inter-provincial differences in banking 
efficiency is discussed in next chapter. 
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Chapter VI. Explanation of inter-provincial differences in banking efficiency 
 
6.1 Introduction 
Having examined the efficiency of Chinese banking industry, this chapter further 
examines the relationship between market structure, market conditions in general, 
bank conduct and performance at the Chinese provincial level. Mainland China 
consists of thirty-one provincial-level administrative units which exhibit a significant 
degree of heterogeneity in natural endowments, economic structure, history of 
economic growth and development, and the current level of living standard. Insofar as 
commercial banking is concerned, there are also important differences in the history 
and current level of banking and financial development as well as banking market 
conditions. Therefore, it should come as no surprise that the financial performance of 
banking institutions also differs across the provincial units. Nevertheless, to the best 
of the authors‘ knowledge, there is so far little hard evidence on the inter-provincial 
differences in banking performance or what significant factors are underlying such, if 
any, differences. The present study aims to fill in this empirical gap in the research 
concerning the Chinese banking sector. 
 
Having measured the efficiency levels of individual provincial branches over the 
period from 1998 to 2003, a panel econometric model is now introduced to examine 
the statistical significance of the factors that explain banking efficiency on the basis of 
the economic literature on institutional complementarity, relative market power, 
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market structure, conduct and bank performance. The empirical results lend support to 
the institutional complementarity and the market concentration hypotheses whilst 
rejecting the relative market power hypothesis of performance in the Chinese 
state-owned commercial banking sector. The results also revealed deterioration in 
banking efficiency in the SOCBs over time despite the banking deregulation and 
consolidation efforts during the study period. 
 
This chapter is structured as follows. Section two highlights the heterogeneous and 
fragmented nature of the Chinese provincial economies and the banking markets. 
Section three discusses the datasets, models, estimation procedures and presents 
empirical findings. The final section concludes. 
 
6.2 Fragmentation of the Chinese provincial markets 
Although China has been a unified country since the first emperor of the Qin Dynasty 
conquered the whole country in 221BC, the Chinese history is beleaguered by 
constant wars and rebellions to seize power by different warlords and peasant leaders 
from different parts of China. Even during the intermittent periods of peace and 
prosperity, the local Chinese governments and officials always enjoyed a high level of 
autonomy in the administration and management of the political, social and economic 
affairs of their regions. The fiscal structure in particular has always been effectively a 
system of highly autonomous federal states under the rule of a central government. 
More recently, despite three decades of market-oriented economic reform that started 
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in 1979, this fragmented administrative structure remains largely intact even to the 
present day and constitutes perhaps the single most important barrier to the integration 
of the whole Chinese economy.  
 
Due to heterogeneity in administrative efficiency, economic geography and the history 
of economic development, and also as a legacy of central planning during the period 
from 1949 to 1979, noticeably different patterns of economic growth and economic 
structures have emerged in the thirty-one provincial units. Such differences in 
provincial administration, economic development and sectoral composition have 
important implications for the demand and supply conditions in the provincial 
banking markets. As a matter of fact, the big four SOCBs were initially set up in the 
early 1980s to serve the specific needs that arose from the implementation of the 
Chinese central government‘s economic plans in designated economic sectors. It was 
relatively recently that the big four SOCBs were commercialised and the central 
government-imposed sectoral restriction on banking operations was started to be 
removed in 1994. Therefore, as a legacy of the historical division of business scopes 
coupled with the very nature of banking that is based on information, reputation, trust 
and network between the bank and the clients, the SOCBs and their traditional 
business sectors are inextricably related. It is expected that the banking businesses and 
performance of CCB, ICBC, ABC and BOC will be related to the significance of 
construction, industrial, agricultural and external trade activities in each provincial 
unit. Moreover, the fragmented administrative system and the rampant practice of 
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protecting local interests through the enactment of local legislations and imposition of 
local fiscal schemes imply that there is very limited inter-provincial competition in 
banking businesses. Therefore, it is also expected that the supply of and demand for 
credit will depend on the level of economic development and standard of living within 
each province. Table 23 presents some key economic indicators that may play a 
significant role in shaping banking businesses and performance in the provincial units.  
 
Table 23. Key economic indicators for Chinese provinces (2003) 
 
GDP/pc 
 
(Yuan) 
GGR* 
 
(percent) 
CON/ 
GDP 
(percent) 
IND/ 
GDP 
(percent) 
AGR/ 
GDP 
(percent) 
DO**  
 
(percent) 
Beijing 25151.74 12.77 34.67 104.02 2.42 154.84 
Tianjin 24203.10 12.92 21.28 165.45 3.60 99.26 
Hebei 10486.18 10.81 10.99 80.42 13.50 10.47 
Shanxi 7412.12 9.32 21.99 99.30 10.15 10.42 
Inner Mongolia 9036.84 12.67 11.98 63.04 15.62 10.89 
Liaoning 14257.81 9.12 16.94 101.84 8.29 36.57 
Jilin 9330.25 10.14 13.75 105.54 17.38 20.18 
Heilongjiang 11612.06 9.43 9.94 65.69 11.35 9.96 
Shanghai 36533.08 11.16 19.13 165.46 1.57 148.81 
Jiangsu 16825.73 11.64 22.43 144.75 7.87 75.50 
Zhejiang 20076.72 13.58 33.29 136.93 5.64 54.12 
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Anhui 6197.16 7.24 15.68 65.70 15.56 12.40 
Fujian 15000.49 9.47 10.50 94.68 8.92 55.90 
Jiangxi 6653.28 8.98 12.70 52.02 13.56 7.40 
Shandong 13628.42 11.72 11.91 123.67 12.86 29.72 
Henan 7291.39 10.15 9.00 76.12 16.14 5.54 
Hubei 9000.30 7.86 16.16 74.61 13.58 7.83 
Hunan 6962.13 7.66 17.65 56.30 14.48 6.66 
Guangdong 17130.36 11.51 11.13 157.89 6.25 172.29 
Guangxi 5631.32 7.57 10.30 52.52 18.31 9.65 
Hainan 8277.77 8.88 5.87 49.70 22.76 28.07 
Chongqing 7190.29 9.57 26.05 70.56 12.00 9.55 
Sichuan 6271.34 8.83 22.46 62.08 14.75 8.55 
Guizhou 3504.47 10.03 15.65 72.09 20.31 6.01 
Yunnan 5634.18 6.59 16.10 63.16 17.60 8.96 
Tibet 6829.03 15.16 15.90 11.59 13.70 7.17 
Shaanxi 6501.10 11.71 18.36 78.35 13.94 9.61 
Gansu 5011.25 8.47 17.15 87.96 21.14 8.42 
Qinghai 7310.04 12.15 19.15 63.53 7.62 7.20 
Ningxia 6640.36 11.18 28.04 91.56 14.05 14.04 
Xinjiang 9708.68 11.07 17.03 59.28 25.71 21.03 
*GDP growth rate 1998-2003 
** Degree of openness 
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Note: the figures are derived from the Chinese Statistical Yearbook (Chinese State 
Bureau of Statistics, 2004). Unless stated otherwise in the table, all the figures are for 
the year 2003. CON/GDP, IND/GDP and AGR/GDP are the ratios of construction 
output, industrial output and agricultural output to provincial GDP respectively. The 
degree of openness is measured by the ratio of total imports and exports to GDP. 
 
As is clear from Table 23, apart from some slight inter-provincial variations, the 
average growth rate in GDP for the period of 1998-2003 was generally very fast 
across all the provinces. However, in terms of GDP per capita, the differences across 
the provinces were substantial, with the highest GDP per capita (in Shanghai) being 
over ten times the lowest figure (in Guizhou which lies in the south-west of China) in 
2003. In general, those provinces in the eastern coast and the big cities enjoyed a 
substantially higher living standard than the interior parts of China. Table 1 shows 
further evidence of significant differences in the extent of industrialisation, 
construction and agricultural activities across the provinces, again highlighting the 
contrast between the eastern coast and the interior parts with the former achieving a 
higher level of industrialisation than the later. It is no surprise that the more affluent 
provincial units, due to their strategic trading positions by the sea and rivers, were 
also considerably more open to international trade, as is shown by the indicator of 
openness in the last column. Therefore, banking businesses conducted in foreign 
currencies are also expected to be located primarily in those big cities and coastal 
provinces. 
167 
 
 
Insofar as the banking sector is concerned, individual provincial banking markets as 
well as the whole Chinese banking sector have been fundamentally shaped by 
economic history and the process of economic reform that started in 1979
9
. Compared 
with the economic reform programmes in the former Soviet Bloc countries in the 
1990s, a strikingly distinctive feature of the Chinese economic reform over the past 
three decades is its gradualist approach. Although banks of alternative ownership 
structure, such as private or joint-stock ownership between local governments and 
corporations, have emerged and indeed grown faster than the state-owned sector, 
these tend to be located almost exclusive in a few big cities and have very limited 
geographic coverage. Currently, apart from the SOCBs, there are twelve national 
shareholding banks, more than one hundred city commercial banks, and tens of 
thousands of urban and rural credit unions in the Chinese banking sector. These latter 
types of banks compete aggressively with the SOCBs in the household retail banking 
market as well as the business banking market for the non-state-owned and local 
collectively-owned industries and businesses, particularly the fast growing small- to 
medium-sized enterprises (SMEs). Nevertheless, these banks still lack the 
infrastructure and the banking network to compete with the SOCBs on a level playing 
field. 
 
                                                        
9 The process of bank reform in China has been covered extensively in the literature (see e.g., Li, et al., 
2001; Chen, et. al., 2005; Fu and Heffernan, 2007; Lin and Zhang, 2008). A detailed discussion 
concerning specifically the reform process of the Chinese SOCBs is given in Chapter 2. 
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More recently, although the Chinese domestic banking market was also open to 
international competition from foreign banking institutions, the dominant mode of 
entry into the Chinese market by foreign banks was strategic alliance or joint venture 
with the SOCBs. It is little wonder that despite the long process of economic reform 
which encompasses reform in banking and financial services, the big four state-owned 
commercial banking groups still dominated the banking market in every provincial 
unit. For example, despite the continuous fall due to rising competition from other 
banks in recent years, the share of total provincial deposits and loans by the big four 
groups still ranged from 45 percent to 94 percent, with an average of 60 percent in 
2003 (the figures are derived from various issues of the ACFB 1998-2004). Table 24 
presents a number of measures that capture the central features of the individual 
provincial banking markets. 
 
Table 24. Banking market characteristics for Chinese provinces (2003) 
 
Deposit/ 
GDP 
(percent) 
Loan/ 
GDP 
(percen
t) 
 
L/D* 
(perc
ent) 
CR4 
(perc
ent) 
Branch density 
CCB ICBC ABC BOC 
Beijing 558.98 329.17 0.59 0.56 0.07 0.69 0.22 0.13 
Tianjin 165.98 154.89 0.93 0.61 0.08 0.58 0.40 0.20 
Hebei 114.47 81.32 0.71 0.59 0.05 0.29 0.29 0.09 
Shanxi 193.42 147.80 0.76 0.58 0.06 0.31 0.35 0.11 
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Inner Mongolia 98.97 91.67 0.93 0.68 0.09 0.55 0.42 0.11 
Liaoning 158.40 126.91 0.80 0.45 0.06 0.45 0.28 0.14 
Jilin 136.64 135.67 0.99 0.59 0.05 0.51 0.39 0.11 
Heilongjiang 112.34 92.40 0.82 0.64 0.07 0.27 0.32 0.09 
Shanghai 277.06 210.66 0.76 0.51 0.13 0.47 0.19 0.08 
Jiangsu 129.87 96.64 0.74 0.56 0.10 0.27 0.26 0.13 
Zhejiang 164.08 132.18 0.81 0.50 0.10 0.34 0.23 0.14 
Anhui 107.62 88.09 0.82 0.59 0.06 0.18 0.20 0.06 
Fujian 107.19 78.75 0.73 0.57 0.07 0.35 0.31 0.12 
Jiangxi 116.88 91.71 0.78 0.64 0.05 0.29 0.32 0.09 
Shandong 103.23 88.21 0.85 0.47 0.05 0.24 0.22 0.09 
Henan 110.36 93.86 0.85 0.53 0.07 0.17 0.29 0.07 
Hubei 114.04 97.70 0.86 0.57 0.09 0.25 0.27 0.10 
Hunan 102.93 84.09 0.82 0.60 0.05 0.22 0.20 0.07 
Guangdong 217.53 147.71 0.68 0.51 0.13 0.34 0.28 0.14 
Guangxi 122.43 86.61 0.71 0.69 0.06 0.22 0.26 0.06 
Hainan 156.54 130.30 0.83 0.71 0.10 0.26 0.35 0.11 
Chongqing 156.09 132.26 0.85 0.51 0.04 0.56 0.20 0.07 
Sichuan 135.84 111.74 0.82 0.63 0.03 0.07 0.24 0.06 
Guizhou 141.39 127.35 0.90 0.68 0.04 0.16 0.17 0.03 
Yunnan 155.70 122.70 0.79 0.64 0.05 0.19 0.25 0.03 
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Tibet 174.65 78.61 0.45 0.94 0.07 NA NA 0.07 
Shaanxi 197.20 151.52 0.77 0.58 0.05 0.27 0.27 0.06 
Gansu 166.61 134.40 0.81 0.66 0.08 0.40 0.33 0.05 
Qinghai 139.50 145.30 1.04 0.75 0.12 0.39 0.41 0.07 
Ningxia 197.59 179.44 0.91 0.61 0.14 0.47 0.37 0.11 
Xinjiang 144.34 114.55 0.79 0.62 0.14 0.38 0.39 0.09 
* Loan/Deposit ratio 
Note: the figures are derived from Almanac of China‘s Finance and Banking (China 
Finance Society, 1998-2004). CR4 is the big four‘s share of total provincial loans and 
deposits. The density of bank branches is measured as the number of branches per 
10000 people. 
 
The significant differences in industrialisation, economic development and living 
standards across the provinces are also reflected in the extent of banking development 
in the provinces which is measured by the deposits/GDP and loans/GDP ratios. As is 
expected, the big cities and coastal provinces enjoyed significantly greater extents of 
banking development than the interior parts. Especially in big cities like Beijing and 
Shanghai, the concentration of banking assets and liabilities not only reflected the 
uneven regional distribution of income and wealth, but also significant externality 
effects arising from spatial agglomeration in the banking sector as well as the 
complementarity effects between banking and non-banking firms, as we discuss in 
more detail in the next section.  
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The loans/deposits ratio reflects the source and cost of financing for banking 
operations. During the study period, the traditional businesses of deposit-taking and 
lending still constituted the bulk of the SOCBs‘ banking operations and contributed to 
around 90 percent of their total commercial income. Due to the still primitive nature 
of China‘s capital markets, deposits were the dominant source, and the cheapest form, 
of bank finance. Column (4) in Table 24 shows that for the majority of the provinces 
the loans/deposits ratio varied between 70 to 80 percent, although the more affluent 
cities and provinces had noticeably lower ratios, reflecting their access to wider 
sources of funding.  
 
With only a few exceptions, the big four SOCBs dominated the bank deposits and 
loans markets, as revealed by the big-four banks‘ market concentration ratios in the 
total deposit and loan market in each province in Column (5). In terms of the banking 
infrastructure as measured by the bank branch density, two groups, i.e. the ICBC and 
the ABC enjoyed unrivalled dominance in every provincial unit. There were also 
variations across the provincial units with the big cities and coastal provinces being 
served with a much higher branch density than the interior parts. 
 
Having depicted a general picture of the inter-provincial differences in the economic 
and banking market conditions, the next section presents details of the empirical 
investigation process concerning selection of variables, data, estimation and the 
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findings. 
 
6.3 Variables, data, estimation and results 
In selecting the explanatory variables, this study started with an as large as possible 
set of variables that are informed by the literature and also allowed by data availability. 
At the provincial level, the variables include living standard as measured by GDP per 
capita (variable name ‗gdppc‘), extent of banking development as measured by the 
ratio of total deposits and loans to GDP (‗ldgdp‘), economic structure as measured by 
industrial, agricultural, construction outputs and foreign trade to GDP ratios (‗indgdp‘, 
‗aggdp‘, ‗congdp‘ and ‗iegdp‘). Market concentration is measured by the 
Herfindahl-Hirschman Index (‗hi‘). The branch-specific variables include each 
branch‘s share of total provincial deposits and loans (‗dlshare‘), scale of operations 
(‗small‘, ‗medium‘, and ‗large‘, with ‗small‘ referring to branches that have less than 
or equal to 80percent of the mean size of deposits and loans, ‗medium‘ being greater 
than 80percent and less than 120percent of the mean size, and ‗large‘ being greater 
than or equal to 120percent of the mean size), branch density (‗dense‘), and 
innovation in other banking business as proxied by the number of cash cards issued 
(‗card‘). The institutional complementarity mechanisms are captured by the 
interaction terms between banking groups and their traditional business sectors 
(‗icbcind‘, ‗abcag‘, ‗ccbcon‘ and ‗bocie‘). Moreover, dummy variables have also been 
introduced to categorise individual branches into corresponding banking groups (‗ccb‘, 
‗icbc‘, ‗abc‘ and ‗boc‘) as well as for individual time periods (from ‗t98‘ to ‗t03‘). 
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Before details of the econometric study are discussed, Table 25 presents some 
summary statistics for the dependent variable and the key explanatory variables.  
 
Table 25 Summary statistics of the key variables (1998-2003) 
Variables Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
efficiency 0.541653 0.2229957 0.15 1 
gdppc 8823.326 5909.868 2301.476 36533.08 
ldgdp 2.514629 1.048501 1.350519 8.881549 
indgdp 78.3793 31.3375 11.5935 165.4637 
aggdp 16.18576 7.102852 1.570427 34.68885 
congdp 14.53428 6.073331 4.826208 34.66605 
iegdp 28.09707 39.16553 3.164371 172.2889 
card 479.4641 944.0653 0.4230807 10636.23 
dlshare 0.1621911 0.0700471 0.0274543 0.7896509 
hi 0.1724555 0.0523217 0.1435884 0.6969885 
dense 0.2212188 0.153633 0.0185579 0.7940298 
 
Clearly, there were significant variations in every aspect of the economic, market and 
branch conditions across the provinces. A typical potential econometric problem in 
panel models is that of multi-collinearity. In this case, a number of explanatory 
variables such as ‗gdppc‘, ‗indgdp‘, and ‗iegdp‘, are clearly correlated, as revealed by 
the pair-wise correlation coefficients. However, whether or not such correlations 
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cause a significant multi-collinearity problem depends on the condition number of all 
the explanatory variables, as is discussed in Greene (2003, p.57-58). Thus, the test for 
multi-collinearity is a major issue in the empirical work. Another empirical issue 
concerns the selection of the final model out of three choices: ‗pooled‘, ‗fixed-effects‘ 
and ‗random-effects‘ models.  
 
The econometric estimation strategy is as follows. The initial model started with all 
the explanatory variables listed above and the number of explanatory variables was 
reduced round by round. In every round, the Breusch-Pagan Lagrange Multiplier test 
was conducted and the pooled regression model was rejected on each occasion in 
favour of the individual effects models. Therefore, model selection was restricted to 
the ‗fixed-effects‘ and ‗random-effects‘ models. The Hausman procedure was 
followed for this purpose. Indeed, the Hausman procedure, together with the condition 
number for testing the significance of the multi-collinearity problem as well as the 
p-values for the estimated coefficients, were used as the criteria for dropping 
explanatory variables from each round of estimation. For example, if the presence of a 
variable caused the value of the condition number to rise and rendered Hausman‘s χ2 
test statistic negative as well as the p-value showed statistical insignificance, then it 
was dropped from the next round of estimation. For the final set of explanatory 
variables, the ‗random-effects‘ model was chosen as best suited for explaining the 
inter-provincial differences in the technical efficiencies of the 122 provincial-level 
bank branches. Details of the final estimated ‗random-effects‘ model using Stata are 
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presented in Table 5 below. In the final model, as the condition number of the matrix 
formed by all the explanatory variables is substantially below 20, multi-collinearity is 
not a serious concern here. The Hausman‘s test statistic strongly suggests the 
acceptance of the null hypothesis that the individual effects are uncorrelated with the 
other explanatory variables. Thus the random-effects model is justified. 
 
Table 26 GLS ‘random-effects’ model of inter-provincial banking efficiency 
(1998-2003) 
Random-effects GLS regression No. of observations: 732 
Group variable (i): branch Number of groups: 122 
R
2
: within = 0.2174 Obs per group: min:  6 
 Between = 0.4033   mean: 6.0 
 Overall = 0.3218   max: 6 
Random effects u_i ~ Gaussian Wald chi2(20) = 243.56 
Corr(u_i, X) = 0 (assumed) Prob > chi2 = 0.0000 
 
efficiency: Coef. (std. error) t P>|t| 
Gdppc 
0.0000152 3 
(0.16e-06) 
4.83  0.000 
Indgdp 
-0.0022042  
(.000593) 
-3.72  0.000 
Aggdp -0.0093521  -3.89  0.000 
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(0.0024015) 
Ccb 
-0.1735126  
(.0605697) 
-2.86  0.004 
Icbc 
-0.1403767  
(0.0831014) 
-1.69  0.091 
Abc 
-0.1381651  
(0.0744821) 
-1.86 0.064 
Card 
0.0000298  
(8.28e-06) 
3.59  0.000 
Icbcind 
0.0031699  
(0.0008819) 
3.59  0.000 
Abcag 
0.0138489  
(0.0035822) 
3.87  0.000 
Ccbcon 
0.0094854  
(0.0034834) 
2.72  0.006 
Bocie 
0.0014172  
(0.0006612) 
2.14  0.032 
t99 
-0.0523852  
(0.016143) 
-3.25  0.001 
t00 
-0.0569385  
(0.0162115) 
-3.51  0.000 
t02 -0.0910774  -5.12  0.000 
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(0.0177963) 
t03 
-0.0805477  
(0.0219386) 
-3.67  0.000 
Medium 
-0.0647546  
(0.0204688) 
-3.16  0.002 
Large 
-0.0900923  
(0.0233075) 
-3.87  0.000 
Hi 
0.430518  
(0.1401125) 
3.07  0.002 
Dense 
-0.3392643  
(0.1068837) 
-3.17  0.002 
Dlshare 
0.0855283  
(0.1890835) 
0.45  0.651 
_cons 
0.7372969  
(0.077269) 
9.54  0.000 
 
sigma_u 0.10710337  
sigma_e 0.13468624  
Rho 0.38738755  (fraction of variance due to u_i) 
Hausman test, 
chi-2(15) : 
5.78  
Condition number 4.289522  
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Clearly, the standard of living (‗gdppc‘) has a significant and positive impact on 
banking efficiency, whereas the extent of industrialisation and the share of agriculture 
in the economy have significant and negative impacts. The extent of banking 
development and the shares of construction and external trade activities do not have 
statistically significant impacts and cause the collinearity problem to worsen; hence 
these variables are dropped from the final model. The negative impacts of 
industrialisation and share of agriculture deserve closer examination, since these 
variables also enter the model through the interaction terms with two banking groups, 
ICBC and ABC. When such interaction terms are also considered, the marginal 
impact of industrialisation on banking efficiency differs between banking groups: it is 
positive (0.00097) for ICBC but negative (-0.0022) for the other groups. Likewise, the 
marginal impact of the share of agriculture on banking efficiency is positive (0.0045) 
for ABC but negative (-0.00935) for the other groups. Therefore, industrialisation 
only benefits ICBC but adversely affects the efficiency of the other banking groups, 
whilst a larger share of agriculture benefits ABC but reduces the efficiency of the 
other groups. Combined with the significant and positive coefficients before the other 
interaction terms (‗ccbcon‘ and ‗bocie‘), it is strikingly clear that, even after years of 
reform and banking deregulation, there still exist strong complementarities between 
the banking groups and their traditional business sectors which they were initially set 
up to serve.  
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The results also lend support to the traditional SCP hypothesis whilst rejecting the 
RMP hypothesis. The extent of market concentration is positively and statistically 
significantly related to banking efficiency, but individual branches‘ market shares 
have a positive but statistically insignificant impact on banking efficiency. Moreover, 
the interaction term between individual market shares and market concentration is 
also insignificant (and had to be dropped from the final model due to 
multi-collinearity offence). Taking the results together, it is clear that, ceteris paribus, 
the more concentrated the market, the higher the big four‘s technical efficiency, and 
vice versa. However, individual provincial branches are not necessarily more efficient 
in more concentrated markets or have higher market shares. A possible explanation of 
this finding is that in a more concentrated provincial banking market, it is easier for 
the four groups to collude in non-price competition and focus on the areas and sectors 
of businesses in which each group has traditionally established a comparative 
advantage through the long-established networks with clients and the accumulated 
‗soft‘ information about their credit demand and supply conditions.  
 
Concerning the scale of banking operations, there is significant evidence of scale 
inefficiency. Compared with the ‗small‘ branches that are used as the reference group, 
both the ‗medium‘ and ‗large‘ branches have a negative impact on banking efficiency. 
Therefore, on average the provincial SOCB branches were operating at a 
beyond-optimal level of scale. Not surprisingly, innovation to develop new businesses 
by branches improves efficiency whilst a rise in branch density reduces efficiency. 
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Insofar as the banking groups are concerned, compared with BOC that is used as the 
reference group, the other three groups and CCB in particular were less efficient. A 
somewhat disturbing finding is that compared with 1998, banking efficiency was 
significantly lower in all the subsequent years apart from 2001, suggesting a general 
deteriorating efficiency performance of the SOCBs over the years of further banking 
reform.  
 
6.4 Conclusions 
The present study represents a first attempt to empirically measure and explain the 
inter-provincial differences in banking efficiency of the Chinese state-owned 
commercial banking groups across the provincial units in recent years. Not 
surprisingly, substantial differences in technical efficiency have emerged across the 
provincial branches, although the general level of efficiency was very low in the 
whole state-owned banking sector during the study period. Empirical tests of 
alternative explanations of bank performance lend strong support to the institutional 
complementarity and the traditional structure-conduct-performance hypotheses and in 
the mean time reject the relative market power hypothesis. It appears that the SOCBs 
benefit from a concentrated market structure and the strong relationship with the 
traditionally established areas of businesses. Such relationships confer a significant 
advantage on a particular banking group at the expense of the other groups. Some 
other disturbing findings have emerged concerning the deterioration in banking 
efficiency over time and the existence of a significant problem of scale inefficiency. 
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Therefore, further banking reform efforts should particularly encourage competition 
in all dimensions, including inter-bank, inter-province and inter-business sector. 
Moreover, further consolidation of bank branches is generally required to improve 
scale efficiency.  
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Chapter VII. Conclusions 
 
7.1 Summary 
The thesis adopted both qualitative and quantity methods to examine the efficiency 
and competitiveness of Chinese state-owned commercial banks. The qualitative study 
was carried out under the framework that represents a synthesis of the traditional 
Structure-Conduct-Performance paradigm about market conditions, firm conduct and 
performance. The quantity study adopted Data Envelopment Analysis (DEA) to 
measure the efficiency levels of the State-owned commercial banks at provincial level 
during the period 1998-2003. Then the thesis carried out an econometric investigation 
into the sources of efficiency for these provincial branches. 
 
The qualitative research adopted the SCP paradigm to examine the structure and 
performance of the Chinese commercial banks. After thirty years‘ painful reform on 
banking system, the state-owned commercial banks have gained limited autonomy in 
their business scope. Over the past decade, capital injections, transfer of bad debts and 
the introduction of foreign investors have mended the pace of the reform of the 
Chinese banking system. The major Chinese commercial banks have improved their 
capital and asset structures remarkably up to 2007. Three of the four SOCBs, ICBC, 
CCB and BOC, have changed their ownership structure and have successfully floated 
on Hong Kong and Shanghai stock exchanges. They are now the world's largest three 
banking group by market value. Their performance is regarded as successful, 
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particularly in the current context of global financial crisis since 2007, although the 
seemingly impressive performance was heavily dependent on the support from both 
the central and local governments. The main thrust of banking reform has been 
directed at the competitive capabilities and efficiency within individual banking 
groups of the SOCBs. Significant amounts of resources and efforts have been 
deployed to increase their business scope, improve banking and financial services, 
strengthen the internal management and risk control systems, and increase operational 
autonomy. It is high time that the consequences and efficacy of such reform 
programmes were objectively assessed, so that further policy measures can be 
effectively implemented to enhance the efficiency and competitiveness of the Chinese 
banking sector. 
 
The qualitative research also revealed that monetary policy is under control of the 
government. Academic studies showed that the adoption of monetary tool have 
minimal impact on the financial market. The key to understanding China‘s monetary 
policy is not to place the conduct of monetary policy in the general framework of 
regulating market incentives to prevent market failure in achieving economic 
efficiency, but to understand the government‘s orientation to prevent social and 
political instability that might be caused by a significant slowdown in the economy 
and the associated mass unemployment problem. Moreover, the banking supervision 
regime in China has improved significantly over the examining period. Nevertheless, 
there are still many problems in banking supervision sector: the existing law system 
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still lags behind the development of banking industry; the data base is not accurate 
and systematic; the on-site supervision lacks continuity and pertinence. 
 
The qualitative research also showed the degree of competition was increased during 
the examination period. However, the Chinese banks were still operating in a highly 
concentrated market. The improvement of financial performance in state-owned 
commercial banks was not driven by competition. The requirement of regulatory 
authority played a main role in this process, including transferring the bad debts to the 
asset management companies and injection of funds to improve the capital ratio. As 
the main competitors to the state-owned banks, the joint-stock commercial banks only 
took a small portion of the market share. The extent of competition in the Chinese 
banking market is fundamentally determined by the structure of the banking market, 
policy intervention and the historical and institutional factors underlying banking 
operations in China. 
 
The distribution of branch network and asset structure of the SOCBs make the SOCBs 
compete in the major central cities except Agriculture Bank. The bad debts, so-called 
―non-performing loans‖, in the SOCBs have been a long debate in Chinese banking 
sector. With the support of financial supervisory authorise, the bad debts were 
transferred to the asset management companies in 1998 and mid of 2000. Moreover, 
the China SAFE Investments (Huijin) injected US$ 79 billion foreign exchange 
reserves to recapitalise the SOCBs. Having been restructured, BOC, CCB and ICBC 
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floated in stock market and demonstrated an astonishing financial performance in 
recent years. After examined the market condition and financial performance, the 
study found out there was little intention or obligation for individual banking groups 
within the SOCB sector to pursue maximum profit as an operating objective. In fact, 
how successful the individual banks perform in the traditional markets for deposits 
and loans fundamentally determine their overall competitiveness and financial 
performance, particularly during the time period under investigation. 
 
As data on banking costs, revenues and net incomes is generally unavailable at the 
provincial level, the present study obtained values for total input efficiency, pure 
technical efficiency, scale efficiency and returns-to-scale characteristic for the SOCBs. 
By Applying Data Envelopment Analysis, the research found that there is a significant 
level of operational inefficiency for the SOCBs as a whole. The generally low level of 
efficiency was primarily due to the low pure technical efficiency. The benefits of 
reform started to be evident at the end of the period. For example, the pure technical 
efficiency started to improve for the whole sector in 2003, and the average scale 
efficiency remained steady from 0.9 in 1998 to 0.96 in 2003. 
 
For performance of the individual banking groups, BOC was found to be the leader in 
operational efficiency in the first half of the period but its leading position was taken 
over by ICBC in the second half. The performance of ICBC in the second period was 
particularly noticeable as this group was the worst performer in the first three years. 
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The other groups showed a mixed fortune over the period. CCB had the lowest score 
for 3 out of the 6 years and was at the bottom of the league table in 2003. ABC came 
second in the table in the first four years but its position dropped to the bottom in 
2002 and second from the bottom in 2003. 
 
Among the 122 examined provincial branches, just over 10 percent operated at an 
efficient scale. Around half of branches operated at decreasing-returns-to-scale, 
suggesting that these branches were operating at a scale that is above the most 
productive level. Given the dominance of interest income in banks‘ total revenue and 
the very limited autonomy by the banks to change their interest rates, it can be 
deduced that these branches were not operating at the profit-maximising scales and 
thus could benefit from a reduction in their scales of operation. The problem was 
particularly acute for CCB and ABC throughout the period. ICBC also experienced a 
significant problem of DRS in every year apart from 2003. In contrast, the most 
significant problem for BOC over the entire period was IRS, thus there was scope for 
many branches in this group to increase the scale of operation. Second, related to the 
problem of above-optimal operational scales, there was also a significant problem of 
surplus inputs of branches, employees and bank cards. Relatively speaking, ICBC had 
the least surpluses whilst CCB and ABC had the most surpluses in all the inputs. The 
problem of surplus labour was particularly severe for ABC. 
 
It is clear that for the whole sector of SOCBs, efficiency at the local provincial level 
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declined but efficiency at the group level generally improved over the entire period. 
Moreover, efficiency at the group level dominated efficiency at the local level and the 
gap was rising in recent years, suggesting that in general the source of inefficiency 
was from the local level. Therefore, further efficiency gain can be obtained more 
effectively by targeting reform efforts at the micro/branch level than at the group level. 
Insofar as the individual banking groups are concerned, BOC was the most efficient at 
the group level. This is not really surprising given this group‘s significant exposure to 
international markets and foreign competition. Nevertheless, compared with the most 
efficient peers within the BOC group, the level of local efficiency was the lowest 
among the four banking groups. Again, this result was not really surprising as it is 
expected that those provinces in the interior parts of China were not as exposed to 
foreign-currency related businesses as their counterparts located in the east coastal 
provinces. In the remaining three groups, some interesting contrasts have emerged. 
Although ABC was not the worst performer in the first few years, it fared worst in the 
efficiency score by 2003. For CCB and ICBC, although these two groups compared 
unfavourably with the BOC in the first few years, they had become almost as efficient 
as BOC in 2002 and 2003. Therefore, ABC seemed to be particularly disadvantaged 
in its operational efficiency over the study period. At the local level, the level of 
inefficiency was very significant across all the banking groups, especially within the 
CCB group.  
 
The panel econometric model examined the statistical significance of the factors that 
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explain banking efficiency on the basis of qualitative research. The significant 
differences in industrialisation, economic development and living standards across the 
provinces are also reflected in the extent of banking development in the provinces 
which is measured by the deposits/GDP and loans/GDP ratios. As is expected, the big 
cities and coastal provinces enjoyed significantly greater extents of banking 
development than the interior parts. Especially in big cities like Beijing and Shanghai, 
the concentration of banking assets and liabilities not only reflected the uneven 
regional distribution of income and wealth, but also significant externality effects 
arising from spatial agglomeration in the banking sector as well as the 
complementarity effects between banking and non-banking firms. 
 
In the econometric estimation model, the ‗random-effects‘ model was chosen as best 
suited for explaining the inter-provincial differences. The model showed that the 
standard of living (income per head) has a significant and positive impact on banking 
efficiency, whereas the extent of industrialisation and the share of agriculture in the 
economy had significant and negative impacts. The result shows the SOCBs have 
been heavily relying on their traditional business with the SOEs and the policy loans 
to agriculture.  The extent of banking development and the shares of construction 
and external trade activities do not have statistically significant impacts. This shows 
the SOCBs needs to improve the business with the constructional and international 
companies. The marginal impact of industrialisation on banking efficiency differs 
between banking groups: it is positive for ICBC but negative for the other groups. 
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Likewise, the marginal impact of the share of agriculture on banking efficiency is 
positive for ABC but negative for the other groups. Therefore, industrialisation only 
benefits ICBC but adversely affects the efficiency of the other banking groups, whilst 
a larger share of agriculture benefits ABC but reduces the efficiency of the other 
groups. Combined with the significant and positive coefficients before the other 
interaction terms, it is strikingly clear that, even after years of reform and banking 
deregulation, there still exist strong complementarities between the banking groups 
and their traditional business sectors which they were initially set up to serve.  
 
The results supported the traditional SCP hypothesis whilst rejecting the RMP 
hypothesis. The extent of market concentration was positively and statistically 
significantly related to banking efficiency, but individual branches‘ market shares had 
a positive but statistically insignificant impact on banking efficiency. It is clear that, 
ceteris paribus, the more concentrated the market, the higher the big four‘s technical 
efficiency, and vice versa. However, individual provincial branches are not 
necessarily more efficient in more concentrated markets or have higher market shares. 
A possible explanation of this finding is that in a more concentrated provincial 
banking market, it is easier for the four groups to collude in non-price competition 
and focus on the areas and sectors of businesses in which each group has traditionally 
established a comparative advantage through the long-established networks with 
clients and the accumulated ‗soft‘ information about their credit demand and supply 
conditions.  
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Concerning the scale of banking operations, there is significant evidence of scale 
inefficiency. Compared with the ‗small‘ branches that are used as the reference group, 
both the ‗medium‘ and ‗large‘ branches have a negative impact on banking efficiency. 
Therefore, on average the provincial SOCB branches were operating at a 
beyond-optimal level of scale. Not surprisingly, innovation to develop new businesses 
by branches improves efficiency whilst a rise in branch density reduces efficiency. 
Insofar as the banking groups are concerned, compared with BOC that is used as the 
reference group, the other three groups and CCB in particular were less efficient. A 
somewhat disturbing finding is that compared with 1998, banking efficiency was 
significantly lower in all the subsequent years apart from 2001, suggesting a general 
deteriorating efficiency performance of the SOCBs over the years of further banking 
reform. 
 
7.2 Implications of the study and suggestions for further research 
This study represented a first attempt to empirically measure and explain the 
inter-provincial differences in banking efficiency of the Chinese state-owned 
commercial banking groups across the provincial units in recent years. A 
comprehensive theoretical framework has been built up to examine the 
competitiveness of Chinese banks from both between and within banking group 
perspectives. 
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The qualitative research combed out the evolution process of the Chinese banking 
industry. The question imposed in this chapter has been and will be a constant 
harassment for both researchers and the policymakers. The Chinese government has 
taken a slow and cautious progress to improve the market conditions. 
 
For the management of the SOCBs, the low efficiency level may be rather 
uncomfortable reading. The decomposition analysis on the source of inefficiency from 
both within-group and between-group aspects for each state-owned commercial 
banking group has provided a clear and comprehensive investigation from both group 
and local level. This kind of information can enable policymakers and the 
management of SOCBs to target specific operational areas for further efficiency 
improvement. Clearly, further reform efforts should be primarily directed at the local 
provincial branch level through branch closures and consolidations to improve both 
technical and scale efficiencies. The traditional barriers that separate different banking 
groups from competing in each others‘ traditional business areas must be removed. 
The dominance of the big four SOCBs in each provincial banking market has to be 
addressed, so is the issue concerning inter-provincial (or spatial) competition among 
all the banks located in different geographical and administrative regions. 
 
The research methods adopted in the thesis can be expanded in future research 
programmes. The policymakers and management of the commercial banks have 
started to seek for more academic support before making decision in 2005. Current 
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research methods provide a solid research basis for future research. The prospects for 
further research in this area are exciting. The rising of Chinese state-owned 
commercial banks has become a significant event. The financial crisis broke out in 
2007 has made the western countries to re-evaluate their regulatory policies and 
banking system. A research on the full picture of the Chinese banking system will be 
interesting and necessary. The methods on evaluating the performance of banking 
institutions will be more comprehensive and localised. The Chinese researcher have 
realised that a modified theoretical framework incorporating banking risks is needed 
to evaluate the Chinese banking system on a more rigorous basis. Both bankers and 
researchers will put more emphasis on the regulation of financial institutions. Future 
research will be more practical. 
 
The data adopted in this research only exist up to 2003. The structure of data has been 
changed from ACFB 2005. The detailed information on loans, deposits, number of 
workers, number of branches, number of cards and card transactions at provincial 
level are unavailable for most of the banking groups. The quantitative analysis has to 
stop up to 2003. These kinds of data must be available in the banking groups‘ 
database. Moreover, if data on bank cost, income and profit are made available, then 
alternative measures of banking efficiency such as x-efficiency in cost or profit can be 
implemented. Moreover, such measures of efficiency can again be subject to rigorous 
econometric analysis to reveal the significant factors that underlie the inter-group and 
inter-provincial efficiency differences. 
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In addition, based on the current research, more accurate measures on market risk will 
be significant for the management of the Chinese commercial banks. This will help 
the banks to reduce system risk and further improve their financial performance. 
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